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Abstract
This thesis consists of three parts. All chapters are centered around the behavioral
decision making and business model innovation. In the first essay, we study a supply
chain with a supplier selling products to a retailer who is boundedly rational. Under
this setting, we study the impacts of the retailer’s bounded rationality on the supplier’s
choice of contract and the supply chain efficiency. We develop a behavioral model that
incorporates the human retailers bounded rationality in a supply chain setting. We then
conduct a series of laboratory experiments to test whether the model’s predictions are
still salient even when the supplier is not necessarily rational.
In contrast to a supply chain with a fully rational retailer, where a wholesale price
contract usually cannot perform better than more complicated nonlinear contracts, we
find that when the retailer is boundedly rational a wholesale price contract can dominate
commonly used nonlinear contracts such as buy-back and revenue sharing contracts. We
characterize the conditions under which a wholesale price contract outperforms more
sophisticated non-linear price contracts for the supplier. In both theoretical model and
the experiments, we find that a wholesale price contract is more likely to be implemented
by the supplier when the supply chain profit margin is low, the retailer is less rational,
the demand variance is high, and the retailer’s reservation value is high. The results
can explain the prevalence of wholesale price contract in business practice when the
rationality of retailers cannot always be guaranteed. We also find that the retailer’s
bounded rationality plays a more important role in determining supply profit than the
supplier’s bounded rationality.
In the second essay, we consider a setting which involves a service provider who
sells access to a service or a product to a unit mass of heterogenous consumers. Such s
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business model is gaining popularity in recent years. With this growth comes opportu-
nities for peer-to-peer trading marketplaces to emerge. However, there is a debate on
whether or not peer-to-peer trading of excess capacity is beneficial to service providers
and consumers. The second essay in this thesis aims to shed light on this debate and
identifies conditions under which the existence of such marketplaces can be a win-win
situation for all parties. We develop a game-theoretic model in which consumers par-
ticipate in a simultaneous coordination game. Consumers are strategic and take into
account the opportunity of purchasing or selling extra capacity on the trading market.
Our model captures the heterogeneity of consumers’ demand and the service provider’s
ability to modify service plans in view of this trading among consumers. We compare
equilibrium outcomes with and without trading and show that outcomes with regard to
service provider profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare are crucially dependent on
service cost and trading price. A service provider would benefit from trading as long as
the trading price is not too low (a low trading price encourages more consumers to opt
for the low plan) and the service cost is not too high (a high service cost makes increased
consumption due to trading too costly). A trading price that is too low can decrease
consumer surplus and social welfare. Hence, a social planner would be interested in
inducing a moderate or high trading price. In settings where the service provider can
modify prices, consumers are no longer guaranteed to benefit from trading. In this case,
trading can hurt consumers if the trading price is either sufficiently high (resulting in
consumers paying a higher price for the higher plan) or sufficiently low (resulting in
less consumption because more consumers opt for the low plan). Our results provide
guidance to service providers, consumers, and policy makers as to when peer-to-peer
trading may or may not be beneficial. The results highlight the important interplay
between trading price and cost of service in determining various outcomes. For policy-
makers, the results can be useful in pointing out when such trading improves outcomes
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for consumers or social welfare and to potential policy levers that could be deployed to
affect outcomes.
Finally, in the last essay, we study the interaction between information asymmetry
and the reciprocity in a financial crowdfunding setting. Most of the crowdfunding
platforms encourage entrepreneurs to tap into their social network and bring investors
from their social networks to their crowdfunding campaigns. This is done with the
intention of creating the early momentum which appears to be the key to running a
crowdfunding campaign. However, the incentives and information of those investors who
are attracted to crowdfunding campaign from the entrepreneur’s social network could
be different from other investors who do not have a social tie with the entrepreneur. On
the other hand, the regular investors do not have a social tie with the entrepreneur and
their sole investment motivation is financial. In the last essay of this thesis, we develop
a signaling game to better understand the interaction between the reciprocity and the
information flow in a financial crowdfunding setting. Our main result indicates that
the reciprocity may create a situation in which the informed investor (those from the
entrepreneur’s social network) cannot signal their type via distorting her investment.
vi
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6and the reciprocity in a financial crowdfunding setting. Most of the crowdfunding
platforms encourage entrepreneurs to tap into their social network and bring investors
from their social networks to their crowdfunding campaigns. This is done with the
intention of creating the early momentum which appears to be the key to running a
crowdfunding campaign. However, the incentives and information of those investors who
are attracted to crowdfunding campaign from the entrepreneur’s social network could
be different from other investors who do not have a social tie with the entrepreneur. On
the other hand, the regular investors do not have a social tie with the entrepreneur and
their sole investment motivation is financial. In the last essay of this thesis, we develop
a signaling game to better understand the interaction between the reciprocity and the
information flow in a financial crowdfunding setting. Our main result indicates that
the reciprocity may create a situation in which the informed investor (those from the
entrepreneur’s social network) cannot signal their type via distorting her investment.
Chapter 1
Is Simplicity the Ultimate
Sophistication?
1.1 Introduction
The emerging literature in behavioral and experimental economics has acknowledged
that people have limited cognitive abilities in optimizing their performances (Simon,
1955). In particular, human decision makers may deviate from the the optimal decision
and exhibit errors in making decisions (Su, 2008; Wu and Chen, 2014). In behavioral op-
erations management, numerous experiments have been conducted to verify the finding
that a human newsvendor facing uncertain demand may not be able to place the optimal
order quantity as predicted by the normative theory. The non-optimizing behavior in
this chapter is referred to as boundedly rational.
The literature on supply chain contracts has suggested adopting more complicated
non-linear contracts, instead of simple wholesale price contracts, to align the incentives
of a rational retailer with that of the supply chain. Two most common contracts of
this kind are buy-back and revenue sharing contracts. Despite of the praise of those
7
8complicated forms of contracts in theory, simple wholesale price contracts are still com-
monplace in many businesses. Our main goal is to address such a puzzle by incorporating
a retailer’s boundedly rational behavior in the supply chain contracting game. In par-
ticular, we adapt a behavioral newsvendor order quantity model from the behavioral
operations literature in a standard two echelon supply chain involving one supplier and
one retailer, and examine if this would make an impact on a supplier’s choice of contract.
In the case that the retailer is fully rational, the retailer tends to order less than
the supply chain optimal level of inventory under wholesale price contracts. However,
the supply chain optimal order quantity can be achieved by nonlinear contracts such as
buy-back and revenue sharing contracts. Take buy-back contract as an example, there
exist pairs of buy back contracts (w, b) under which the supply chain is coordinated. In
addition, arbitrary supply chain profit allocation between the retailer and the supplier
can be achieved by changing the buy-back contract parameters. The supplier’s profit
increases with the buy-back price b. Given that the retailer has certain bargaining
power in a supply chain (e.g., the retailer has a reservation value or outsider option),
by choosing the buy-back contract at maximum buy-back price b, the manufacture will
extract all the surplus above reservation value from the supply chain. The same results
apply to revenue sharing contract or other non-linear contracts that coordinates the
supply chain.
However, the results may not continue to hold when the retailer is boundedly ratio-
nal. Specifically, when the retailer is boundedly rational, there is a systematic deviation
from the optimal order quantity and the order quantity place by the retailer may not
be the best response to a given contract. Our work addresses a few questions in supply
chain contracting with boundedly rational retailers. How does a supplier’s choice of
contract change when dealing with a boundedly rational newsvendor? Are nonlinear
contracts such as buy-back or revenue sharing contracts still preferred over wholesale
9price contracts when the retailer is boundedly rational? How is the supplier’s choice
of contract affected by factors such as profit margin, demand variance, the retailer’s
bounded rationality and reservation value? We find that, when facing a boundedly
rational retailer, the supplier may not necessarily gain more profit under a nonlinear
contract, such as buy-back contract or revenue sharing contract, than under a whole-
sale price contract. This is because, in contrast to the case of fully rational retailer, a
supplier may suffer more loss from the retailer’s biases under nonlinear contracts where
the supplier’s profit is affected by the retailer’s ex-post performance. Hence, the sup-
plier’s profit may not always increase with the buy-back price or revenue sharing rate.
As a result, there exists a wide parameter region in which a wholesale price contract
outperforms nonlinear contracts.
To further support our behavioral models prediction and show that the wholesale
price contract is indeed preferable for human suppliers, we conduct a series of con-
trolled laboratory experiments in which human subjects play the role of suppliers. We
develop hypotheses to test whether insights derived from our behavioral model sustain
in a controlled laboratory environment. Our experimental results show that changes in
human suppliers’ contractual preferences are consistent with what our behavioral model
predicts. That is, human suppliers are more likely to choose a wholesale price contract
when the retailer’s rationality is low, the profit margin is low, and demand variation is
high.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 is devoted to the relevant
literature; Section 1.3 presents our behavioral supply chain model with a boundedly ra-
tional retailer; Section 1.4 characterizes the conditions under which a wholesale price
contract performs better than buy-back contracts and investigates how the supplier’s
preference to a wholesale price contract changes under different situations; Section 1.5
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presents laboratory experiments that provide empirical support to our theoretical find-
ings. Section 1.6 revisits some of our assumptions and checks the robustness of our
results. Section 1.7 discusses implications and concludes this chapter.
1.2 Literature Review
There are two main areas of research related to our study: (1) supply chain contracting
(2) behavioral studies of newsvendor models, and (3) supply chain contracting. A classic
result in the supply chain contracting literature is that a wholesale price contract can-
not coordinate a supply chain involving different decision makers that aim to maximize
their own profits due to double marginalization. However, Pasternack (1985) shows that
a buyback contract can coordinate a supply chain and allows for an arbitrary profit di-
vision between a retailer and a supplier. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) propose a revenue
sharing contract and show that it can be equivalent to a buyback contract in terms of
allocating profits between a retailer and a supplier. Beside buyback and revenue-sharing
contracts, there are also other contracts aiming to resolve the misalignment of incentives
between supply chain partners when facing stochastic demand. Examples are penalty
(Lariviere, 1999) and sales-rebate (Taylor, 2002) that achieve supply chain coordination.
A comprehensive review of different coordination mechanisms for a supply chain with
a newsvendor retailer can be found in Lariviere (1999), Tsay et al. (1999), Kaya and
O¨zer (2011), and Cachon (2003). There are other studies that extend the classic coordi-
nation problem by considering alternative assumptions and richer problem setting such
as information sharing and feedback (Ha et al., 2011), competition (Tsay and Agrawal,
2000; Chen et al., 2008), leakage of information (Kong et al., 2013), and fairness (Cui
et al., 2007).
A common feature of the aforementioned literature is that retailers are fully rational
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in that they are able to make optimal decision to maximize their expected profits. How-
ever, the emerging literature in the behavioral operations management suggests that
this assumption does not necessarily hold. Evidences from laboratory experiments have
indicated that human subjects may exhibit different behavioral biases and their deci-
sions may deviate from the expected profit-maximizing order quantity(Sterman, 1989;
Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Croson and Donohue, 2002; Bendoly et al., 2006). Carlson and
O’Keefe (1969) report that subjects made ”almost every kind of mistake” in a newsven-
dor experiment with human subjects. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) observe that a
human newsvendor’s order quantities show a significant pull-to-center effect. That is,
a human newsvendor places an order quantity in between the theoretical prediction
and the mean demand, which results in an under-order of high-margin products and
an over-order of low-margin products. The robustness of this observation is repeatedly
confirmed by other studies, including Bostian et al. (2008), Kremer et al. (2010), Ho
et al. (2010), and Bolton and Katok (2008), among others.
While the above literature mostly focuses on investigating the behavioral bias itself,
in recent years, there is an emerging literature continues to explore the optimal design
of contracts incorporating human biases. Loch and Wu (2008) examine the effect of
social preferences such as relationship and status seeking under wholesale price contracts
chosen by wholesalers. O¨zer et al. (2011) explore trust and trustworthiness among
supply chain partners and show that the demand information can be effectively revealed
under wholesale price contracts, contradicting to the cheap talk theory that babbling
equilibrium always occurs. Ho et al. (2014) consider wholesale price contracts offered
to sequential retailers with fairness concern. Most of the aforementioned papers focus
on newsvendors’ behavior under wholesale price contracts. Recently, a few papers start
looking into subjects’ behavioral biases under more complicated forms of contracts.
Becker-Peth et al. (2013) find that subjects place significantly different order quantities
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under contracts with different parameters with the same critical ratio. They propose a
behavioral model which takes predicable irrationalities such as anchoring, loss aversion,
and mental accounting into account in the design of buyback contract and show that
their model can fit the experimental data accurately. Li et al. (2016) study the effect
of a newsvendor’s overconfidence in a competitive setting. They show that when profit
margin is high, overconfidence bias can lead to first-best outcome.
There are only a few papers that consider how a supplier’s choice of contract is
affected when a supply chain partner exhibits bounded rationality. Zhang et al. (2015)
examine the contract preferences of a loss-averse supplier and show that, from the point
of view of a loss-averse supplier, buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are not always
equivalent. Their theoretical results as well as experimental studies confirm that a
loss-averse supplier prefers buyback contracts in a low critical ratio setting and revenue-
sharing contracts in a high critical ratio setting. Although they examine the supplier’s
contract preferences, the retailer in their setting is rational and orders according to the
normative theory. In contrast to their setting where a retailer is fully rational, we focus
on the impact of a retailer’s bounded rationality on a supplier’s choice of contract.
A few papers examine the impact of a retailer’s behavioral bias on a supplier’s
contracting decision. (Kalkanci et al. (2011), Kalkancı et al. (2014), and Katok and Wu
(2009)). They find that the performance gap between the wholesale price contract and
more complex contracts is not as large as it is predicted by the normative theory. In
contrast, our work points out that a simple wholesale price contract can perform better
than the more complicated nonlinear contracts (e.g. buyback and revenue sharing)
believed to coordinate supply chain due to retailers’ bounded rationality.
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1.3 Model Description: Notations and Setup
We consider a dyadic supply chain with a rational supplier (he) and a boundedly rational
retailer (she) who sells a product at market price p. The downstream demand of the
product denoted by D, is random and is uniformly distributed according to D ∼ U(µ(1−
∆), µ(1 + ∆)), where µ is the mean of the demand and ∆ is the scale parameter that
captures the variations of the demand.
The supplier offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the retailer and, before the de-
mand is realized, the retailer places an order with the supplier. Production takes place
at the supplier at per unit cost c and the salvage value is normalized to zero. The
retailer observes the realized demand at the end of the period. In the following, we first
present the retailer’s behavioral ordering model in Section 1.3.1 and then introduce the
class of nonlinear contracts considered in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 The Behavioral Order Quantity from a Boundedly Rational Re-
tailer
In a classic newsvendor model with a fully rational retailer, the retailer always places
an optimal order quantity q∗ that maximizes her expected profit. The behavioral model
departs from standard newsvendor model in that the retailer is not always able to choose
the optimal order quantity. The deviation from the optimal newsvendor order quantities
observed in laboratory experiments is called as “pull-to-center” effect. Researchers
have suggested three different behavioral ordering models in the literature: demand
chasing (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al., 2008), mean-anchoring (Schweitzer
and Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al., 2008), and Logit choice (Su, 2008), which will be
incorporated in this chapter using a generic newsvendor behavioral ordering model.
The behavioral ordering model consists of the optimal order quantity and a behavioral
bias term. That is, under a given contract (w, u, v), the order quantity placed by a
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Table 1.1: Newsvendor Behavioral Order Quantity Heuristics
Ordering Heuristic Q = λ q∗ + (1− λ) q˜ generic model in §1.3.1
Mean-anchoring q˜ = µ see §1.6.1
Logit model q˜ ∼ TruncatedN (µN , σ2N ) see §1.6.1
Demand chasing q˜ ∼ U(µ(1−∆), µ(1 + ∆)) base model in §1.4
boundedly rational retailer is given by
Q(w, u, v) = λ q∗(w, u, v) + (1− λ) q˜, (1.1)
where q∗(w, u, v) is the optimal order quantity that satisfies P(q∗(w, u, v) ≥ D) =
cru
cru+c
r
o
= p−w+up−v+u . The term q˜ captures the deviation from the optimal order quan-
tity and λ is the retailer’s rationality coefficient, with λ = 1 representing a fully rational
retailer. As shown in Table 1.1, different behavioral models studied in the literature
could be considered as special cases of the behavioral order quantity model in (1.1).
For example, if q˜ is equal to the mean (or median) demand, then Q captures the mean-
anchoring decision heuristic; if q˜ follows a truncated Normal distribution with proper
mean and standard deviation, then Q expresses the behavioral order quantity induced
by the Logit choice model introduced in Su (2008) (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix A
for the formal statement and proof); and finally if q˜ follows the same distribution as
demands, then Q represents the demand chasing as it is seen from the supplier’s point
of view.
In the base model, we consider the demand chasing heuristic. That is, the retailer’s
behavioral orders is a weighted average of the optimal order quantity q∗ and a random
error q˜, where q˜ has a distribution that is identical to the demand’s distribution, i.e.,
q˜ ∼ U(µ(1 − ∆), µ(1 + ∆)). Therefore, this captures demand chasing as seen by the
supplier. Later, in Section 1.6.1, we will show that our results also hold for the other
two behavioral ordering models as well.
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For notation simplicity, let ξ = 2(p−w+up−v+u )− 1 = p−2w+u+vp−v+u and notice that the non-
negative (negative) values of ξ corresponds to high (low) margin scenarios. Under a
uniformly distributed demand, the optimal order quantity is q∗ = µ(1 + ∆ξ) and the
behavioral order quantity observed by the supplier is
Q(w, u, v) = λµ
(
1 + ∆ ξ
)
+ (1− λ)q˜, (1.2)
with E[Q] = µ(1 + λ∆ ξ). When λ = 1, the behavioral order quantity Q is reduced to
the classic newsvendor order quantity q∗ from a rational retailer, and when λ = 0, Q
is the order quantity from an irrational retailer whose decision is random and does not
respond to the contract parameter (w, u, v). When 0 < λ < 1, the retailer is boundedly
rational and the order quantity has a random term q˜. Hence, when deciding on the
contract to offer to the retailer, the supplier faces two different sources of randomness:
demand uncertainty and a noisy order quantity by the boundedly rational retailer.
Based on the behavioral order quantity model, we first derive the expected leftover
E[Q −D]+ and the service level P(Q ≥ D) as follows (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix
A).
E[Q−D]+ = µ∆
12
(
3 + 6λξ +
(
1 + λ
(−2 + λ+ 3λξ2) )) (1.3)
P(Q ≥ D) = 1 + λξ
2
(1.4)
Recall that ξ = 2(p−w+up−v+u ) − 1 ≥ 0 if and only if the critical ratio p−w+up−v+u ≥ 12 .
When the retailer is boundedly rational (i.e. λ < 1) and p−w+up−v+u ≥ 0.5, the retailer’s
probability of overstocking increases with the retailer’s rationality coefficient λ. In
contrast, if p−w+up−v+u < 0.5, the retailer’s service level decreases with the retailer’s bounded
rationality. In other words, a boundedly rational retailer is more likely to place an order
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larger (smaller) than the optimal order quantity q∗ when the profit margin is high (low).
These results are consistent with the “pull-to-center effect” observed in the literature.
1.3.2 Supply Chain Contract and Profit Functions
We introduce a general framework that covers a wide range of supply chain contracts
that are shown to effectively reduce the double marginalization in the supply chain
literature. Without providing the specific contract terms, we first represent the supply
chain profit, the retailer’s profit, and the supplier’s profit with underage and overage
costs. Later in this section we introduce a general contract framework which incorporate
a wide range of supply chain contracts as its special case.
Denote the retailer’s behavioral order quantity by Q and the random demand by D.
The supply chain profit can be written as
Πc = c
c
u E
[
Q
]− (ccu + cco)E[Q−D]+,
where ccu = p− c and cco = c are supply chain’s underage and overage costs, respectively.
In a similar way, the retailer’s profit (Πr) and the supplier’s profit(Πs) can be represented
as
Πr = c
r
u E
[
Q
]− (cru + cro)E[Q−D]+, and (1.5)
Πs = c
s
u E
[
Q
]− (csu + cso)E[Q−D]+. (1.6)
where cru(c
s
u) and c
r
o(c
s
o) are the retailer’s (supplier’s) underage and overage costs, re-
spectively. Since Πc = Πr + Πs always holds, we have c
s
u + c
r
u = c
c
u(= p − c) and
cso + c
r
o = c
c
o(= c). Many supply chain contracts can be phrased using the above frame-
work (see Table 1.2). For example, under a wholesale price contact the retailer’s un-
derage cost is cru = p − w and we have cru + cro = p. Furthermore, the manufacture’s
17
underage cost is csu = w − c and csu + cso = 0.
In order to reduce double marginalization, a nonlinear contract aims to increase
the retailer’s order quantity by (1) increasing the retailer’s underage cost and/or (2)
decreasing her overage cost. Using this framework, we can categorize supply chain
contracts into four mutually exclusive categories which cover a wide range of supply
chain contracts (see also Chen and O¨zer (2017)).
1. Downside-protection. A contract in this category reduces the retailer’s overage
cost compared to that of the wholesale price contract while the underage cost
stays unchanged. In our notations, under a downside-protection contract we have
cru = p− w and cro ≤ w. We define cro = w − v with v ≥ 0.
2. Upside-protection. A contract in this category increases the retailer’s underage
cost compared to that of the wholesale price contract while the overage cost stays
unchanged. In our notations, under an upside-protection contract we have cru ≥
p− w and cro = w. We define cru = p− w + u with u ≥ 0.
3. Two-sided protection. A contract in this category simultaneously reduces the re-
tailer’s overage cost and increases the retailer’s underage cost compared to those
of the wholesale price contract. In our notations, under a downside-protection
contract we have cru ≥ p − w and cro ≤ w where we define cru = p − w + u and
cro = w − v.
4. No-protection. A contract in this category does not change the retailer’s overage
and underage costs comparing to those of the wholesale price contract, i.e. cru =
p − w and cro = w. The contracts in this category, such as two-part tariff and
wholesale price, are usually used to share channel profit between the retailer and
the supplier without changing the inventory risk from one party to another.
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Let cru = p − w + u and cro = w − v and observe that retailer’s critical ratio is
cru
cru+c
r
o
= p−w+up−v+u . Here, w is the wholesale price, u captures the changes in the retailer’s
underage cost (comparing to its base value p−w), v indicates the changes in the retailer’s
overage cost (comparing to its base value w), and the sum of overage and underage costs
decreases by v−u from its base value p in the wholesale price contract. We now introduce
our general nonlinear contract (w, u, v). This contract increases (decreases) retailer’s
underage(overage) cost from its base value by u(v). According to (1.5) and (1.6) for a
contract (w, u, v), the retailer’s and the supplier’s profit functions can be written as
Πr(w, u, v) = (p− w + u)E
[
Q
]− (p− v + u)E[Q−D]+, (1.7)
and
Πs(w, u, v) = (w − c− u)E
[
Q
]− (v − u)E[Q−D]+, (1.8)
respectively, where Q denotes the retailer’s order quantity under the contract (w, u, v)
which is specified in Section 1.3.1. The equation (1.7) suggests that the supplier’s
profit does not depend on the ex-post demand if and only if u = v. A contact is a
wholesale price contract if and only if u = v holds1. On the other hand, manufacturer’s
profit under a nonlinear contract depends on ex-post realization of demand implying
u 6= v. As we have mentioned, the contract (w, u, v) includes most of well-known supply
chain contracts as its special cases. Table 1.2 lists common supply chain contracts and
shows how they can be represented as special cases of a general contract (w, u, v). For
example, (w, u, v) = (w, 0, 0) represents a wholesale price contract with wholesale price
w, a buyback contract with a buyback price b can be written as (w, u, v) = (w, 0, b),
1A wholesale price contract is defined as u = v = 0. However, for any u = v > 0, the contract
(w, u, v) can be transformed into an equivalent wholesale price contract (w − u, 0, 0). See Lemma 6 in
the Appendix A for the formal proof.
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Table 1.2: Special Cases of Contract (w, u, v)
Contracts u v cru c
r
o Critical Ratio
Supply chain − − p− c c p−cp
Wholesale w 0 0 p− w w p−wp
Buyback (w, b) 0 b p− w w − b p−wp−b
Revenue sharing (w, f) 0 (1− f)p fp− w w fp−wfp
Rebate (w, r) r 0 p− w + r w p−w+rp+r
Penalty (w, z) z 0 p− w + z w p−w+zp+z
and a revenue sharing contract with a sharing rate f can be written as (w, u, v) =
(w, 0, (1− f)p).2
We denote the set of all feasible contracts that the supplier may offer to the retailer
by
F = {(w, u, v) : 0 ≤ w ≤ p, −(p− w) ≤ u ≤ w, −(p− w) ≤ v ≤ w}.
The condition is derived by assuming that the value of the wholesale price w, the
retailer’s overage cost cro, and the retailer’s underage cost c
r
u all need to be non-negative
and less than p. In addition, the critical ratio under a contract (w, u, v) is between its
minimum value induced by the wholesale price contract, i.e. p−wp , and the maximum
value by the integrated supply chain, i.e. p−cp .
We study the supply chain problem from the supplier’s point of view subject to the
constraint that the retailer needs to earn at least her reservation utility α.3 Hence, the
2We adopt the same way to define u and v as in Chen and O¨zer (2017) by comparing the overage
and underage cost of revenue sharing with the wholesale price contract (w + (1− f)p).
3Even though the retailer has limited ability in choosing the optimal decision, the supplier would
offer the retailer a contract that gives her at least the reservation utility (in expectation) to keep her
in business. This is because the retailer can evaluate the expected outcome based on her long-run
interaction with the supplier. Our model can be generalized to the case in which the participation
constraint is replaced with P (Πr ≥ α) ≥ β > 0, where β represents the retailer’s capability in making
participation decisions.
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supplier’s problem can be expressed as
maxw,u,v
{
Π s(w, u, v) s.t. Π r(w, u, v) ≥ α, (w, u, v) ∈ F
}
. (P s)
We also formulate the contract design problem from the supply chain’s point of view
and study the problem
maxw,u,v
{
Π c(w, u, v) s.t. Π r(w, u, v) ≥ α, (w, u, v) ∈ F
}
(P c)
as a benchmark.
1.4 Model Analysis and Results
In this section, we consider the supplier’s choice of contracts among all nonlinear con-
tracts in the form of (w, u, v). In Section 1.4.1 we derive the optimal value of w for a
given (u, v). In Section 1.4.2, we endogenize the supplier’s decision of u and v and show
that among all possible nonlinear contracts (w, u, v), a contract with no protection, such
as a simple wholesale price contract, can perform better than a contract with u, v 6= 0.
1.4.1 Optimal Wholesale Price
We first investigate the supplier’s optimal choice of w for given u and v by solving
Φs(u, v) = maxw
{
Π s(w, u, v) s.t. Π r(w, u, v) ≥ α, (w, u, v) ∈ F
}
. (P sw)
Similar to the analysis of the fully rational case 4, we can show that the supplier
fully extracts the retailer’ surplus up to her reservation value. That is, the constraint
Π r(w, u, v) ≥ α in P sw is binding.
4See the proof of Lemma 2, part (iii) in Appendix A.
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Lemma 1 The optimal solution of P sw is the unique wα(u, v) which solves the equation
Πr(wα(u, v), u, v) = α. In addition, wα(u, v) increases in u− v.
Lemma 1 implies that the solution to P sw is unique and the retailer earns, in ex-
pectation, her reservation value. This simplifies the problem P sw and enables us to
characterize the optimal contract in §1.4.2. As the following lemma indicates, the above
result also enables us to examine the impact of retailer’s bounded rationality on her
service level.
Lemma 2 The retailer’s service level P(Q ≥ D) = 1+ξ2 under the optimal wholesale
price wα(u, v) does not change with u−v when λ = 1, and is strictly increasing in u−v
when 0 ≤ λ < 1.
Intuitively, as long as the supplier leaves the same profit α to the fully rational
retailer, he has to induce the same critical ratio by providing the contract (wα(u, v), u, v)
so that the retailer places the same order quantity. However, for a boundedly rational
retailer, wα(u, v) increases with u−v at a lower rate because the retailer is less responsive
to the contract term. As a result, the retailer’s service level increases in u− v.
1.4.2 Optimal Protections
We now endogenize the supplier’s decision on (u, v) and solve the optimization problem
P s. When a retailer is rational, a contract (w, u, v) with non-zero u or v allows the risk
sharing between the supplier and the retailer. The goal in this section is to show that
the optimal choice for a supplier contracting with a boundedly rational retailer can be
in the form of no-protection contract, i.e. u = v = 0. As a no protection contract with
u = v = 0 induces the same overage and underage costs as the wholesale price contract,
the outcome of any such a contract is identical to the wholesale price contract.
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(a) Fully rational retailer (λ = 1) (b) Boundedly rational retailer (λ = 0.65)
Figure 1.1: Examples of Fully Rational and Boundedly Rational Cost Function
Πs(wα(b), b) = Πs(w, b, 0) with Parameters of p = 1, c = 0.5, µ = 200, ∆ = 0.5 for
a Buyback Contract.
When the retailer is fully rational, the supplier’s profit function Πs(wα(u, v), u, v)
is convex and strictly increasing in v − u. However, when the retailer is boundedly
rational, although Πs(wα(u, v), u, v) is still convex, it is not always increasing anymore.
Figure 1.1b illustrates this point using an example of buyback contract. Recall that
the contract (w, u, v) = (w, 0, b) represents the buyback contract with wholesale price
w and buyback price b. As in Figure 1.1b, the supplier’s profit Πs(wα(0, b), 0, b) first
decreases as b (=v−u) increases and then increases. This subtle difference between the
rational retailer and the boundedly rational retailer gives rise to our main result. Next,
we characterizes the conditional under which a wholesale price contract is preferable to
other non-linear contracts.
Since the optimal solution to the problem P sw is wα(u, v) and we have Π c(wα(u, v), u, v) =
Π s(wα(u, v), u, v) + α, solving P s is equivalent to solving
maxu,v{Π c(w, u, v) s.t. w = wα(u, v), (w, u, v) ∈ F}. (1.9)
As shown in Lemma 7 in the Appendix A, the supply chain profit in (1.9) depends on
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contract parameters only through the intermediate variable ξ, i.e. we can write the
supply chain’s profit as
Πc(ξ) = µ (p− c(1 + ∆λξ))− µ p
12
(
∆
(
λ(λ+ 3 ξ(λξ − 2)− 2) + 4)). (1.10)
Since ξ is a well-defined function with maximum value 1 and minimum value ξ = 1 −
2wα(0,0)p , we can write the problem (1.9) as maxξ{Πc
(
ξ
)
s.t. ξ ≤ ξ ≤ 1}. Because Πc(ξ)
is concave, the solution of this problem is either the interior solution 1λ
(
p−2c
p
)
solved by
the first order condition or one of the boundary points. The following proposition shows
that when the condition 1λ
(
p−2c
p
)
< 1 − 2wα(0,0)p holds the optimal choice of contract
by the supplier, among all feasible contracts (w, u, v), will be a wholesale contract.
Proposition 1 If the condition
0 ≤ wα(0, 0) ≤ 1
2
(
p− 1
λ
(p− 2c)
)
(1.11)
holds, the wholesale contract (w∗, u∗, v∗) = (wα(0, 0), 0, 0) is optimal among all feasible
nonlinear contracts defined in F .
This proposition is in sharp contrast with the classical results in the literature. For
example, Pasternack (1985) shows that, under a buyback contract (w, b), the supplier’s
profit is always increasing in buyback price b. This implies that, when dealing with a
fully rational retailer, the supplier always prefers a buyback contract with b > 0 (i.e.,
the downside-protection with u = 0 and v = b > 0) to a wholesale price contract.
Note that the condition (1.11) holds only when the retailer is boundedly rational.
When the retailer is fully rational, i.e. when λ = 1, the condition (1.11) can never be
satisfied because 1λ
(
p−2c
p
)
> ξ = p−2wα(0,0)p cannot hold as long as wα(0, 0) ≥ c. Hence,
Proposition 1 confirms the classic result that nonlinear contracts, such as buyback,
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revenue sharing, and rebate, dominate wholesale price contracts when the retailer is
fully rational. Intuitively, when the retailer is rational, a nonlinear contract serves as a
mechanism to motivate the retailer to place a larger order quantity. Hence, a nonlinear
contract can always implement the supply chain’s optimal order quantity by having the
supplier sharing the risk with the retailer. However, when the retailer is boundedly
rational, her order can be already larger than the supply chain optimal order quantity
due to the errors that the retailer may make under a wholesale price contract. Adopting
a nonlinear contract in such cases may harm the supplier’s profit, especially when the
profit margin is low. Taking the buyback contract as an example, consider an extreme
case in which the retailer is fully irrational, i.e. λ = 0. That is, the retailer’s order
quantity is a random number that is independent of the supplier’s contract. In such
a case, the best strategy for a supplier is to set the highest possible wholesale price
while setting the buyback price to be zero. The next two corollaries present sufficient
and necessary conditions for the optimality of a wholesale price contract based on the
intuition discussed above.
Corollary 1 (Necessary Condition) The wholesale price contract w∗ = wα(0, 0) is
optimal among all feasible nonlinear contracts only if p− 2c ≤ 0.
Corollary 1 states that the superiority of a wholesale price contract happens only
when the supplier produces low margin profit products. The result is consistent with
real-world observation that nonlinear contracts are adopted mainly in high margin in-
dustries, such as revenue sharing contracts in DVD rental (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005),
rebate contracts in high tech companies such as Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Lotus
(Kaya and O¨zer, 2011) and pharmaceutical companies (Dunlop et al., 2018).On the
other hand, wholesale price contracts are more often observed in low margin industries
such as grocery stores. The sufficient condition in the next corollary indicates that if the
profit margin is low and the retailer is sufficiently irrational, a wholesale price contract
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is optimal for any values of α and ∆.
Corollary 2 (Sufficient Condition) The wholesale price contract w∗ = wα(0, 0) is
always optimal among all feasible nonlinear contracts if 2 cp > 1 + λ.
Notice that the condition 2 cp > 1 + λ in Corollary 2 holds only when the condition
p− 2c ≤ 0 in Corollary 1 holds as well.
1.4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine how the supplier’s choice of contracts is affected when the
parameters in the model change using buyback contracts as an example.
Proposition 2 For given parameters p, c, µ, ∆, and α, there exists 0 ≤ λ¯ ≤ 1 such that
a wholesale price contract is optimal among all nonlinear contracts if and only if λ ≤ λ¯.
In addition, the threshold λ¯ is nondecreasing in c.
Figure 1.2 shows the supplier’s optimal choice of contract for pairs (λ, c) where
p = 12, µ = 200, ∆ = 0.5, and α = 20. As the rationality coefficient λ decreases,
the supplier chooses a wholesale price contract for a wider range of unit production
cost c. For example, given c = 9, the supplier prefers a buyback (nonlinear) contract
for λ = 0.75, whereas the supplier’s preference shifts to a wholesale price contract if
the rationality coefficient decreases to λ = 0.45 or below. When λ is relatively low,
the retailer is not quite responsive to a nonlinear contract and the supplier prefers a
wholesale price contract because he otherwise has to share a high risk with the retailer
whose order is very random under a nonlinear contract. When λ is relatively high,
the supplier always prefers a nonlinear contract because it is effective in aligning the
retailer’s incentive to that of supply chain
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Proposition 3 For given parameters p, λ, µ, ∆, and α, there exists 0 ≤ c¯ < p such
that a wholesale price contract is optimal if and only if c ≥ c¯. In addition, the threshold
c¯ is decreasing in λ.
As shown in Figure 1.2, given a rationality coefficient λ = 0.6, a buyback (nonlinear)
contract is preferred if c = 7, whereas the preference is shifted to a wholesale price
contract when c increases to c = 10. As we have stated in Corollary 1, a wholesale
price contract is preferred only in the low margin cases, i.e., cp ≥ 12 . If cp is more
than 12 (i.e., the area below the dashed line in Figure 1.2), a buyback contract with a
positive buyback price is preferred for all feasible values of λ, µ, ∆, and α. Proposition
4 shows how the demand variation or the accuracy of demand information can affect
the supplier’s contracting preferences.
Proposition 4 For given parameters p, λ, c, µ, and α, there exists 0 ≤ ∆¯ ≤ 1 such
that a wholesale contract is optimal if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆¯. In addition, the threshold ∆¯
is increasing in λ.
As shown in Figure 1.3a, the accuracy of the demand information matters when λ is
medium. As ∆ decreases, the accuracy of the demand information improves. Figure
1.3a indicates that the supplier is more likely to adopt a wholesale price contract when
the demand is less accurate (i.e., ∆ is large), but is less likely to do so when the demand
information is more precise (i.e. ∆ is small).
Proposition 5 For given parameters p, λ, c, µ, and ∆, there exists α¯ > 0 such that
a wholesale contract is optimal if and only if α ≥ α¯. In addition, the threshold α¯ is
increasing in λ.
Proposition 5 and Figure 1.3b show that the retailer’s reservation value (or outside
option) α can affect the supplier’s choice of contract. When α increases, the supplier
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Figure 1.2: Effects of Changes in λ and c on the Supplier’s Choice of Contract
(a) c = 8.75 and α = 20 (b) ∆ = 0.5 and c = 10.5
Figure 1.3: Effects of Changes in ∆ and α on the Supplier’s Choice of Contract (p = 12
and µ = 200)
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favors the wholesale price contract more. This is because the supplier has to lower the
wholesale price in order to leave more reservation value to the retailer which makes
nonlinear contracts less likely to be profitable.
1.5 Laboratory Experiments
To examine whether human decision makers exhibit a similar contractual preferences as
those predicted by the behavioral model, we conduct a series of laboratory expe riments.
As so, we have human subjects play the role of a supplier who needs to offer a contract
to a boundedly rational retailer. The purpose of the experiments is not to tease out a
human supplier’s behavioral biases. Instead, we use experiments as a robustness check
and to validate the results obtained in the behavioral model. That is, a suppliers may
prefer a wholesale price contract when facing a boundedly rational retailer despite of
other potential biases that we haven’t considered in the model.
1.5.1 Hypotheses
We first study how changes in parameters affect subjects’ decisions. Our behavioral
model suggests that wholesale price contracts become more favorable when retailer’s
rationality decreases (Proposition 2), production cost increases (Proposition 3), and
variance of demand increases (Proposition 4). These results lead to Hypotheses 1.
Hypothesis 1 When the retailer’s rationality decreases, production cost increases, or
demand variation increases, human suppliers are more likely to choose a wholesale price
contract.
Our behavioral model predicts that, when the retailer is boundedly rational, the
supplier may gain higher profits under a wholesale contract than under any other non-
linear contract (a contract with non-zero u and v). Although human suppliers’ choices
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Table 1.3: Summary of Treatments
Treatments λ× 100% c ∆
1. BASE : Baseline 75% 9 0.5
2. LOWR : Low Rationality 55% 9 0.5
3. HPCO : High Production Cost 75% 10.5 0.5
4. HDVAR : High Demand Variation 75% 9 0.8
may not completely follow our behavioral model’s prediction, we expect that majority
of subjects choose a wholesale price contract when the condition in Proposition 1 is
satisfied. We examine this in Hypotheses 2 which serves both as a robustness check of
our behavioral model and a sanity check of our experiments.
Hypothesis 2 Where the wholesale price contract is predicted to be optimal by the
behavioral model, a larger portion of human suppliers choose a wholesale price contract.
1.5.2 Design and Implementation
Our experimental design consists of 4 treatments. Treatments differ in the values that
the bounded rationality coefficient λ, the production cost c, and the demand variation
∆ take. In particular, we consider λ ∈ {55% , 75%}, c ∈ {9, 10.5}, and ∆ ∈ {0.5 , 0.8},
µ = 200. In our first treatment (baseline or BASE), we keep the values of c and ∆
the same as in BASE treatment, but decrease λ to = 0.55. Similarly, to form the third
treatment (high production cost or HPCO), we increase c to 10.5. Finally, in the fourth
treatment (high demand variation or HDVAR), we increased ∆ from 0.5 to 0.8 which
corresponds to the demand distribution D ∼ U(40, 360). Table 1.3 summarizes our
experimental design and four treatments.
30
Table 1.4: The Menu of Contracts and Their Payoffs
Contract Expected Payoff Rational q∗
w b BASE LOWR HPCO HDVAR others HDVAR
A 10.75 0 246 35 80 173 121 65
B 11 7.75 249 11 15 143 147 110
C 11.25 0 302 101 156 199 127 75
D 11.5 8.25 316 98 104 188 113 51
Human subjects took the role of suppliers who would offer a contract to a com-
puterized boundedly rational retailer. Subjects were informed that the retailer was
computerized and placed an order quantity according to Equation (1.1). we provided
subjects with the rational order quantity so they do not need to calculate q∗(see Figure
B1 in the Appendix B)5. Table 1.4 shows the list of contracts we used in our experi-
ments. We used the buyback contract as the nonlinear contract. In addition, to have
a fair comparison, the number of buyback contracts and wholesale price contracts were
equal and the list of contracts is kept the same for all treatments. The list of con-
tracts was constructed such that it includes a contract close to the optimal contract
in each treatment with numbers rounded to the closest quarter. While the contract
(w, b) = (11.5, 8.25) results in the highest payoff in the BASE treatment, the contract
(w, b) = (11.25, 0) is the most profitable choice in other three treatments.
We used between-subjects design, i.e., each subject was assigned to only one treat-
ment, and all experimental sessions followed the same procedure. In each round, sub-
jects chose a contract to offer to the retailer before the retailer’s order quantity and the
random demand were realized. Then, subjects observed the retailer’s order quantity,
the realized demand, and their own payoffs before moving to the next decision round.
5This is to reduce the cognitive load of their task and to avoid any possible calculation errors. This
ensures us that our results are not driven by limited conative ability of subjects to predict q∗. We
conduct experiments to examine if the results would be affected if the supplier is not provided with the
rational optimal order quantity In Section 1.5.4
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Experiments were programmed and conducted with Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each
subject first played 3 practice rounds, in which their performance did not affect their
monetary payments, followed by 30 rounds of the same game in which they accumulated
credits toward their final monetary payment. Subjects were paid $4 show-up fee plus a
performance-based payment. The sessions took 70 to 90 minutes and payments ranged
from $15 to $27. We conducted the experiments at a university in North America where
a total of 63 students participated in our study across four treatments. Participants were
given written instructions and a quiz to ensure that they understood the instructions
(see Appendix C).
1.5.3 Results
Before providing statistical analysis, we present a summary of the experimental results.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the percentage of subjects choosing each contract. In almost all
treatments, the suppliers’ contract preferences follow the same order as the expected
payoffs (see Table 1.4)6. On average, 45% of subjects have chosen the optimal buyback
contract (11.5, 8, 25) in BASE treatment, whereas roughly half of the subjects (51%,
48%, and 44%, respectively, in LOWR, HPCO, HDVAR treatments) have chosen the
optimal wholesale price contract (11.25, 0) in the other three treatments. This indicates
that the overall trend is consistent with the behavioral model’s prediction.
We use multinomial logistic regression to compare the outcomes between treat-
ments7. Let piti represent the probability that a subject offers contract i ∈ {A,B,C,D}
in treatment t ∈ {2(LOWR), 3(HPCO),4(HDVAR)}. Set the contract D as the base
6The only exception is HPCO treatment in which more subjects have chosen contract B than contract
A although the expected payoff of contract A is higher. Even though this order is not consistent with
the order of the expected payoffs, these two contracts (A and B) together contributes to only 12% of
all choices and the effect is not significant in our analysis.
7Here we only presents the results for contracts C and D. In the Appendix B, we follow the same
analysis but aggregate contracts with the same type (wholesale price vs. buyback). We can get the
similar results that wholesale price contracts are more likely to be offered in LOWR treatment, HPCO
and HDVAR compared to BASE treatment.
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(a) BASE (b) LOWR
(c) HPCO (d) HDVAR
Figure 1.4: Summary of Experimental Results for Each Treatment
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category and define
Itk =

1 if k = t,
0 if k 6= t,
as the dummy variables for treatment t with k = 2, 3, 4. The multinomial logistic
regression model can then be formulated as8:
log
(
pitj
pitD
)
= αtj +
4∑
k=2
βtj I
t
k, j ∈ {A,B,C}. (1.12)
We conduct three comparisons: (1)LOWR vs. BASE, (2)HPCO vs. BASE, and (3)HD-
VAR vs. BASE. The coefficient βtj represents the treatment effect between offering con-
tract j to contract D in treatment t compared to the BASE treatment. Table 1.5 shows
the estimation results of log
(
pitC
pitD
)
(for estimation results of log(pitA/pi
t
D) and log(pi
t
B/pi
t
D)
see Appendix B). We reject the null hypothesis that there is no treatment effect in the
likelihood of offering contract C versus D, i.e. H0 : β
t
C = 0, with p-value< 0.05. Ac-
cording to Table 1.5, the probability of offering the contract C in LOWR treatment is
exp(1.021) = 2.775 times larger than that in BASE treatment. In other words, when the
retailer’s rationality decreases from 0.75 to 0.55, keeping everything else unchanged, we
expect that a supplier is 2.775 times more likely to offer the contract C. In the HPCO
treatment and HDVAR treatment, we observe the same trend, i.e., the supplier is 1.466
more likely to offer a wholesale price contract C when the production cost c is increased
from 9 to to 10.5, or 2.912 more likely to offer a wholesale price contract C when the
demand variation is increases from 0.5 to 0.8. These results provide strong supports
for Hypothesis 1. Also, while all factors including rationality coefficient, demand vari-
ation, and production cost matter in determining the possibility of offering wholesale
8We use the aggregate data from all periods. In Appendix B, we present the model with an additional
independent variable of time period and show that the results do not change if we account for the time
period effect This also confirms that there is no learning effect.
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Table 1.5: Estimation Results for Multinomial Logistic Regression
∗∗∗p− value < 0.001; ∗∗p− value < 0.01;∗p− value < 0.05
Treatment Intercept αtC Treatment Effect β
t
C
LOWR
(t=2)
Coef. α2C -0.216
∗ (0.1) 1.021∗∗∗ (0.16)
Wald χ2 4.28 43.351
exp(β2C) – 2.775
HPCO
(t=3)
Coef. α3C -0.216
∗ (0.1) 0.404∗∗∗(0.13)
Wald χ2 4.28 9.44
exp(β3C) – 1.498
HDVAR
(t=4)
Coef. α4C -0.216
∗ (0.1) 1.090∗∗∗ (0.17)
Wald χ2 4.28 44.067
exp(β4C) – 2.975
price contracts rather than buyback contract, the impact of rationality coefficient and
demand variation play more significant roles than the production cost.
In Hypothesis 2, we focus on subjects’ choices within each treatment. To test the
first part of Hypothesis 2, we aggregate the two choices of wholesale price contracts (i.e.
the contract A and C) and buyback contracts (i.e. the contract B and D) and check
which contract type (wholesale or buyback) is chosen more frequently using Chi-square
test (χ2) (see Table B4 in Appendix B for p-values and the estimations).
In the BASE treatment, we find that the proportion of subjects who chose a whole-
sale price contract is significantly higher than those who chose a buyback contract . The
null hypothesis that two types of contracts are chosen evenly is rejected with χ2 = 8.54
and p-value< 0.01. Since the buyback contract C and the wholesale price contract
D contribute to 83% of choices, we also test the null hypothesis that D is chosen as
often as C. The null hypothesis is rejected under a chi-square test with χ2 = 4.1 and
p-value< 0.05.
In the LOWR treatment, 67% of subjects offered a wholesale price contract where
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the wholesale price contract C were offered more than 50%. The statistical tests provide
strong support to reject the null hypothesis that the two types of contracts were chosen
evenly. Wholesale price contracts were chosen significantly more than buyback contracts
(χ2 = 57.4 and p-value< 0.001). In addition, comparing the two most popular contracts
C and D, the wholesale price contract C was chosen significantly more often than the
buyback contract D (χ2 = 51.95 and p-value< 0.001).
In the HPCO treatment, 52% of subjects offered a wholesale price contract whereas
48% offered a buyback contract (see Figure 1.4c). Despite that the dominance of
adopting wholesale price contracts over buyback is not significant ( χ2 = 1.42 and
p-value> 0.1), the wholesale price contract C is chosen significantly more often than
any other contract (χ2 = 5.36 and p-value< 0.05).
In the HDVAR treatment, 64% of subjects offered wholesale price contract, whereas
36% offered buyback contracts (see Figure 1.4d). This difference is also statistically
significant (χ2 = 35.2 and p-value< 0.01). In addition, the wholesale price contract
C was chosen more frequently than the buyback contract D (χ2 = 50.6 and p-value<
0.001). These together provide strong supports for Hypothesis 2.
1.5.4 Robustness Checks
We conduct two additional treatments to check whether the results observed in this
section hold in more complicated settings. In both treatments, we keep the parameters
the same as LOWR treatment , i.e. λ = 0.75, c = 9, and ∆ = 0.5 where more
human subjects chose a wholesale price contract. We extend the LOWR treatment to
(1) the cases with 6 contracts (SIXC) and (2) the case without providing the retailer’s
optimal quantity (NOOPT). To examine whether there is a significant difference between
treatments SIX(t = 5) and NOOPT(t = 6) with LOWR treatment, we estimate the
multinomial logistic regression log
(
pitw
pitbb
)
= αtw +β
t
w I
t with the treatment dummy I5 (I6
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Table 1.6: Summary of descriptive statistics for the Extra Experiments
Contracts
LOWR (n=16) SIXC (n=14) NOOPT (n=17)
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
A : (10.75, 0) 0.16 0.065 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.091
B : (11, 7.75) 0.10 0.083 0.08 0.064 0.08 0.099
C : (11.25, 0) 0.51 0.123 0.41 0.102 0.61 0.089
D : (11.5, 8.25) 0.23 0.081 0.23 0.085 0.13 0.102
E : (11, 0) – – 0.09 0.085 – –
F : (11.25, 8) – – 0.06 0.085 – –
Wholesale: {A, C, E} 0.67 – 0.63 – 0.79 –
Buyback: {B, D, F} 0.33 – 0.37 – 0.21 –
) taking value 1 when the data belongs to the treatment t = 5 (or 6) and zero when the
data belongs to LOWR treatment.
In the treatment SIX, we find that the extra complexity from adding extra con-
tracts to the menu does not change human subjects’ contractual preferences. The null
hypothesis of observing no treatment effect in the likelihood of offering a wholesale price
contract between SIXC and LOWR, i.e. H0 : β5 = 0, cannot be rejected (p−value > 0.1;
see Table B6 in Appendix B). This implies that human suppliers facing retailers with
low rationality still prefer a wholesale price contract to a buyback contract when more
choices of contracts are presented.
In the treatment NOOPT, we keep the same four contracts as presented in LOWR
treatment, but we do not provide subjects with the optimal order quantity from a
rational retailer (see Table 1.6 for summary of results). The coefficient β6 is significant
and positive (p−value < 0.001; see Table B6 in Appendix B). This implies that subjects
in NOOPT treatment prefer the wholesale price contract even more than subjects in
LOWR treatment.
In sum, the results obtained from comparing treatments SIXC and NOOPT with
LOWR treatment indicate that the observations in Section 1.5.3 are not driven by the
simplifications made in the experimental design and similar results can be observed once
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we introduce more complexity to the experiments.
1.5.5 Discussion: Supplier/Retailer’s Bounded Rationality and Sup-
ply Chain Profit
While the retailer’s bounded rationality would affect the supplier’s choice of contract,
the supplier’s bounded rationality in choosing contracts would also affect the supply
chain profit. In this section, we examine the impact of both the retailer’s and the
supplier’s bounded rationality on the supply chain profit.
Assume that both the retailer and the supplier are boundedly rational. The retailer’s
bounded rationality is as described in Section 1.3 and the supplier chooses a contract
according to a Multinomial Logit model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Su, 2008).We
set p = 12, µ = 200, λ ∈ {55% , 75%}, c ∈ {9, 10.5}, and D ∼ U(100, 300), the same
setting as used in the experiments. In addition, the supplier chooses from the same
four contracts as in the experiments, i.e. (w1, b1) = (10.75, 0), (w2, b2) = (11, 7.75),
(w3, b3) = (11.25, 0), and (w4, b4) = (11.5, 8.25). According to the Multinomial Logit
model, a supplier chooses the contract (wi, bi), i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, with probability
P[(wi, bi)] =
eθΠs(wi,bi)∑
j∈{1,2,3,4} eθΠs(wj ,bj)
where θ denotes the supplier’s rationality coefficient and a larger value of θ repre-
sents a more rational supplier. Therefore, when the supplier is boundedly rational,
the expected supply chain profit can be represented by Ψc =
∑
j∈{1,2,3,4} P[(wj , bj)] ×
Πc(wj , bj) and, similarly, the retailer’s expected profit can be represented by Ψr =∑
j∈{1,2,3,4} P[(wj , bj)]×Πr(wj , bj).
As shown in Table 1.7, while the increase of a retailer’s rationality and a supplier’s
would both increase the supply chain profit, the impact of the former is more salient
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Table 1.7: Channel and retailer Profits (numbers rounded to the closest integer)
c λ θ 0.0025 0.005 0.0075 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Channel
9
0.55 353 354 354 355 355 355 355 355
0.75 365 366 366 367 368 368 369 369
10.5
0.55 122 125 126 127 127 127 127 127
0.75 154 155 155 156 156 156 157 157
Retailer
9
0.55 31 20 16 14 13 13 13 13
0.75 66 56 54 53 52 527 52 512
10.5
0.55 28 17 14 13 13 13 13 13
0.75 63 55 56 56 56 57 57 57
than the latter. In particular, the increase of the supplier’s rationality is ignorable when
θ ≥ 0.05. In other words, the retailer’s bounded rationality play a more important role
in supply chain efficiency. In addition, when the supplier is more rational, the marginal
increase of the retailer’s rationality would result in more increase in supply chain profit.
1.6 Extensions
In this section, we pursue three extensions of the base model. Section 1.6.1 discusses
how the base model can be modified to incorporate other behavioral ordering heuristics.
In Section 1.6.2, we experimentally test whether the rationality coefficient λ is affected
by the contract’s parameters. Section 1.5.5 considers the case in which the supplier is
also boundedly rational and investigates how it affects the supply chain profit.
1.6.1 Other Behavioral Order Quantity Models
Our base model in Section 1.3 is developed based on the assumption that errors follow
the same distribution as demands. Under this assumption, the behavioral order quantity
model in Equation (1.1) mimics the retailer’s demand chasing heuristic as seen from the
supplier’s point of view. Here, we check the robustness of our results under two other
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behavioral models proposed in the literature, namely, mean-anchoring and Logit models.
Mean-anchoring Heurestic
Mean-anchoring is a well-documented heuristic which is repeatedly cited by researchers
to explain human retailer’s ordering behavior (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bostian
et al., 2008). We adopt the same mean-anchoring model as in Bostian et al. (2008)
which assumes that behavioral order quantity is the weighted average of the optimal
order q∗ (with weight λ) and demand mean (with weight 1−λ). That is, the boundedly
rational retailer’s order quantity is qp = λ q
∗ + (1 − λ)µ. This is a special case of the
general behavioral model in (1.1) where q˜ = µ.
Our finding that a wholesale price contract may perform better than a nonlinear
contracts still holds under this behavioral model. Under the mean-anchoring order
quantity model, the behavioral order quantity is the same as the expected order quantity
in our base model in Section 1.4 and the probability of overstocking stays unchanged as
well. However, the expected leftover changes to E[qp −D]+ = 14∆µ(λξ + 1)2. Despite
this difference, we show that still the wholesale price contract can perform better than
nonlinear contracts (see Proposition 18 in the Appendix A).
The intuition behind the result is that when a retailer is boundedly rational and
the profit margin is low, her order quantity is already higher than the order quantity
which is optimal for the supplier. Hence, the supplier prefers to use a wholesale price
contract. The necessary condition (Corollary 1) and the sufficient condition (Corollary
2) remains unchanged in the case of mean-anchoring heuristic and we only need to
replace the wholesale price with w in Proposition 18.
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Logit Model
Another widely acknowledged behavioral order quantity model in the literature is the
Logit model proposed by Su (2008). We first show that the generic behavioral order
quantity model in (1.1) can incorporate the Logit model in Su (2008) once being adapted
for our setting. In particular, Lemma 3 shows that, when the demands follow a uni-
form distribution, the Logit model results in the behavioral order quantity following a
truncated Normal distribution.
Lemma 3 Let D ∼ U(µ(1 −∆), µ(1 + ∆)) and consider a contract (w, u, v). The be-
havioral order quantity predicated by Logit model follows a truncated normal distribution
over the interval [µ(1−∆), µ(1 + ∆)] with µN = µ(1 + ξ∆) and σ2N = 2β∆µp−(v−u) .
Table 1.8 presents the supplier’s choice of contract when the retailer’s order quan-
tities follow the Logit model. We vary the retailer’s rationality coefficient over λ ∈
{0.45, 0.75} and the supplier’s production cost over c ∈ {8, 9, 10}. We assume that
the retailer’s random error are distributed according to q˜ ∼ TruncatedN (0, σ2N ) where
the variation is either high (σ2N = 80) or low (σ
2
N = 40), and the truncated Normal
distribution is distributed over the interval [µ(1−∆), µ(1 + ∆)]. All other parameters
are fixed and similar to our experimental design in Section 1.5.2, i.e. µ = 200, ∆ = 0.5,
and α = 100.
When the rationality is high (λ = 0.75), the optimal choice of contract is a wholesale
contract only when the production cost and the variance are high (c = 8 and σ2N = 80).
We observe a similar trend when λ = 0.45. For example, when the production cost
increases from c = 8 to c = 10, the choice of contract changes from a buyback contract
to a wholesale price contract. In addition, when the production cost is medium and
the variation is high (c = 9 and σ2N = 80), decreasing λ from 0.75 to 0.45 changes
the contract preferences of the supplier from a buyback contract to a wholesale price
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Table 1.8: Numerical Results for the Logit Behavioral Order Quantity Model
Parameters Optimal Contract Parameters Optimal Contract
(c, λ, σ2N ) Type w
∗ b∗ (c, λ, σ2N ) Type w
∗ b∗
(10, 0.75, 40) BB 11.10 2.25 (10, 0.45, 40) WS 11.22 0
(10, 0.75, 80) WS 10.97 0 (10, 0.45, 80) WS 10.90 0
(9, 0.75, 40) BB 11.22 7.50 (9, 0.45, 40) BB 11.25 4.30
(9, 0.75, 80) BB 11.17 7.45 (9, 0.45, 80) WS 10.9 0
(8, 0.75, 40) BB 11.22 9.00 (8, 0.45, 40) BB 11.27 6.65
(8, 0.75, 80) BB 11.19 8.75 (8, 0.45, 80) BB 10.92 1.30
contract. These observations are consistent with the results derived in the base model.
Contracting with Optimistic and Pessimistic Retailers
In this section, we explore the effects of the retailer’s optimistic or pessimistic ordering
behavior on the supplier’s contract choice. While keeping other assumptions unchanged,
we extend the retailer’s random error from a uniform distribution U(µ(1−∆), µ(1+∆))
to a beta distribution with parameters β1 and β2 which is scaled to the interval [µ(1−
∆), µ(1 + ∆)].9
Figure 1.5 shows how the skewness of beta distribution changes with β1. As β1
increases, the random errors are more positively skewed. For example, the retailer’s
errors are symmetric around the mean with (β1, β2) = (3, 3), are positively skewed with
(β1, β2) = (6, 3) , and are negatively skewed with (β1, β2) = (1.5, 3), which represents a
neutral, pessimistic and optimistic retailer, respectively.
9To scale a beta random variable defined over [0, 1], to any arbitrary interval [c, d], we may use the
following transformation. Let q follows a standard beta distribution with parameters (β1, β2), then q˜β
corresponding to (β1, β2) follows the probability density function
(x−c)β1−1 (d−x)β2−1
(d−c)β1+β2−1 B(β1,β2) for x that takes
values over the interval [c, d] where B(., .) denotes the beta function.
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Figure 1.5: Modeling Retailer’s Random Errors Using Beta Distribution
We consider the supplier’s choice of contract when the retailer’s random error q˜ fol-
lows a beta distribution. The retailer’s rationality coefficient varies over λ ∈ {0.45, 0.75}
and the supplier’s production cost takes values c ∈ {8, 9, 10}. All other parameters are
fixed and similar to our experimental design in Section 1.5.2, i.e. µ = 200, ∆ = 0.5, and
α = 100.
Table 1.9 illustrates how the changes in the skewness of the distribution of term
q˜ can affect the supplier’s contractual preferences. A wholesale price contract is more
attractive for the supplier who sells the product to an optimistic retailer (β1 = 6) than a
pessimistic retailer (β1 = 3 or 1.5). Intuitively, a more optimistic retailer is more likely
to order more than that the supplier wishes. Hence, a buyback contract may reduce the
supplier’s profit by committing to purchase back the unsold items from the optimistic
retailer. In addition, when c increases from 8 to 10, the preferences shift from a buyback
contract to a wholesale price contract. Moreover, the supplier facing the retailer with
lower rationality coefficient (λ = 0.45 compared to 0.75) earns a higher profit under a
wholesale price contract. These results are consistent with our main findings in Section
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Table 1.9: Numerical Results for the Case with Random Errors According to Beta
Distribution
Parameters Optimal Contract Parameters Optimal Contract
(c, λ, β1) Type w
∗ b∗ (c, λ, β1) Type w∗ b∗
(10, 0.75, 1.5) BB 11.13 4.4 (10, 0.45, 1.5) WS 10.93 0
(10, 0.75, 3) WS 10.94 0 (10, 0.45, 3) WS 10.53 0
(10, 0.75, 6) WS 10.77 0 (10, 0.45, 6) WS 10.11 0
(9, 0.75, 1.5) BB 11.23 8.65 (9, 0.45, 1.5) BB 11.17 6.75
(9, 0.75, 3) BB 11.1 6.6 (9, 0.45, 3) WS 10.53 0
(9, 0.75, 6) BB 10.82 1.4 (9, 0.45, 6) WS 9.98 0
(8, 0.75, 1.5) BB 11.29 9.9 (8, 0.45, 1.5) BB 11.31 9.75
(8, 0.75, 3) BB 11.2 9.05 (8, 0.45, 3) BB 10.68 2.25
(8, 0.75, 6) BB 11.07 7.8 (8, 0.45, 6) WS 9.99 0
1.5.3 that wholesale price contracts are preferred when λ is small, c is large, and ∆ is
large.
1.6.2 Retailer’s Rationality Coefficient
In the base model, we assume that the retailer’s rationality coefficient λ is independent
of contracts’ parameters. In this section, we conduct laboratory experiments on the
retailer’s ordering behavior to examine to what extent this assumption is valid. We
explain how our findings from the laboratory experiments can be incorporated into our
behavioral model and, then, discuss the implications to our main results.
We use the same basic parameters used in Section 1.5.2, i.e. p = 12, µ = 200, and
∆ = 0.5. We consider four levels of buyback prices b ∈ {0, 3, 6, 9} and four levels of
critical ratios cr ∈ {0.42, 0.33, 0.25, 0.17}10. For each combination of buyback price and
critical ratio, the corresponding wholesale price was calculated leading to 16 contracts
10We only focus on low critical ratio scenarios since, as suggested by Corollary 1, the wholesale
contract superiority over nonlinear contracts only holds for low critical ratio scenarios.
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Table 1.10: List of Contracts (w, b) in Treatment RET with cr = p−wp−b
cr b 0 3 6 9 q∗
0.42 (7,0) (8.25,3) (9.5,6) (10.75,9) 183
0.33 (8,0) (9,3) (10,6) (11,9) 167
0.25 (9,0) (9.75,3) (10.5,6) (11.25,9) 150
0.17 (10,0) (10.5,3) (11,6) (11.5,9) 133
listed in Table 1.10. We recruited 19 human subjects playing as retailers to participate
in the retailer experiments (referred to as RET). At each round, a subject was offered a
randomly chosen contract, and then decided on the order quantity before the demand
was realized. Each subject first played 3 practice rounds followed by 35 rounds of the
same game. A subject was paid a performance-based bonus and $4 show-up fee. A
session took 55 to 70 minutes and the payments were ranged from $12 to $20.
The goal of the retailer experiments is to examine whether human retailers’ bounded
rationality is affected by contracts’ parameters. We used buyback contracts as examples
of nonlinear contracts and investigated the impact of buyback price on the rationality
coefficient λ under different. critical ratio. Our experimental results, summarized in
Figure 1.6, find that the impact of the changes in the buyback price on the rationality
coefficient is more pronounced when the critical ratio is low.confirm this intuition. For
critical ratios 0.42 and 0.33, the human newsvendors order quantity was not affected
significantly by the changes in the buyback price. However, for the critical ratios 0.25
and 0.17, as the buyback price increased, the human retailers’ rationality dropped.
To rigorously test the above observations, at each level of critical ratio, we estimate
the regression model λcrb = λ
cr◦ +τ cr b+cr on the aggregate (over all subjects) rationality
coefficient, where b is the buyback price and τ cr is the coefficient of interest at the critical
ratio cr. As indicated in Table 1.11, while the estimated coefficients τ0.42, τ0.33, and
τ0.25 are not significantly different from zero, τ0.17 is significant with p− value < 0.05.
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Figure 1.6: The Changes in Rationality Coefficient as the Buyback Price Changes
Table 1.11: Estimation Results for Treatment RET
cr = 0.42 cr = 0.33 cr = 0.25 cr = 0.17
λcr◦ intercept 0.860 (0.110) 0.659 (0.072) 0.772 (0.040) 0.827 (0.021)
τ cr
coefficient -0.008 (0.020) 0.008 (0.013) -0.021 (0.007) -0.023 (0.004)
p-value 0.734 0.586 0.100 0.026
Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of H0 : τ
0.17 = 0 with 5% significant level11. We
conclude that the retailer’s bounded rationality coefficient is not significantly affected
by the buyback price for the critical ratios higher than 0.25, but it decreases in the
buyback price for the smaller values of critical ratio.
We now revisit the behavioral model in Section 1.3, and relax the assumption that
λ is a constant and is not affected by contracts’ parameters. Based on our experimental
results, we propose that the relation between the rationality coefficient and buyback
11Hypothesis H0 : τ
0.25 = 0 can be rejected at 10% significant level. However, this does not qualita-
tively change our results in this section.
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price can be captured by
λ(b, cr) =

λ◦ if cr > cr`,
λ◦ − τ crb if cr ≤ cr`.
(1.13)
If cr > cr`, the rationality coefficient is constant and it is not effected by changes in
the buyback price12. If cr ≤ cr`, the retailer’s bounded rationality decreases as the
buyback price increases. The threshold cr` can be evaluated through the experiments.
Our experiments indicate that cr` ≤ 0.33.
Our main result in Proposition 1 stays unchanged even if the rationality coefficient
changes with buyback price according to (1.13). If cr > cr`, the rationality coefficient
is constant (as assumed in the base model) and our main result in Proposition 1 does
not change. If cr ≤ cr`, the retailer’s bounded rationality is less than its base value
under positive buyback prices. This would make the buyback price less favourable since
a retailer is more likely to make errors as the buyback price increases. In sum, since
for any critical ratio cr we have λ(b, cr) ≤ λ◦, the region in which a wholesale price
contract is preferable expands.
1.7 Conclusion
Even though the advantages of adopting more complicated contracts, such as buy-
back and revenue sharing contracts, to reduce double marginalization have been well-
documented in the supply chain literature, wholesale price contracts are still widely
observed in the real-world practices. Our research aims to providing explanations for
this puzzle by incorporating human retailers’ bounded rationality into the traditional
12Theoretically, λ◦ can depend on the value of cr, however, our experimental results does not show
a significant difference in λ◦ for different values of cr. See Appendix B for detailed analysis and
estimations.
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model of a supply chain. We propose a generic behavioral order quantity model which
captures a retailer’s deviation from normative theory’s prediction. The behavioral order
quantity model includes well-known newsvendor ordering heuristics as its special cases.
We then examine the supplier’s choice of contract between nonlinear contracts and
wholesale price contracts in the presence of the retailer’s bounded rationality. In contrast
with the classic result in supply chain coordination literature which indicates that the
supplier can always be better off by using a nonlinear contract, our results suggest that
wholesale price contracts can actually be more profitable than many nonlinear contracts
believed to achieve a higher profit for the supplier.
We identify the potential advantages of wholesale price contracts as compared to the
more complicated nonlinear contracts when the retailer is boundedly rational. First, a
boundedly rational retailer may place orders that already lead to a stockout probability
that is lower than the rational best response under the wholesale price contract. Hence,
a nonlinear contract does not help in moving the retailer’s order quantity towards the
supply chain optimal order quantity. This is in sharp contrast to the classic newsvendor
coordination theory, which suggests that the supplier can always do better with an
optimally designed nonlinear contract.
We provide the condition under which a wholesale price contract performs better
than nonlinear contracts. We find that the supplier is more likely to implement a whole-
sale price contract when the profit margin is relatively low. This seems to be in line
with most real-world practices, in which complicated contracts are usually adopted in
the high profit margin industries such as DVD rentals, semiconductor, pharmaceutical,
and software industries. On the other hand, low margin industries such as grocery are
more likely to adopt a simple wholesale price contract. The advantage of wholesale
price contracts also depends on the demand variance, the retailer’s bounded rationality,
and reservation value (or bargaining power). In particular, wholesale price contracts
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are more likely to be adopted when the retailers’ demand variation is high, the re-
tailer is less rational, and the retailer’s reservation value (or bargaining power) is high.
The results hold under different behavioral ordering heuristics such as demand chasing,
mean-anchoring, and Logit model.
We test whether the results derived from the behavioral model sustain in a con-
trolled laboratory environment with human subjects taking the role of the supplier.
The laboratory experimental results show that human suppliers’ contractual preference
are consistent with the prediction from the behavioral model. That is, human suppliers
are more likely to choose a wholesale price contract when the retailer’s rationality is
low, the production cost is high, and the demand variation is high.
We find that the retailer’s bounded rationality plays an more important role than the
supplier’s in improving supply chain profit. We also find that the supplier’s preference
to wholesale price contracts would not be reduced when we vary the number of contracts
presented to the supplier, or do not provide a rational retailer’s optimal order quantity
to the supplier as a reference. Moreover, the results are also robust when the retailer’s
rationality coefficient are dependent on the contract parameters.
Chapter 2
Peer-to-Peer Trading of Usage
Allowances
2.1 Introduction
A growing number of businesses are being built around a model that provides customers
access to a product or a service up to a specified amount (an allowance). Examples are
many and include cloud-based data storage (for a specified fee, a customer is able to
store data up to a certain amount), mobile phone service plans (a customer is able to use
data up to a certain amount), fitness classes (a customers can attend up to a maximum
number of classes), season tickets for sporting events (a ticket holder is able to attend
up to a specified number of events), and fractional ownership of vacation homes (time
shares), jets, and boats (an owner is entitled to a specified usage time per year). In
each of these cases, the firm providing the access (the service provider) offers consumers
a menu of prices and usage allowances. In most of these cases, the realized usage of
consumers is uncertain with some consumers experiencing a need for usage (e.g., the
need for phone data) that is below their allowance while others experiencing a need for
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usage that exceeds their allowance1. This possibility of either a shortfall or excess in
realized usage offers an opportunity for a marketplace to emerge, in which consumers
trade unused capacity among each other.
Service providers have tended to resist the emergence of such marketplaces, as they
are perceived as potentially cannibalizing demand and resulting in downward pressure on
prices. However, a growing number of service providers have recently allowed for these
peer-to-peer trading markets to exist and, in some cases, facilitated their operation. For
example, China Mobile Hong Kong (CMHK), a major mobile phone service provider in
Hong Kong, has recently launched a platform (2CM) that allows its customers to trade
unused data among each other. CMHK typically offers its customers two data plans: one
with 1 GB and one with 5 GB. China Mobile Hong Kong chairman, Tiger Lin Zhenhui,
explained the rationale for launching this service as follows : “Many users who subscribe
to a 5GB monthly plan may not use all the data. The 2CM platform would give them the
chance to trade capacity2.” It is now also increasingly common for sporting event ticket
sellers to allow (and in some cases facilitate through their sales portals) the peer-to-peer
resale of unused tickets and passes. Similarly, operators of fractional vacation homes
are increasingly enticing buyers with the promise of facilitating the rental of unused
portions of their time shares. Note that the trading platform may not necessarily be
owned or operated by the service provider, but rather by a third party entity.
There are several reasons why a service provider may allow or facilitate the peer-to-
peer trading of usage allowances. Such trading could enhance the value of the service
in the eyes of consumers. In turn, this could induce more demand for the product (e.g.,
1Note that the setting we describe does not preclude the case of a one time access to a product or
a service, such as a single ticket to a sporting event. Tickets are typically bought before the day of
the event. However, the circumstances of a consumer who bought a ticket could change on the day of
the event and they may no longer wish to attend the event. Similarly, a consumer who did not buy a
ticket before the day of the event may now have a desire to attend. Hence, there is an opportunity for
a trading market for single use access.
2http://innovation-village.com/you-can-now-sell-unused-internet-data-china-mobile-customers
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in the case of CMHK, more customers willing to buy the higher data plan). It may also
allow the service provider to increase profits by increasing prices.
While there are clearly potential benefits to trading among consumers, it is less
clear whether or not these benefits always outweigh the potential harm trading can
cause a service provider because of cannibalization (e.g., in the case of CMHK, fewer
customers deciding to purchase the high data plan and instead relying on the trading
market to supplement the allowance that comes with the low data plan) or because of
increased usage of the service and the associated cost. It is also not clear how trading
impacts consumers. On one hand, consumers may be able to fulfill more of their usage
and enjoy additional surplus if they sell their excess capacity. On the other hand, the
service provider may increase the price or modify other aspects of the service so as to
extract any additional surplus generated through trading. Similarly, it is not clear how
trading affects social welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and firm’s profit) given that
any potential increase in usage is accompanied by an increase in usage cost. Given the
heterogeneity of consumers in terms of their usage, it is also not clear if all consumers
are similarly affected by trading or if some consumers benefit or are harmed more than
others.
In this paper, we address these and other related questions. In particular, we con-
sider an equilibrium model involving a service provider who sells access to a service or a
product to risk neutral consumers. The service provider offers two contracts to hetero-
geneous consumers whose type determines their random usage. A contract specifies an
upfront payment and, in exchange, grants access up to a predetermined allowance. In
equilibrium, consumers self-select by signing up for one of the two contracts. We show
that a unique equilibrium exists specified by thresholds on consumers’ type.
We show that peer-to-peer trading affects equilibrium outcomes in two ways. First, it
affects the choice of consumers between the contract with the higher usage allowance (the
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high plan) and the contract with the lower usage allowance (the low plan). The prospect
of trading can lead more consumers (relative to the case of no trading) to choose the
low plan, as they now also have an opportunity to purchase additional capacity on the
trading market if they need it. We refer to this effect as cannibalization. It is also possible
that for the prospect of trading to lead more consumers to purchase the high plan, as
they now have an opportunity to sell excess capacity on the trading market if they need
it. We refer to this effect as market expansion. Second, trading affects consumption
(the aggregate amount of usage fulfilled). In particular, trading can result in more
consumption if consumers are able to fulfill unmet demand by purchasing additional
capacity on the trading market. We refer to this effect as consumption enhancement.
However, it is also possible for trading to result in less consumption if more consumers
choose the low plan and available capacity on the trading market is not sufficient to
fulfill unmet demand. We refer to this effect as demand throttling.
We show that whether or not trading improves profit, consumer surplus, and social
welfare depends on the relative strength of these four effects, which in turn depends
on two factors: (1) the cost incurred by the service provider per unit of usage and (2)
the prevailing trading price. In particular, trading is harmful to a service provider if
either the trading price is sufficiently low (in this case cannibalization prevails with fewer
consumers choosing the high plan) or if the usage cost is sufficiently high (in this case the
consumption effect dominates, with consumption increasing without a sufficient increase
in the number of consumers who choose the high plan). We show that these outcomes
are determined by well-specified thresholds on cost and trading price. Assuming no
changes are made to plans’ prices and allowances, consumers of course always benefit
from trading (a consumer can stick to the same plan but now benefits from buying
and selling excess capacity). However, social welfare can be harmed if consumption is
throttled. We show that this is the case when the trading price is sufficiently low, as
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determined by also a well-specified threshold. Put together, these results show that there
are five distinct regions, dependent on service cost and trading price, that correspond to
different combinations of positive and negative outcomes for profit, consumer surplus,
and social welfare, with one of these regions corresponding to an improvement in all
three (a region of low enough service cost and high enough trading price).
In settings where the service provider is able to modify the contract terms, we show
that the service provider charges a higher price for the high plan. This comes at the
expense of consumers who are no longer guaranteed to benefit. We show that, in this
case, trading can hurt consumers if trading price is either sufficiently low (resulting in less
consumption because more consumers opt for the low plan) or sufficiently high (resulting
in consumers paying a higher price for the higher plan because of the adjustment to the
price of the high plan made by the service provider). Again, depending on trading price
and service cost, we can identify five regions corresponding to different combinations
of positive and negative outcomes for service provider’s profit, consumer surplus, and
social welfare. An important difference is that in this case, it is possible for trading to
be harmful to all three metrics. We also examine the impact of trading on individual
consumers. We show that those who benefit the most are those with a moderate usage
type, as they are more likely to experience a mismatch between the plan they purchased
and their realized demand.
When the trading price is in the hands of consumers and is set via a market clearing
mechanism, then perhaps surprisingly trading always improves outcomes for service
provider’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Moreover, in contrast to the
case where the trading price is exogenously specified, the benefit from trading to the
service provider is non-monotonic, first increasing and then decreasing. The implication
is that when the trading price is set via a market clearing mechanism, trading is most
beneficial to service providers with moderate service costs while when the trading price
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is exogenously specified (independently of service cost), trading is most beneficial to
service providers with low service costs.
These results have several managerial implications. They provide guidance to service
providers, consumers, and policy makers as to when peer-to-peer trading may or may not
be beneficial, including when trading is beneficial to all or none. The results highlight
the important interplay between trading price and cost of service in determining various
outcomes. They also point to when there is an opportunity for the service provider to
extract more of the surplus created by a trading marketplace through contract redesign.
For policy makers and regulators, the results can be useful in pointing out when such
trading improves outcomes for consumers or social welfare and to potential policy levers
that could be deployed to affect outcomes. The results also point to the value of letting
trading price be market-driven and determined by choices consumers make.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide a review of
related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe the model. In Section 2.4, we character-
ize the equilibrium with and without trading. In Section 2.5, we examine the impact
of trading on equilibrium outcomes. In Section 2.6, we consider the service provider’s
problem and characterize optimal contracts’ prices. In Section 2.7, we consider variants
and extensions to the basic model, including the case where the trading price is deter-
mined via a market clearing mechanism, the case of a single contract, and the case of
a system with a general usage distribution. In Section 2.8, we offer some concluding
comments.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two related streams of literature: the emerging literature on peer-to-peer
product sharing and the literature on secondary markets (the peer-to-peer trading of
usage allowances can be viewed as a secondary market for access). We start with
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reviewing the literature on peer-to-peer product sharing. This stream of literature
aims to understand how consumer behavior (ownership and usage), firm’s profit and
decisions, and social welfare, among other metrics, may change when consumers who
own a product are able to share it with those who do not own it via short term rentals.
Jiang and Tian (2016) examine how product sharing affects the firm’s pricing and
quality decisions. They find that, in the presence of sharing, the firm increases its quality
allowing consumers with variable consumption to generate a higher rental income during
low usage periods. Tian and Jiang (2018) consider a two-tier supply chain and show that
when the cost of building the production capacity is high both the manufacturer and the
retailer benefit from product sharing, with the retailer’s share being larger. However,
when the cost of capacity is low, the retailer benefits but not the manufacturer. Abhishek
et al. (2016) study the effect of sharing on the manufacturer and identify consumer
heterogeneity as a determining factor for the profitability of sharing. If the heterogeneity
is moderate, both the firm and consumers can be better off in the presence of a peer-
to-peer market. Our work is different from above studies in the following important
aspects. First, sharing does not affect the production cost of a durable good whereas
for a service good a firm’s service cost depends on the actual usage which is affected
by sharing. Hence, sharing only changes the sales (or revenue) of a manufacturer of
durable goods whereas sharing changes both the revenue and cost of a service provider.
Second, from the perspective of consumers, durable goods on the secondary markets are
usually of lower quality, but service goods on the peer-to-peer market are of the same
quality as goods on the primary market. Third, in the service good setting, the usage
allowances expire after usage and there is no moral hazard or product depreciation as
in the case of sharing of durable goods. Finally, different from Abhishek et al. (2016),
our results are not driven by the level of consumer heterogeneity.
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Benjaafar et al. (2018) study the ownership decision of heterogenous consumers
and its implications on usage and social welfare. They show that peer-to-peer product
sharing always benefits consumers, but ownership and usage levels may or may not
increase. Cachon and Feldman (2018) examine how a firm’s pricing strategy changes
in the presence of a recourse strategy (e.g. reselling) which allows buyers or firms to
transfer the ownership after the initial sale. They show that a recourse strategy can
improve both the buyers’ and the firm’s welfare. Their setting is different from ours in
that in their case each customer demands one unit of capacity. In ours, customers are
heterogenous in their demands. Yang et al. (2016) show, in the context of a queueing
system, that allowing consumers to trade their positions in a queue can improve both
social welfare and the firm’s profit.
There is also a growing number of empirical studies which attempt to assess the effect
of peer-to-peer platforms on incumbent firms (e.g. taxies and hotels), social welfare,
and consumers. Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015) use US automobile industry data
and study whether peer-to-peer rental is social welfare-improving. They report a 0.8 to
6.6% increase in consumer surplus attributed to peer-to-peer rentals. They show that
increase in surplus is more pronounced for low to medium income consumers. Zervas
et al. (2017) estimate that the entry of Airbnb in the city of Austin, Texas caused an
8-10% decrease in hotels revenue with economy and budget hotels effected the most.
They argue that Airbnb not only provides a more affordable accommodation option,
but also benefits those staying in hotels because of lower prices due to competition.
The second related stream of literature is that on secondary markets. This literature
focuses on the tension that arises between value enhancement and cannibalization. The
value of a product is enhanced because of the opportunity to resell the product on the
secondary market. Cannibalization arises because of the possibility that some customers
may forego purchasing a new product in favor of a used product in the secondary
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market. Zhu (2014) argues that a secondary market improves social welfare by increasing
allocation efficiency while it negatively affects provider’s profit. Lee and Whang (2002)
study the implications of a secondary market in a supply chain setting. They show
that a secondary market always improves retailers’ profit. However, whether or not
a secondary market improves the supplier’s profit and supply chain welfare depends
on the retailers’ critical ratio. Desai and Purohit (1998) study a monopolist’s tradeoff
between leasing and selling durable goods and find that if the depreciation rate for the
sold items is high, then the monopolist is better off by selling its products. Lim et al.
(2014) use a similar setting as in Desai and Purohit (1998) to analyze the adoption of
electric vehicles and show that when the firm adopts the battery leasing business model,
a secondary market can improve its profit.
Our work is different from these papers in that we consider a service good which
makes the firm’s profit dependent on the actual usage not the units sold. Also, in con-
trast to durable goods, the usage allowances on the secondary market are of the same
quality, i.e. there is no depreciation, and there is no moral hazard. The setting used by
Lee and Whang (2002) is closest to ours with some notable differences. In our model
consumers are heterogenous whereas the retailers in their setting are homogenous. In
addition, we study the firm’s pricing reaction to the secondary market whereas in Lee
and Whang (2002) the firm’s price is exogenous. The latter leads to a different result
with respect to consumer surplus (individual and aggregate) which in our case may
decrease when there is a secondary market. Other related research streams include dy-
namic models of selling durable goods in the presence of a secondary market (Rust, 1985;
Huang et al., 2001), secondary market as a device for price discrimination (Anderson
and Ginsburgh, 1994), adverse selection (Hendel et al., 2005), the effect of preference
inconsistency (Johnson, 2011), and durable good oligopoly (Esteban and Shum, 2007).
There is extensive literature that studies the impact of a secondary market in the
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specific context of ticket resale. Swofford (1999) is the first to propose a theoretical
framework to study ticket resale. He explains that brokers’ different risk attitudes allows
them to exist without hurting the provider’s profit. Courty (2003b) considers a setting
in which a monopolist sells tickets to customers who learn their valuations over time. He
shows that the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale. This is different
from our results that peer-to-peer trading can be profitable for the service provider.
Courty (2003a) argues that the existence of brokers does not affect the social welfare
and if they do not exist in the market their surplus will be captured by either the service
providers or customers. In our setting, the secondary market is peer-to-peer and there
is no broker. Also, we show that a secondary market can improve the social welfare by
changing the behavior of consumers and enabling more consumption. Cui et al. (2014)
consider an event provider selling capacity to two classes of customers: diehard and busy
professionals. They argue that a provider with small capacity and fixed pricing is more
likely to benefit from ticket resale. Similarly, Geng et al. (2007) show that, when the
event provider’s capacity is limited and the number of high valuation customers is large
enough, a partial resale can improve both customers’ surplus and the event provider’s
profit (relative to no resale or unrestricted resale). The service provider in our setting
is uncapacitated and there are no restrictions on resale; a setting in which Cui et al.
(2014) show that ticket resale hurts the event provider. Moreover, in our setting the
service provider’s cost depends on the actual usage (not the sold allowances) and we
allow the service provider to set the prices.
Finally, two additional streams of literature are worth mentioning. First, there is
a body of literature which focuses on information goods. Examples include Novos and
Waldman (1984), Kim et al. (2018), and Galbreth et al. (2012) who argue that allowing
some sharing (piracy) of information goods, such as software licenses, can improve social
welfare and firm’s profit. Second, there is a body of literature that examines the effect
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of secondary markets empirically. Leslie and Sorensen (2013) empirically study a major
rock concert and report that the secondary market increased allocation efficiency by 5%.
Chen et al. (2013) use US automobile industry data and estimate that the net effect
of the secondary market could be up to a 35% decrease in the new car manufacturer’s
profits.
2.3 Model Setup
We consider a risk neutral monopolist selling a service good to a unit mass of risk
neutral consumers. We refer to the monopolist seller as the service provider. The
service provider offers two contracts (or plans): a low usage plan with a usage allowance
q1 and a price p1 and a high usage plan with a usage allowance q2 and a price p2. For
simplicity, we consider a setting with two plans. It is possible to study settings with
multiple plans. However, the analysis is less tractable while most of the qualitative
insights remain the same. The use of two plans is common in practice, including some
of the examples mentioned in the introduction. Without loss of generality, we assume
q2 > q1 and p2 > p1 and refer to q1, q2, p1 and p2 as contract parameters. The service
provider incurs a service cost c for each unit of capacity that is used by the consumers.
In other words, the service provider’s service cost depends on the actual consumption,
not the usage allowance she sells.
The consumption (demand) of a consumer is a random variable and consumers are
heterogeneous in their distribution of consumption. Each consumer’s type, denoted by
θ, is his private information and the service provider only knows the distribution of
types across the population which is distributed uniformly on the unit interval [0, 1].
We denote the consumption of a consumer of type θ by Xθ (a random variable) and
we assume it is distributed according to the probability distribution Fθ(x). The type
θ distinguishes consumers in their consumption; a consumer of a higher type is more
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likely to have higher consumption. We capture this heterogeneity by assuming that each
type’s consumption stochastically dominates that of any lower type. More formally, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Stochastic Dominance) Let θ1 and θ2 be two arbitrary types in
[0, 1] and, without loss of generality, assume θ2 > θ1. For any x ∈ R+ we have F¯θ2(x) >
F¯θ1(x) where F¯ denotes the survival function of the distribution f .
This assumption implies that a consumer of a higher type (say θ2) is more likely to
experience a higher demand than a consumer whose type is lower (say θ1).
In the absence of peer-to-peer trading of usage allowance, the only interaction that
takes place is between the service provider and the consumers. Each consumer chooses
a contract under which she pays price pi to the service provider for a usage allowance
in the amount qi with i ∈ {1, 2}. Once demands are realized, a consumer can consume
up to his allowance which is either q1 or q2 depending on the contract he chose. In
the presence of peer-to-peer trading, consumers privately learn their realized demands
and they can trade the unused part of their quota at the prevailing trading price which
we denote by pi. Depending on the setting, the trading price may be set by the owner
of the trading platform or through a market clearing mechanism if pricing is in the
hands of individual sellers. In this chapter, for much of the analysis, we take trading
price as being exogenously specified (this would arise naturally if the trading platform
belongs to a third party who chooses trading prices to maximize profit or some other
objective.). In Section 2.7.1, we consider the case where price is determined through a
market clearing mechanism. Figure 2.1 summarizes the sequence of events that happens
with or without peer-to-peer trading.
We assume consumers are risk neutral and have valuation r for each unit of usage.
The utility of a consumer of type θ, who elects a plan (q, p), in the absence of trading
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Figure 2.1: Sequence of events with and without peer-to-peer trading
is given by
un(q, θ) = rE[min{Xθ, q}]− p, (2.1)
where E is the expectation operator over the type θ’s random consumption.
When peer-to-peer trading is allowed, consumers can buy and sell excess capacity.
In particular, when a consumer’s realized demand is smaller than his contract’s usage
allowance (i.e. Xθ < q), a situation we call overage, the consumer puts up his surplus
capacity on the trading market. On the other hand, when a consumer’s realized demand
is larger than his allowance, a situation we call underage, he can purchase additional
capacity from the trading market.
We denote the aggregate demand (supply) of capacity on the trading market by ψd
(ψs). If the aggregate supply exceeds the aggregate demand, the available demand is
uniformly rationed among all the sellers (we refer to this situation as demand rationing)
such that a seller can sell a fraction α = min
{
ψd
ψs
, 1
}
of their excess capacity on the
trading market. Similarly, when the aggregate supply exceeds the aggregate demand,
the aggregate demand is uniformly assigned to individual sellers (we refer to this sit-
uation as supply rationing) and each buyer can acquire a fraction β = min
{
ψs
ψd
, 1
}
of his need for extra capacity from the trading market. The functions α and β are
endogenously determined in equilibrium. Note that the rationing functions α and β are
complementary, i.e. α < 1 implies β = 1 and, similarly, β < 1 implies α = 1.
In the presence of trading, the expected utility of a consumer of type θ can be
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expressed as
ut(q, θ) = rE[min{Xθ, q}] + αpi E[q −Xθ]+ + β (r − pi)E[Xθ − q]+ − p
= un(q, θ) + αpi E[q −Xθ]+ + β (r − pi)E[Xθ − q]+. (2.2)
If it turns out that Xθ < q (overage), a type θ individual can sell a fraction α of her
overage at price pi on the trading market. This gives her an additional utility which is
captured by the amount αpi E[q −Xθ]+. Similarly if Xθ > q (underage), the consumer
can purchase additional capacity on the trading market. Her utility from each extra
unit of capacity that she purchases and consumes is r − pi. She can satisfy a fraction β
of her underage through the trading market which gives her an additional utility equal
to β (r − pi)E[Xθ − q]+.
To avoid trivial cases in which a portion of consumers leaves the market without
purchasing a plan or there is a plan that does not attract a positive mass of consumers,
we make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Full Market Coverage) For the lowest type (i.e. θ = 0), there
exists a plan mi, i ∈ {1, 2} such that u`(qi, 0) ≥ 0 for ` ∈ {t , s}.
Assumption 3 (Full Plan Coverage) There exists a consumer of type θ1 who
prefers plan m1 over m2, i.e. u`(q1, θ1) ≥ u`(q2, θ1) with ` ∈ {t , s}. Similarly, there
exists a consumer of type θ2 who prefers plan m2 over m1, i.e. u`(q2, θ2) ≥ u`(q2, θ2).
In words, we avoid cases in which a portion of consumers leaves the market without
purchasing a plan (Assumption 2) or there is a plan that attracts no consumers (As-
sumption 3). The full market coverage implies that the service provider wants to cover
the whole market regardless of the market mechanism he implements. These two as-
sumptions allow us to focus only on the effect of peer-to-peer trading contorting for
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market size.
Finally, and mostly for expositional simplicity, we assume that demand is distributed
according to a two-point discrete distribution as specified in Assumption 4 below. In
Section 2.7.3, we revisit this assumption and show that our main results hold under a
more general distribution of demand.
Assumption 4 (Discrete Type-Dependent Demand) A consumer of type θ has
an uncertain demand which can be either high (H) or low (L) and follows the probability
mass function
Pθ(Xθ = H) = θ and Pθ(Xθ = L) = 1− θ. (2.3)
Assumption 4 implies that as a consumer’s type increases, she is more likely to have a
higher demand. It is straightforward to verify that the distribution in Assumption 4
satisfies the stochastic ordering we specified earlier in Assumption 1. For expositional
simplicity we also make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 q1 = L and q2 = H.
The results we show here do not depend on the above assumption. However, it allows us
to provide explicit expressions for various equilibrium outcomes, making our analysis in
subsequent sections more tractable. Moreover, if we consider the case without trading
as our status quo, choosing q1 = L and q2 = H is optimal for the service provider.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the equilibrium in the absence of peer-to-peer trading
which, for our analysis, serves as a benchmark and may be viewed as the status quo.
Then we do the same in the presence of trading.
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2.4.1 Systems without Trading
In the following theorem, we characterize the equilibrium for a system without trading.
Theorem 1 Let ρ = p2−p1H−L . Without trading, there exists an equilibrium specified by a
threshold θn =
ρ
r such that a consumer of type θ < θn prefers plan m1 and a consumer
of type θ ≥ θn prefers plan m2. The threshold θn decreases in p1 and increases in p2.
Theorem 1 shows that, perhaps consistent with intuition, consumers with sufficiently
low θ, as specified by the threshold θn, choose plan m1 and the rest choose plan m2.
Moreover, a higher value for p2 makes plan m1 a more attractive option and leads to
higher θn while a higher value of p1 leads to lower θn and more consumers preferring
contract m2.
It follows that the service provider’s profit is given by
Πn = p1 θn + p2 (1− θn)− c Pn, (2.4)
where Pn denotes the total consumption (aggregate amount of demand fulfilled) when
no trading takes place and is given by
Pn =
∫ θn
0
{θ L+ (1− θ)L} dθ +
∫ 1
θn
{θH + (1− θ)L} dθ,
or equivalently
Pn = L+
H − L
2
(1− θ2n). (2.5)
Finally, it is easy to verify that Assumptions 2 and 3 reduce to r ≥ p1L , and r ≥ ρ.
From these two equations, it is easy to confirm that the consumer who has the highest
type, i.e. θ = 1, prefers high plan m2, and the consumer who has the lowest type, i.e.
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θ = 0, prefers low plan m1.
2.4.2 Systems with Peer-to-Peer Trading
First note that if a consumer of type θ purchases a plan with usage quota q, his expected
overage and underage are given by (2.6) and (2.7), respectively:
O(q, θ) = (1− θ)(q − L), (2.6)
and
L(q, θ) = θ(H − q). (2.7)
We denote the set of types who opt for plan mi by Θi where i ∈ {1, 2}. Using
this notation, the aggregate demand on the trading market, denoted by ψd, and the
aggregate supply, denoted by ψs, are given by
ψs =
∫
θ∈Θ2
O(H, θ) dθ, (2.8)
and
ψd =
∫
θ∈Θ1
L(L, θ) dθ. (2.9)
In the following theorem, we characterize the corresponding equilibrium.
Theorem 2 In the presence of peer-to-peer trading, there exists a unique equilibrium
characterized by the threshold
θt =

r − pi
2r − (ρ+ pi) if pi ≤ ρ,
ρ
ρ+ pi
if ρ < pi,
(2.10)
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with ρ = p2−p1H−L , such that a consumer of type θ < θt prefers plan m1 and a consumer of
type θ ≥ θt prefers plan m2. The threshold θt increases in p2 and decreases in p1 and
pi.
Given θt, we can simplify (2.8) and (2.9) as ψs =
H−L
2 (1 − θt)2 and ψd = H−L2 θ2t ,
respectively. The rationing coefficients can now be explicitly expressed as
α = min
{
θ2t
(1− θt)2 , 1
}
, (2.11)
and
β = min
{
(1− θt)2
θ2t
, 1
}
. (2.12)
Using the above equations, the service provider’s profit can be written as
Πt = p1 θt + p2 (1− θt)− cPt
or, equivalently, as
Πt = Πn + (p2 − p1)(θn − θt)− c (Pt − Pn), (2.13)
where Πn is the service provider’s profit without trading. The total consumption Pt is
given by H+L2 −max {ψd − ψs, 0} or equivalently as
Pt =
H + L
2
−max
{
H − L
2
(2 θt − 1), 0
}
. (2.14)
The first term in (2.14), i.e. H+L2 , captures the amount of capacity needed to fully
satisfy all consumers’ demand. If supply exceeds demand on the trading platform, i.e.
ψs ≥ ψd, all consumers consumption is fully satisfied and the total consumption is
Pt =
H+L
2 . However, if ψs < ψd, not all consumers can satisfy all of their consumption
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and the total consumption is less than its maximum value of H+L2 by an amount of
H−L
2 (2 θt − 1).
Finally, in the presence of peer-to-peer trading, Assumptions 2 and 3 can be restated
as follows:
r ≥ p1 − βpi
L− β (2.15)
ρ− αpi
r − αpi − β(r − pi) ≥ 0, (2.16)
and
ρ− αpi
r − αpi − β(r − pi) ≤ 1. (2.17)
2.5 Impact of Peer-to-Peer Trading
In this section, we examine the impact of introducing peer-to-peer trading assuming no
changes are made to plan prices and usage allowances.
2.5.1 Impact on Plan Selection
As a preamble, we first characterize the impact of trading on consumer decisions re-
garding plan selection. The following proposition characterizes the impact of trading
on consumer decisions regarding plan selection.
Proposition 6 (Plan Selection) In the presence of trading, θt ≤ θn if and only if
pi ≥ pih where pih = r − p2−p1H−L .
Proposition 6 shows that the higher the trading price, the more consumers purchase the
high plan. This makes intuitive sense. A higher trading price enhances the perceived
value of the high plan. The prospect of earning income from excess capacity reduces
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the effective cost of the high plan to a consumer. Proposition 6 also shows that there is
a threshold on the trading price, pi, above which more consumers (relative to the case
without trading) opt for the high plan and below which more consumers opt for the low
plan. In other words, if the trading price is sufficiently low, more consumers opt for the
low plan.
2.5.2 Impact on the Service Provider
The following proposition describes the impact of trading on the service provider.
Proposition 7 If c > 2 r ρr+ρ , trading (relative to no trading) leads to lower profit for the
service provider. If c ≤ 2 r ρr+ρ , there exists a unique threshold pip such that trading leads
to higher profit for the service provider if and only if pi > pip where
pip =

ρ(2r − c)(r − ρ)
ρ(2r − c)− rc if c ≤ 2r
(
1− r
ρ
)
,
2r2
2r − c − ρ if c > 2r
(
1− r
ρ
)
.
Moreover, the threshold pip increases in c.
Proposition 7 shows that whether or not trading is beneficial to the service provider
depends on both the cost of usage and the trading price. If the cost of usage is sufficiently
high, then trading will always harm the platform. This can be explained as follows.
First, note that for the service provider to benefit from trading, more consumers need
to opt for the high plan. However, more consumers opting for the high plan also means
higher consumption and, therefore, higher usage cost. If the unit usage cost is sufficiently
high, the increase in usage cost more than offsets the increase in revenue, resulting in a
net decrease in profit. When the unit cost is sufficiently low, then it is possible for the
firm to profit. However, this requires that the number of consumers who choose the high
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Figure 2.2: The service provider’s profit with and without trading; r = 1, H = 6, L = 2,
p2 = 5, p1 = 2
plan is sufficiently large. This is the case only if the trading price is sufficiently large
(above threshold pip). When the trading price is in the interval [pih, pip], even though
more consumers choose the high plan, the resulting increase in revenue is not enough to
offset the increase in usage cost due to higher consumption. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
combination of cost and trading prices under which trading is profitable for the service
provider.
2.5.3 Impact on Consumers
As mentioned already, consumers always benefit from trading. However, consumers,
depending on their type, may benefit differently. In this section, we characterize how
consumers of different types are affected by trading. We first define the difference in
the consumers’ utility with and without trading as ∆u(θ) = ut(θ, q)−un(θ, q) where un
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(a) pi = 0.15, r = 1, H = 2, L = 1, p2 = 1.5,
p1 = 1
(b) pi = 0.85, r = 1, H = 2, L = 1, p2 = 1.5,
p1 = 1
Figure 2.3: Improvement in consumer surplus due to trading
and ut are defined in (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. The following proposition provides
an explicit formula for ∆u(θ) and characterizes how consumers of different type benefit
from trading.
Proposition 8 The function ∆u(θ) is piece-wise linear and given by
∆u(θ) =

(H − L) (r−ρ)2r−pi θ if θ < min{θn, θt},
(H − L)ρ− (H − L)
(
r − (r−ρ)2r−pi
)
θ if θn < θt and θn < θ < θt,
(H − L)ρ(ρ−pi)pi + (H − L)
(
r − ρ2pi
)
θ if θn ≥ θt and θt < θ < θn,
(H − L)ρ2pi (1− θ) if θ > max{θn, θt},
(2.18)
Moreover, the consumer of type θ = θn benefits the most from trading.
Proposition 8 shows that consumers fall in three segments. Consumers in the first
segment with θ ≥ max{θn, θt} purchase the high plan with or without trading. We refer
to this segment as high type. Consumers in the second segment with θ ≤ min{θt , θn}
purchase the low plan with or without trading. We refer to this segment as the low
type. Lastly, consumers in the third segment, and perhaps the more interesting of the
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three, are switchers who change their purchasing behavior in the presence of trading.
In one case, if θt = max{θt , θn}, switchers prefer to purchase the low plan and they
rely on the trading market to purchase extra capacity they may need. In the other case,
when θt = max{θt , θn}, the opposite happens. Switchers change from the low plan to
the high plan and sell any leftover on the trading market.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the utility difference ∆u(θ) increases in θ for low type
consumers (i.e. θ < min{θn , θt}) and decreases for high type consumers (i.e. θ >
max{θn , θt}). Therefore, the consumer who benefits the most should be a switcher.
Intuitively, when the trading price is low, the consumer who benefits the most is the
consumer with the highest supply of capacity on the trading market which happens to
be θ = θn(see Figure 2.3a). On the other hand, when the trading price is high, the
consumer who benefits the most is the consumer with the highest demand for capacity
on the trading market which again is θ = θn(see Figure 2.3b).
2.5.4 Impact on Social Welfare
We define social welfare as the sum of aggregate consumer surplus and the service
provider’s profit. Let Sn and St denote, respectively, the social welfare in the case
without and with trading. They can be obtained as St = (r − c)Pt and Sn = (r − c)Pn
where Pt (as in (2.14)) and Pn (as in (2.5)) are, respectively, the total consumption with
and without trading.
The following proposition characterizes the impact of trading on social welfare.
Proposition 9 There exists a unique threshold pis =
ρ(r−ρ)(ρ+r)
ρ2+r2
, with ρ = p2−p1H−L , such
that St(pi) < Sn if and only if pi < pis. Moreover, the threshold pis is less than pip.
As mentioned earlier, the social welfare is higher as long as the total consumption is
higher. Therefore, obviously, when more consumers opt for the higher plan, which
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Trading price (0, pis) [pis, pih) [pih, pip) [pip, r)
Consumer surplus ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Social welfare ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Portion choosing high plan ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Provider’s profit ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑
Table 2.1: The impact of trading on consumer surplus, social welfare, portion of con-
sumers choosing high plan, and the service provider profit
happens when pi ≥ pih, social welfare increases. However, since trading improves effi-
ciency by reallocating unused capacity, social welfare can still increase even if the total
allowances sold shrinks. When the trading price is in the interval [pis, pip), the total al-
lowances sold decreases with trading. However, the social welfare increases by allowing
consumers to trade.
2.5.5 Summary of Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results regarding the impact of trading on the service provider,
consumers, and social welfare when c ≤ 2 r ρr+ρ and shows that there exists a triple-win
region. The outcomes can be partitioned, based on the trading price, into three regions:
region I where only consumers benefit, region II where consumers benefit and social
welfare improves but the service provider is hurt, and regions III where consumers and
the service provider benefit and social welfare is improved (a triple win region). Finally,
if c > 2 r ρr+ρ , the service provider’s profit deceases by trading regardless of the trading
price (i.e. pip → r). In this case, there does not exists a triple-win region, but both the
consumer surplus and social welfare are improved by trading for pi ≥ pis.
2.6 The Service Provider’s Problem
So far, we treated the prices, p1 and p2, as being exogenously specified. In this section,
we allow for these to be decisions that the service provider makes and that may differ
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with and without trading. The ability to modify prices in response to trading allows
the service provider to extract surplus that may otherwise accrue to consumers. In this
section, we examine the extent to which pricing flexibility affects equilibrium outcomes.
We are particularly interested in investigating whether trading continues to be beneficial
to consumers or if it is possible for consumers to be worse off with than without trading.
Note that, for tractability, we leave the allowances unchanged and set at values that
are optimal for the service provider in the absence of trading, i.e. q1 = L and q2 = H.
Allowing the service provider to modify these quantities would allow the service provider
to extract additional surplus. In this sense, the results in this section provide a lower
(upper) bound on service provider (consumer) surplus.
Without trading, the service provider’s pricing problem can be stated as follows:
max p1,p2 p1 θn + p2 (1− θn)− c Pn (2.19)
subject to p1 ≤ r L,
ρ ≤ r, and
θn =
ρ
r
.
Similarly, in the presence of trading, the service provider’s problem can be stated as:
max p1,p2 p1 θt + p2 (1− θt)− c Pt (2.20)
subject to p1 ≤ r L− β(r − pi)L, (2.21)
0 ≤ ρ− αpi
r − αpi − β(r − pi) ≤ 1, and (2.22)
(2.10) - (2.12).
Constraint (2.21) ensures that the full plan coverage requirement is satisfied and con-
straint (2.22) guarantees that the full market is covered by plans mt1 and m
t
2, i.e. all
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consumers participate. The last constraint ensures that the switching threshold θt is the
equilibrium of the consumers purchasing game. The following Theorem characterizes
the optimal prices with and without trading.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Prices) Without trading, the service provider’s optimal prices
are pn1 = r L and p
n
2 = r L+
r2
2 r−c ρ. With trading, the optimal prices are p
t
1 = r L and
pt2 =

r L+ ρ pi if c ≤ pi − 2(r − pi),
r L+ ρ
(
2r − pi −
√
(2r − pi − c)(r − pi)
)
if c > pi − 2(r − pi).
(2.23)
Moreover, pt2 ≥ pn2 with both pn2 and pt2 increase in c.
Theorem 3 shows that the price for the low plan is the same with or without trading and
is set at rL, which corresponds to the maximum price at which the consumer with the
lowest type (θ = 0) is willing to purchase. This is not the case for the price of the high
plan. Since trading enhances the value of the high plan, the service provider charges a
higher price with trading. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the difference in the two prices
can be significant. It is affected by both the trading price and the service cost, with the
difference being most significant when the service cost is low and the trading price is
high. This suggests (as we will formally show next) that this is also the region where
trading is most profitable for the service provider. With trading, prices are increasing
in the trading price which makes intuitive sense (since the value of the high plan to a
consumer increases in the trading price). The more interesting feature is perhaps the
fact that, when the trading price is sufficiently high and the service cost is sufficiently
low (c < pi−2(r−pi)), the high plan’s price is invariant to the service cost. In this case,
the total consumption is at its maximum value P¯ and if the service provider increases
the high plan’s price, some consumers would choose the low plan causing revenue loss
while service cost is unaffected. Therefore, when c < pi − 2(r − pi) holds, pt2 does not
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Figure 2.4: The effect of changes in the service cost on the high plan price; r = 1, L = 1,
H = 3
change as the service cost increases by a small amount. The flat part of the pt2 curve in
Figure 2.4 corresponds to this scenario.
Next, we examine how the pricing decision made by the service provider affects
equilibrium outcomes. Of particular interest is the impact on consumers. As we show
in the following proposition, it is now possible that consumers are actually worse off
with trading than without it. The following proposition characterizes the impact of
trading (under optimized prices) on consumers.
Proposition 10 (Consumer Surplus) When prices are set optimally, the following
statements hold.
1. Aggregate consumer surplus is higher with than without trading if and only pi∗c1 ≤
pi ≤ pi∗c2 with both pi∗c1 and pi∗c2 increasing in c.
2. There exists a type θ` ∈ (θn, θt) such that all consumers with type θ ≤ θ` benefit
from trading and all consumers with type θ > θ` are worse off. Moreover, among
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(a) Aggregate consumer surplus (b) Individual consumer surplus
Figure 2.5: The effect of trading on consumer surplus
all consumers, the consumer of type θn benefits the most.
Proposition 10 shows that, in contrast to the case where prices are exogenously specified,
consumers may not necessarily benefit from trading. This can be explained as follows.
Consumer surplus is determined by the difference in the value derived from consumption
and the price paid to service provider. When service provider is able to respond to the
presence of trading by modifying prices, it chooses a higher price for the high plan. This
could result in more consumers choosing the lower plan which is more likely to occur
when the trading price is low. In this case, we witness both a decrease in aggregate
consumption and an increase in prices which causes the aggregate consumer surplus to
drop below its value without trading.
A higher price for the high plan may not necessarily lead to more consumers choosing
the low plan. When the trading price is high, more consumers choose the high plan
despite the increase in its price. However, even in this case, it is possible for consumer
surplus to decrease if the trading price is sufficiently high. This can be explained by the
following. The increase in the trading price leads to more consumers choosing the higher
plan. This increases the total consumption up to the point that the total consumption
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reaches its maximum value where all consumers demand is satisfied. If the trading price
increases further, the total consumption stays unchanged while the high plan’s price
increases. This leads to a decrease in aggregate consumer surplus.
In summary, as indicated by Proposition 10, trading can hurt consumers if the
trading price is either sufficiently low (resulting in less consumption) or sufficiently high
(resulting in consumers paying a higher price for the higher plan). These results are
depicted in Figure 2.5a. Note that, initially, consumer surplus increases with the trading
price because the increase in the trading price leads to more consumers choosing the
higher plan and an increase in the total consumption. As the trading price increases,
eventually, the total consumption reaches its maximum value. An increase in trading
price beyond this point only increases the high plan’s price without changing the total
consumption. Therefore, consumer surplus decreases in pi for high trading prices.
At an individual level, consumers who decide to purchase the low plan benefit from
trading (since they pay the same price with or without trading), with the benefit in-
creasing in the type θ. The individual who benefits the most is the one who is indifferent
between the low and high plan without trading. Individuals who decide to purchase the
high plan may not necessarily benefit. This is because the high plan is now more ex-
pensive. Consumers who can be hurt by trading are those with the highest type since
they are least likely to have excess capacity to sell. These results are depicted in Figure
2.5b.
The effect of trading on service provider and social welfare does not qualitatively
change from the case with exogenous prices. In particular, we can show again that
service provider benefits from trading if and only if the trading price is sufficiently high.
Similarly, for social welfare, it increases by trading if and only if the trading price is
sufficiently high. These results are formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Service Provider’s Profit & Social Welfare) The following
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statements hold.
1. There exists a threshold pi∗p such that trading leads to a higher service provider’s
profit if and only if pi ≥ pi∗p.
2. There exists a threshold pi∗s such that trading leads to higher social welfare if and
only if pi ≥ pi∗s .
3. The thresholds pi∗p and pi∗s increase in c and pi∗s ≤ pi∗p
We conclude this section by highlighting thee main differences between the results
here and those in Section 2.5 where prices are exogenous. First note that the triple-win
region is characterized by both a lower and an upper bound on the trading price. This
is different from the results in Section 2.5 in which the triple-win region is characterized
by only a lower bound on the trading price. Secondly, when prices are exogenous,
the triple-win region exists when the service cost is not too high, but when the prices
are optimized, the triple-win region exists for any c ∈ [0, r). Lastly, when prices are
exogenous then, under any trading price, at least one of the performance metrics is
improved by trading (see Table 2.1). However, when prices are set optimally, there
exists a no-win region where none of the performance metrics is improved (see Figure
2.6).
2.7 Other Settings and Extensions
In this section, we consider variants and extensions to our basic setting. In Section
2.7.1, we consider the case where the trading price is determined via a market clearing
mechanism. In Section 2.7.2, we consider the case of a single contract and study the
effect of having more than one contract on the profitability of trading. Finally, in Section
2.7.3, we consider the case in which consumers’ demands follow a general distribution.
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Figure 2.6: The impact of trading under optimal prices
2.7.1 Market Clearing-Determined Trading Price
In this section, we study the case in which the trading price is set via a market clearing
mechanism, which would arise if pricing is in the hands of individual sellers of excess
capacity. The market clearing price is the price at which aggregate supply(ψs) equals ag-
gregate demand(ψd). We maintain all other assumptions as in the base model described
in Section 2.4 and Section 2.6.
Let pim denote the market clearing price. Then pim is the price pi that solves ψs = ψd.
In the following proposition, we characterize the market clearing price and its impact
on various equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 12 The market clearing price is unique and given by pim =
1
3(2r + c).
Moreover, under this price, the service provider’s profit, social welfare, and aggregate
consumer surplus are all improved relative to the no trading scenario.
Proposition 12 shows that when the trading price is set via a market clearing mechanism,
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(a) Fixed trading price (pi = 0.8) (b) The market clearing trading price
Figure 2.7: The effect of the service cost on the service provider’s gain from trading
trading benefits everyone: the service provider, consumers, and social welfare. Recalling
from Section 2.6 that the ”triple win” region is characterized by lower and upper bounds
pi∗p and pi∗c2 on the trading price, Proposition 12 implies that the market clearing price
pim is always between these two thresholds, regardless of the value of c.
Note that the trading price now depends on service cost, c. This leads to an addi-
tional difference in outcomes. As the next proposition shows, the service cost impacts
the gain from trading by the service provider differently from the case where the trading
price is exogenously specified.
Proposition 13 For a fixed trading price pi, the service provider’s profit gain from
trading, Πt − Πn, decreases in c. However, under the market clearing trading price
pim, the profit gain is concave in c, first increasing and then decreasing, and attains its
maximum at cm = (2−
√
3)r.
As the first part of Proposition 13 states, when the trading price is exogenous, the
service provider’s gain from trading, Πt − Πn, decreases in the service cost (see Figure
2.7a). The intuition is straightforward. Trading induces more consumption. So, if
c increases, the cost to the service provider also increases. However, this is not the
case when the trading price is set via a market clearing mechanism. In particular, the
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profit gain Πt − Πn first increases and then decreases in c (see Figure 2.7b). This is
because, pim is now an increasing function of c. Hence, an increase in c is compensated
by an increase in the trading price. The increase in the trading price enhances the
value of the high plan (and hence the fraction of consumers who choose it), increasing
the service provider’s revenue. When c is sufficiently small, the increase in the service
providers revenue is larger than the increase in the resulting service cost (due to more
consumption). Therefore, the profit gain increases in c. However, when c is sufficiently
large, the increase in the service cost surpasses the increase in revenue and the profit
gain decreases.
The implication from this result is that, if the trading price is set independently
of the service cost, then service providers with low costs benefit the most from trad-
ing. In contrast, when the trading price is set via a market clearing mechanism, then
service providers with moderate service costs benefit the most. The behavior of other
performance metrics (social welfare and consumer surplus) with respect to c is not qual-
itatively affected by the market clearing trading price and is similar to the case with
the exogenously specified trading price.
2.7.2 The Case of a Single Contract
In this section, we consider a setting with a single contract (instead of two). In some
applications, such as gym membership and residential internet, the service provider may
offer a single contract. Our first goal here is to investigate if our main results continue to
hold for the case with one contract. Second, we compare outcomes with one versus two
contracts and assess the impact of having more than one contract on the various parties.
The following theorem characterizes the service provider’s optimal single contract.
Proposition 14 For a service provider who offers a single contract, the contract that
maximizes profit in the absence of trading is given by m∗◦ = (L, rL). A contract that
82
maximizes profit in the presence of trading is given by
m∗◦ =

(L, rL) if pi ≤ c,(H + L
2
, r L+ pi
H − L
2
)
if pi > c.
(2.24)
Moreover, if pi ≥ c, trading increases the service provider’s profit and social welfare
relative to the case without trading while the aggregate consumer surplus decreases with
trading. If pi < c, the service provider profit, consumer surplus, and social are the same
with and without trading.
The contract m∗◦ has a few interesting features. When the trading price is smaller than
the unit service cost (pi < c), the service provider implements the same contract with
trading as without trading. The reason is intuitive. When pi < c, demand exceeds
the supply on the trading market and, hence, any unit of capacity sold gets consumed
and increases the service provider’s cost by c. This decreases the service provider’s
profit since he can charge at most pi for those units. Therefore, by offering the contract
(L, rL), the service provider effectively shuts down the trading market. As a result,
when pi < c, trading does not change equilibrium outcomes. In contrast, when pi ≥ c,
there is an opportunity for the service provider to extract more surplus from consumers
by offering a higher capacity and charging a higher price. Another notable feature of
m∗◦ (compared to the case with two plans) is that the triple win region does not exist.
For pi ≥ c, both social welfare and the service provider’s profit increase, but this comes
at the expense of consumers who see their surplus decrease. When pi ≥ c, consumer
surplus decreases since trading enables the service provider to extract more surplus from
the high type consumers by charging a higher price.
Next, we study the effect of having more than one contract on equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, we compare the outcomes with one versus two contracts and answer the
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Figure 2.8: The effect of the number of contracts on the service provider’s gain from
trading
following question. Is trading more valuable to service providers when they offer two
plans or when they offer only one? For the sake of brevity, we relegate the formal
statements of results to Proposition 19 in the Appendix D.
We summarize the results below and illustrate them graphically in Figures 2.8.
Region I (pi ≥ max{pi∗p, c}). In this region, the gain from trading is positive regardless
of the number of contracts. However, the gain is larger with one plan. The
intuition is as follows. With two plans service providers can price-discriminate
even without trading and, hence, the gain from trading is lower.
Region II (pi < pi∗p). Trading decreases the service provider’s profit when there are
two plans and trading weakly increases the service provider’s profit with one plan.
Hence, the gain from trading is larger with a single plan.
Region III (pi∗p ≤ pi ≤ c). The service provider’s profit is not affected by trading when
there is only a single plan. In contrast, the service provider’s gain from trading is
positive when there are two plans.
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In summary, in Region III, the gain from trading is larger when there are two plans and
elsewhere it is lager when there is a single plan.
2.7.3 General Demand Distribution
In this section, we consider a more general demand distribution Fθ(x) (with density
fθ(x) and survival function F¯θ(x)). The utility of a consumer of type θ with and
without trading can be, respectively, written as:
un(q, θ) = r
∫ q
0
F¯θ(x) dx− p,
and
ut(q, θ) = r
∫ q
0
F¯θ(x) dx+ αpi
∫ q
0
(q − x) dFθ(x) + β (r − pi)
∫ ∞
q
(x− q) dFθ(x)− p,
where α = min
{
ψd
ψs
, 1
}
and β = min
{
ψs
ψd
, 1
}
are defined (as in Section 2.3) in terms of
aggregate supply (ψs) and aggregate demand (ψd) on the trading market. First, note
that the expected overage and underage of a consumer of type θ who selects a plan with
allowance q are
O(q, θ) =
∫ q
0
(q − x) dFθ(x) (2.25)
and
L(q, θ) =
∫ ∞
q
(x− q) dFθ(x), (2.26)
respectively. Denote the set of consumers who opt for contract mi by Θi with i = 1, 2
and define
ψs =
∫
θ∈Θ1
O(q 1, θ) dθ +
∫
θ∈Θ2
O(q 2, θ) dθ (2.27)
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and
ψd =
∫
θ∈Θ1
L(q 1, θ) dθ +
∫
θ∈Θ2
L(q 2, θ) dθ. (2.28)
In Theorem 4 below, we show that there are again unique thresholds characterizing the
equilibrium behavior of consumers with and without trading.
Theorem 4 There is a unique threshold θt(θn) for the cases with (without) trading such
that a consumer of type θ ≥ θt(θn) prefers contract m1 = (q1 , p1) and otherwise prefers
contract m2 = (q2 , p2). The threshold θt solves
∫ q2
q1
F¯θt(x) dx =
p2 − p1 − αpi (q2 − q1)
r − αpi − β(r − pi) , (2.29)
and the threshold θn solves
∫ q 2
q 1
F¯θn(x) dx =
p 2 − p 1
r
. (2.30)
Moreover, thresholds θt and θn increase in p2 and decrease in p1. The threshold θt
decreases in pi.
Given the equilibrium thresholds obtained in Theorem 4, we can obtain the total con-
sumption without and with trading as
Pn =
∫ θn
0
∫ ∞
0
min(d, q1) dFθ(d) dθ +
∫ 1
θn
∫ ∞
0
min(d, q2) dFθ(d) dθ (2.31)
= P¯ −
∫ θn
0
L(q1, θ)dG(θ)−
∫ 1
θn
L(q2, θ)dG(θ), (2.32)
and
Pt = P¯ −max
{∫ θt
0
L(q1, θ) dθ +
∫ 1
θt
L(q2, θ) dθ −
∫ θt
0
O(q1, θ) dθ −
∫ 1
θt
O(q2, θ) dθ, 0
}
,
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respectively, where P¯ denotes the consumption level which satisfies all demands and
is defined as P¯ =
∫ 1
0
∫∞
0 ddFθ(d) dθ. Finally, for the case without (i = n) and with
(i = t) trading, social welfare (Si = (r − c)Pi) and the service provider’s profit (Πi =
p1θi + p2(1− θi)− cPi) are defined as before.
In the following proposition, we show that our main results (summarized in Table
2.1) does not change qualitatively and the existence and uniqueness of thresholds can be
established when demands are distributed according to the distribution function Fθ(x)
3.
Proposition 15 There exists a well-defined c¯ such that, if c < c¯, the triple-win region
is characterized by a lower bound pip on trading price, i.e. pi ∈ [pip, r) and if c ≥ c¯, under
any pi, service provider’s profit decreases by trading and the triple-win region does not
exist. Moreover, there exists thresholds pis and pih such that St(pi) ≥ Sn if and only if
pi ≥ pis and θt(pi) ≤ θn if and only if pi ≥ pih.
Table 2.2 numerically illustrates the results in Proposition 15 by comparing equilib-
rium outcomes with and without trading for different trading prices. In these numerical
illustrations, we assume that demands follow a truncated normal distribution on the
interval [0, 1] with demand mean θ ∈ [0, 1]4. As in Table 2.2, trading improves social
welfare if pi ≥ 0.2; more consumers opt for the high plan if pi ≥ 0.5; and the service
provider’s profit increases with trading if pi ≥ 0.7.
3We assume Fθ(x) is atomless and continuous in θ.
4Truncated normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ on the interval [a, b] is defined
as
f(x) =
φ
(
x−µ
σ
)
σ
(
Φ
(
b−µ
σ
)− Φ (a−µ
σ
))
where φ(.) is the standard normal distribution and Φ(.) is its cumulative distribution function.
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Table 2.2: Changes in equilibrium outcomes;
fθ ∼ TruncatedN (θ, 12), q1 = 0.35, p1 = 0.28, q2 = 0.6, p2 = 0.42, r = 1, c = 0.3
social welfare portion choosing high plan service provider’s profit
Trading without with without with without with
price trading trading trading trading trading trading
0.1 0.255 0.253 0.435 0.048 0.231 0.178
0.2 0.255 0.267 0.435 0.125 0.231 0.183
0.3 0.255 0.283 0.435 0.217 0.231 0.189
0.4 0.255 0.304 0.435 0.339 0.231 0.197
0.5 0.255 0.331 0.435 0.492 0.231 0.207
0.6 0.255 0.350 0.435 0.661 0.231 0.223
0.7 0.255 0.350 0.435 0.783 0.231 0.240
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed that whether or not trading improves profit, consumer sur-
plus, and social welfare depends on the relative strength of four effects: cannibalization,
market expansion, consumption enhancement, and demand throttling, which in turn
depends on two factors: (1) the cost incurred by the service provider per unit of us-
age and (2) the prevailing trading price. We found that trading is harmful to a service
provider if either the trading price is sufficiently low (in this case cannibalization prevails
with fewer consumers choosing the high plan) or if the usage cost is sufficiently high
(in this case the consumption effect dominates, with consumption increasing without a
sufficient increase in the number of consumers who choose the high plan). Assuming no
changes are made to plans’ prices and allowances, consumers of course always benefit
from trading. However, social welfare can be harmed if consumption is throttled. We
showed that this is the case when the trading price is sufficiently low. Putting these re-
sults together, we showed that there are five distinct regions, dependent on the service
cost and the trading price, that correspond to different combinations of positive and
negative outcomes for profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, with one of these
regions corresponding to an improvement in all three (a region of low enough service
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cost and high enough trading price).
In settings where the service provider is able to modify the contract terms, we showed
that the service provider charges a higher price for the high plan. This comes at the
expense of consumers who are no longer guaranteed to benefit. We show that, in this
case, trading can hurt consumers if the trading price is either sufficiently low (resulting
in less consumption because more consumers opt for the low plan) or sufficiently high
(resulting in consumers paying a higher price for the higher plan because of the adjust-
ment to the price of the high plan made by the service provider). Again, depending
on trading price and service cost, we identified five regions corresponding to different
combinations of positive and negative outcomes for service provider’s profit, consumer
surplus, and social welfare. An important difference is that in this case, it is possible
for trading to be harmful to all three metrics.
Chapter 3
The Role of Information and
Reciprocity in Revenue-sharing
Crowdfunding
3.1 Introduction
For many years entrepreneurs and small businesses have been struggling to access finan-
cial resources to start or scale up their businesses. Many researchers reported the lack
of capital as an important factor hindering the growth of entrepreneurship and innova-
tion (Schumpeter, 2017; King and Levine, 1993; Brown et al., 2009). The traditional
sources of capital for entrepreneurs are bank loans and venture capitals which can be
difficult to access for many entrepreneurs. In early 2000s, the advent of crowdfunding
platforms offered a substitute for traditional funding methods which quickly emerged as
an innovative financing option for entrepreneurs. Ever since crowdfunding market keeps
growing. In 2019, the crowdfunding market transactions valued at $6.9 billion and it is
estimated to reach $11.2 billion by 2023 (Statista, 2019).
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In recent years, crowdfunding grew both in size and diversity of models it imple-
ments. Crowdfunding platforms implement two main business models: non-investment-
based and investment-based. In a non-investment-based platform, backers (or investors)
receive a nonmonetary reward for their contributions. The rewards in non-investment-
based platform could be in two forms. In the donation-based crowdfunding, rewards are
simply the honor of donation or being listed as the contributor to a good cause. Exam-
ples of such platforms are Gofundme, JustGiving, and Kiva. Alternatively, in platforms
such as Indiegogo, Kickstarter, and Rockethub, rewards are usually an early version of
an actual product (e.g. a new smart watch, a creative backpack, a smart cooler, or a
book signed by the author).
In an investment-based (or financial) crowdfunding, backers (or investors) enter into
a security contract with the entrepreneur through the crowdfunding platform and they
will receive financial returns for their investments. Financial crowdfunding platforms
implement a variety of financial securities. The common financial contracts used by
crowdfunding platforms are debt (e.g. LendingClub), equity (e.g.crowdfunder), and
revenue-sharing (e.g.Bolster). Comparing to the traditional financing methods such
as bank loans (a debt contract) and Venture Capital(VC) investments (usually an eq-
uity contract), the most distinct contract which is used in financial crowdfunding is
the revenue-sharing contract. Under this contract, the entrepreneur commits to return
a portion of her future revenue to the campaign. Then, the crowdfunding platform
distributes this return among investors proportional to their investments. This con-
tract is an appealing option for the entrepreneurs and small businesses for two main
reasons. First, they do not need to forgive the ownership of their idea or firm (as in
an equity crowdfunding or VC investment). Second, the revenue sharing contract does
not create an obligation for entrepreneurs to return a pre-determined payoff (as in a
debt crowdfunding or bank loans). Hence, the revenue sharing contract has usually a
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lower level of liability for entrepreneurs. Platforms such as Bolster, Fig, Localstake, and
Micro-finance are a few examples of crowdfunding platforms which implement a revenue
sharing contract.
Despite its flexibility and ease of raising money, crowdfunding comes with its own
challenges. Managing a crowdfunding campaign can be a daunting task. One fundamen-
tal challenge that entrepreneurs are facing is creating the initial investment momentum.
The early investments appeared to be crucial in the success of a crowdfunding campaign.
Kickstarter reports that once a campaign raises over 20% of the initial funding goal, the
project has an 80% chance of success. Similarly, Seedrs reports that once a campaign
hits 30% of its funding goal the success rate climbs to 90% (compared to only 50% after
a campaign reaches the 5% mark). This is also empirically validated by some studies in
the entrepreneurship literature (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018). Hence, most crowd-
funding platforms emphasize the importance of early investors and advice entrepreneurs
to tap into their social networks to bring the early investors to their campaign.
The common practice of attracting early stage investors, often from her network and
with social tie with the entrepreneur, can create an additional layer of complexity. The
investment motives of these investors are different from other investors who only invest
for financial return. Polzin et al. (2017) argue that the investors with strong tie with
the entrepreneur care more about her success than their own financial returns. On the
other hand, those investors without a social tie with entrepreneur are attracted to the
campaign solely for its financial returns. These different motives among investors can
distort the information flow from informed to uninformed investors. In this paper, we
address questions around the information and reciprocity in the context of the revenue
sharing crowdfunding. We are interested in the interaction between the reciprocity
and information. In particular, whether the reciprocity between the entrepreneur and
investors can influence the existence and types of outcome (separating and pooling)
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which arise in the equilibrium.
In this work, we develop a signaling game to address the questions possed above. The
type of the entrepreneur represents the future revenue of his project which can be either
high or low. The entrepreneur sets up a revenue-sharing crowdfunding campaign and
seeks funding from two investors. There is one inside investor (insider) and one outside
investor (outsider). The main difference between the insider and the outsider is that
the insider has social tie with the entrepreneur. This has two implications to our model.
First, the insider is informed about the quality of the project and its future revenue.
Second, the existence of reciprocity implies that the insiders investment motives are
not solely financial. The insider cares about the entrepreneurs payoff as well. On the
other hands, the outsider is neither informed about the quality of project nor has social
ties with the entrepreneur. The outsider holds some prior beliefs about the quality of
project and, upon her arrival and observing the insiders investment, she updates her
beliefs and then makes an investment.
Our analyses reveal a few interesting findings. In our signaling game, we find that
the reciprocity which exists between the entrepreneur and the insider may hinder the
information transmission from the insider to the outsider. In particular, we specified
a well-defined parameters region with relatively high reciprocity and uncertainty in
which a separating equilibrium does not exist which implies that in this region there
is no information transmission from informed agent (insider) to the uninformed agent
(outsider).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we review related literature
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 introduces our model setup and in Section 3.4 we define and
derive the equilibria as well as our off-equilibrium beliefs refinement. Finally, we explore
the effects of reciprocity an information asymmetry in Section 3.5 before we conclude
this chapter in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Literature Review
The work in this chapter contributes to two main streams of Operations Management
(OM) literature, namely, the emerging literature on crowdfunding and the literature on
signaling. This work also relates to the informal finance literature.
The OM literature on crowdfunding mostly focuses on reward-based crowdfunding
where papers study the issues related to the pricing, signaling, revenue management,
and predicting the dynamics or outcomes of a reward-based crowdfunding campaign.
Examples are signaling the quality (Chakraborty and Swinney, 2019), revenue man-
agement (Zhang et al., 2017), pledging dynamics (Alaei et al., 2016; Kuppuswamy and
Bayus, 2018), predicting a campaigns success (Mollick, 2014), risk of fraud and miscon-
duct (Belavina et al., 2018), and coordinating the crowdfunding and Venture Capitalist
(VC) funding (Roma et al., 2018; Babich et al., 2018). Among these studies those who
consider signaling and herding in reward-based crowdfunding are closer to our work.
Babich et al. (2018) investigate the role of reward-base crowdfunding as a signaling
device to VC and banks. Surprisingly, they find that a successful reward-based crowd-
funding may induce competition among investors and may reduce VCs’ propensity to
fiance the entrepreneur’s project. This eventually may hurt the entrepreneur who loses
the value of VC’s experience and expertise. Roma et al. (2018) study how a reward-
base crowdfunding campaign can serve as a signaling devise to VCs. They show that
the entrepreneur has a stronger preference, comparing to a VC, to run a crowdfund-
ing campaign. Also, it can be possible that the entrepreneur prefers to approach VC
directly. Jiang et al. (2018) empirically study the effects of project updates by the en-
trepreneur on the investment and herding behavior of investors. They conclude that
the platform’s market share and regulations are among the most important factors af-
fecting the herding behavior. There are two fundamental differences between our work
and these studies. First, in the financial crowdfunding, investors seek financial return
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from their investment and, second, in a revenue-sharing crowdfunding the return to each
investor depends on the total investment on the campaign which, in turn, may affect
how informed investors reveal their information.
The literature on financial crowdfunding is relatively small. Chen (2018) studies the
effects of information asymmetry on an equity-based crowdfunding. He shows that in-
formation aggregation may fail and higher quality projects may not have a higher chance
of getting founded. Fatehi and Wagner (2019) consider a revenue-sharing crowdfund-
ing setting and study the dynamic stochastic control problem arising in this setting.
They argue that the revenue-sharing crowdfunding could be superior to other methods
of entrepreneurial financing such as bank loans and equity securities. Li (2018) shows
that a simple profit-sharing contract could often coordinate investments of individuals
with private information and achieve the first best (harness the wisdom of crowd). In
our model we assume investors are risk-neutral and we focus on the interaction between
information asymmetry and reciprocity. These two features distinguishing our work
from Fatehi and Wagner (2019) and Li (2018). Our setting is different from that of
Chen (2018) in that investors are different from each other in two dimensions, namely
information and reciprocity, and we consider a revenue-sharing contract instead of an
equity agreement.
The model we have in this chapter also relates to the literature on informal finance.
Different from a regular financial contracts (e.g. bank loans and equity investments), in
an informal finance agreement there is no legal commitment. A browser receives cash
from lenders (in most cases family members and friend) and promises to return cash
in future. However, the commitment (or promise) is not legally binding. The main
focus of informal finance literature is to understand how informal finance resources
can substitute or complement the other types of securities (for a review of alternative
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investments literature see Cumming and Zhang, 2016). In particular, how the extra in-
formation that informal lenders have affects their investment (or lending) decisions (Lee
and Persson, 2016). Since informal finance resources are a significant source of finance
for small companies and entrepreneurs, especially those with limited access to formal
financial resources, understanding their interaction with formal financial resources is the
key to developing better understanding of entrepreneurship growth (Allen et al., 2018;
Karaivanov et al., 2013). Polzin et al. (2018) study investment motives in financial
crowdfunding by using a data from a large-scale survey. They find that the level of
social tie with the entrepreneur significantly affects investment and information seeking
behavior. Results in Polzin et al. (2018) are consistent with other studies reporting that
friends and family may accept below market or even negative return (Karaivanov et al.,
2013; Banerjee et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the
role of informal financial resources and their abilities to convey private information in
a crowdfunding setting. Our work complements the empirical works in this literature
by providing a rigorous game-theoretical framework to study the effects of social ties
on the information flow in a revenue-sharing crowdfunding where formal and informal
resources coexists.
3.3 Model Setup
We present our model setup and assumptions in this section. First, we explain the
characteristics of the entrepreneur’s project and crowdfunding campaign. Then, we in-
troduce investors and entrepreneur’s utility functions. Lastly, we outline the chronology
of events and actions.
Crowdfunding Campaign. We consider a penniless entrepreneur who would like
to initiate a project (or an idea) and needs an initial investment of size F to execute
his project. The revenue that the project generates depends on the entrepreneur’s type
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θ which could be either high(h) or low(`). If the project is successfully executed, it
generates non-negative revenue µθ with µh > µ`. It is commonly believed that the state
of economy is high with probability p and low with probability 1− p.
In order to raise capital, the entrepreneur sets up a crowdfunding campaign. We
consider a crowdfunding platform with All-or-Nothing crowdfunding format. All-or-
Nothing crowdfunding is widely used by many financial crowdfunding platforms such
as Fig, SeedInvest and EquityNet. In an All-or-Nothing crowdfunding campaign, the
entrepreneur receives the campaign’s investment if and only if the total investment is
larger than a predetermined threshold. We denote the crowdfunding goal by F . If
the campaign is successful, i.e. the campaign attracts at least F of investment, the
entrepreneur executes the project and shares his revenue with investors according to
a revenue sharing contract. Under a revenue sharing contract with parameter α, the
entrepreneur shares α×100% of his revenue with investors in the campaign. We assume
that the platform has enough monitoring power that can verify the entrepreneur’s rev-
enue. After receiving α × 100% of the entrepreneur’s revenue, the platform distributes
the return among the investors proportional to their investments. We assume that α is
exogenously given and F ≤ αµ`. 1
Utilities. There are two (type of) potential investors: the inside investor or the
insider (indexed by i) and the outside investor or the outsider (indexed by t). The
main distinguishing differences between an insider and an outsider are the information
and the social tie. The insider belongs to the entrepreneur’s social network, e.g. friends
and family2, and is informed about the quality of the entrepreneur’s project. Therefore,
her investment can serve as a signaling device. In contrast, the outside investor is
uninformed about the quality of the project and do not have a social tie with the
1Our results could be generalized, without much of difficulties, to the case in which αµ` < F ≤ αµh.
2Alternatively, one can interpret insiders as investors who have been attracted from the entrepreneur’s
refunding activities. There are recent examples of pre-crowdfunding platforms who try to faceplate the
interaction of the entrepreneur and some investors before the official lunch of a crowdfunding campaign.
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entrepreneur.
In our model, there is one insider whose investment is denoted by xi and one outsider
who invests xt. Therefore, the crowdfunding campaign receives the total investment of
xi + xt. The crowdfunding campaign is successful if and only if xi + xt > F in which
case the entrepreneur executes the project and returns an α×100% of his revenue to the
crowdfunding platform. The investors’ return is proportional to their investments, i.e.
the insider receives xixi+xt × 100% of the return and the outsider receives xtxi+xt × 100%
of the return to the campaign.
The outsider’s investment decision is only driven by financial returns and there is no
social tie between the entrepreneur and the outsider. Therefore, the outsider’s utility is
defined as follows:
ut(x, xi, µ) =

x
xi+x
αµ− x if xi + x ≥ F,
0 otherwise,
(3.1)
where the outsider believes project is of high type with probability β and µ = βµh +
(1− β)µ`.
The insider’s return from the campaign, similar to that of the outsider, is propor-
tional to her investment and is equal to xixi+xtαµθ. However, the insider not only cares
about the financial return, but also she cares about the entrepreneur’s success and pay-
off. We capture this altruistic utility by introducing the parameter φ ∈ [0, 0.5] which
we refer to it as reciprocity coefficient. The reciprocity coefficient φ denotes the degree
to which the insider cares about the entrepreneur’s payoff. We express the insider’s
altruistic utility as a weighted average of her payoff and the entrepreneur’s payoff. That
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is, the insider’s utility is
ui(x, µθ, µ) =

φpie(x, µθ, µ) + (1− φ)
(
x
x+xt
αµθ − x
)
if x+ xt ≥ F,
0 otherwise,
(3.2)
where pie is the entrepreneur’s payoff and
x
x+xt
is the outsider’s own financial return.
When φ = 0, the insider does not have reciprocity with the entrepreneur. When
φ = 0.5, the insider’s utility is fully aligned with that of the entrepreneur and she
equally cares about her payoff as well as the entrepreneur’s payoff. The way we model
reciprocity in (3.2) is commonly used in the informal finance literature (see for example
Lee and Persson (2016)).
In the case that campaign is successful, the entrepreneur receives the total investment
of xi + xt. After spending a fixed cost of F , the entrepreneur executes the project and
return αµθ to the crowdfunding campaign keeping (1−α)µθ for himself. Therefore, the
insider’s utility in (3.2) can be written as
ui(xi, µθ, µ) =

φ
(
(1− α)µθ − F + xi + xt
)
+ (1− φ)
(
xi
xi+xt
αµθ − xi
)
if xi + xt ≥ F,
0 otherwise.
(3.3)
Timeline. Figure 3.1 summarizes the sequence of events. At the beginning, the en-
trepreneur sets up his crowdfunding campaign which is characterized by two parameters
α and F (exogenously given). The insider arrives and invests xi. Next, the outsider
arrives and observes the insider’s investment. The outsider updates her beliefs to β
and invests xt. At the end, if xi + xt < F , the campaign fails and investments are
returned and the entrepreneur does not receive funding from the crowdfunding cam-
paign. If xi + xt ≥ F , the campaign is successful and the platform charges investors
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accounts and transfers the total investment amount of xi +xt to the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur executes the project at fixed cost F , the project’s revenue is realized, and
the entrepreneur transfers αµθ to the campaign. The platform distributes the return
from the entrepreneur among the investors proportional to their investments.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
The sequence of events that we follow is similar to Chen (2018) who studies infor-
mation asymmetry in an equity crowdfunding market. Our timeline is also similar to
papers in the observational learning literature which assume that the informed agent
moves first and, then, the uninformed agents moves after observing the informed agent’s
action.
3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we describe our solution concept which is a Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and introduce the method which we use to refine the off-equilibrium path
beliefs. A Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game described in Section 3.3 should
specify the insider’s investment for each type of insider(denoted by xθ, θ ∈ {h, `}), the
corresponding outsider’s belief (denoted by β), and investment for each type of insider
(denoted by xt). Formally, we denote a pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
by tuple 〈xh, x`, β〉 and specify it as follows.
Definition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium 〈xh, x`, β〉 consists of (1) an insider’s invest-
ment for each type, xθ ∈ R+ with θ ∈ {h, `}, (2) an outsider’s posterior belief that the
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entrepreneur is of high type, β : R+ → [0, 1], and (3) an outsider’s investment strategy
xt : R+ × [0, 1] → R+ such that the subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
crowdfunding game satisfies:
1. For each level of insider’s investment, the outsider’s belief β is update from prior
β◦ according to Bayes’ rule.
2. For given xθ and β with µ = βµg + (1− β)µ`, the outsider’s investment xt solves
xt = arg maxz≥0
{
I{z+xi≥F}
(
z
xi + z
αµ− z
)}
(3.4)
3. The insider’s investment xθ solves
xθ = arg maxz≥0
{
I{z+xt≥F}
(
φ
(
(1− α)µθ − F + z + xt
)
+ (1− φ)
(
z
z + xt
αµθ − z
))}
(3.5)
3.4.1 Full Information Benchmark
In this section, we derive the equilibrium for a benchmark case without information
asymmetry. We denote the future return of the project by µ and assume that αµF ≥
2(1−φ). This assumption ensures interior solutions for the investments. In other words,
we avoid cases in which campaign fails, i.e. xi + xt < F , or the total investment on the
campaign is more than the future return, i.e. xi + xt > αµ.
Next proposition presents the equilibrium outcome for a simple benchmark in which
there is no reciprocity and no information asymmetry.
Proposition 16 Assume φ = 0. In the equilibrium, investors equally split the profit of
the campaign by investing αµ4 .
In a setting described in Proposition 16, the only difference between the insider and the
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outsider is that the insider has the first mover’s advantage. However, interestingly, the
insider could not use this to her advantage to earn a higher utility. The intuition is as
follows. If the insider wants to earn a higher return, she needs to invest more. In such a
case, the outsider finds her share damped. To compensate and earn a larger share, the
outsider also increases her investment which creates competition between the investors
for a larger share.
Next we consider the benchmark in which there is no information asymmetry, but
φ > 0 . Proposition 17 characterizes the investors equilibrium investments for this case.
Proposition 17 Assume φ > 0. In the equilibrium, xi =
αµ
4(1−φ)2 and xt =
(1−2φ)αµ
4(1−φ)2 .
Moreover, the outsider’s utility decreases in φ while the utility of the insider and the
entrepreneur increases in φ.
When φ > 0, the insider has incentives to invest more. As a result, the outsider
responds by reducing her investment. This makes the outsider’s share, and hence her
payoff, smaller. However, since the increase in the insider’s investment is larger than
the decrease in the outsider’s investment, the total investment on the campaign and
the entrepreneur’s utility increase in φ. As φ increases the insider’s payoff decreases.
However, her utility increases in φ due to earning more reciprocal utility through her
investment.
3.4.2 Off-equilibrium Beliefs Refinement
Now, we turn to the solution for the case with asymmetric information. In order to
restrict off-equilibrium path beliefs, we use the widely-used Intuitive Criterion (Cho
and Kreps, 1987). We also make the following assumption.
Assumption 6 φ ≤ ρ1+ρ where ρ =
√
µ`
µh
.
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Assumption 6 makes the exposition easier. It is also necessary condition for having a
pure strategy separating equilibrium which we study next in Section 3.4.3. Moreover, the
parameter region characterized by Assumption 6 is a more realistic setting to consider.
In particular, in most of relevant cases the difference between µh and µ` is not very
large, i.e. the value of
√
µ`
µh
closer to 1 are more realistic to consider in a revenue sharing
crowdfunding. Assumption 6 rules out a rather small parameter region in which both
the reciprocity and uncertainty regarding the revenue of project are high.
Fix an equilibrium 〈xh, x`, β〉3. For an off-equilibrium path investment x˜ /∈ {xh, x`}
note that 0 = arg maxβ∈[0,1] ui(x˜, µθ, µ). Hence, ui(x˜, µθ, µ`) represents the maximum
profit an insider of type θ earns from deviation to an off-equilibrium investment x˜. An
equilibrium is said to fail the Intuitive Criterion if there exists some off-equilibrium
action x˜ /∈ {xh, x`} such that the inequality ui(xθ, µθ, µ) < ui(x˜, µθ, µ`) holds only for
one type. We formalize this idea in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Intuitive Criterion) Consider an equilibrium 〈xh, x`, β〉 with µ =
(1 − β)µ` + βµh. The equilibrium 〈xh, x`, β〉 fails Intuitive Criterion otherwise the
conditions
1. If ui(xh, µh, µ) < ui(x˜, µh, µ`) and ui(x`, µ`, µ) ≥ ui(x˜, µ`, µ`), then β(x˜) = 1,
2. If ui(xh, µh, µ) ≥ ui(x˜, µh, µ`) and ui(x`, µ`, µ) < ui(x˜, µ`, µ`), then β(x˜) = 0,
3. In all other cases, no restriction on β(x˜) = β,
hold for all off-equilibrium path investments x˜ 6= {xh, x`}.
The first condition in the Definition 2 indicates that if an off-equilibrium path investment
x˜ is such that the low-type insider’s utility is less than her equilibrium utility and the
high-type insider’s utility is more than her equilibrium utility, then the off-equilibrium
3In a separating equilibrium we have xh 6= x` and in a pooling equilibrium we have xh = x`
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investment x˜ should come from a high-type insider, i.e. β(x˜) = 1. The intuition
behind the second condition is also similar. Finally, the last condition indicates that
if there exist an off-equilibrium investment under which both types earn a higher (or
lower) utility than the equilibrium utility, then the intuitive criterion does not impose
a restriction.
3.4.3 Separating Equilibrium
We first start with introducing some notations. Denote the investment level of an
investor of type θ in a separating equilibrium by xSPθ and let β˜ denote off-equilibrium
beliefs and define µ˜ = β˜µh + (1 − β˜)µ`. More precisely, a separating equilibrium is
defined by a tuple 〈xSPh , xSP` , β˜〉 where xSP` 6= xSPh , β(xSPh ) = P(µ = µh|xi = xSPh ) =
1, β(xSPh ) = P(µ = µ`|xi = xSP` ) = 0, and for any off-equilibrium investment x˜ /∈
{xSPh , xSP` } off-equilibrium beliefs are β(x˜) = P(µ = µh|xi = x˜) = β˜. As in Section
3.4.1, we focus on the cases in which the project is feasible and can generate non-negative
utility for investors and the entrepreneur. Also, since the constraint xi + xt > F is
already incorporated in the the mathematical programs (3.4) and (3.5), here we focus
on the incentive compatibility constraints in the equilibrium.
Fix an off-equilibrium path beliefs β˜. A separating equilibrium satisfies
ui(x
SP
` , µ`, µ`) ≥ ui(xSPh , µ`, µh), (ICs`)
and
ui(x
SP
h , µh, µh) ≥ ui(xSP` , µh, µ`). (ICsh)
where xθt is defined in (3.4). In words, to sustain a separating equilibrium, we need to
ensure that neither type deviates from its separating equilibrium investment. As we for-
malize in next lemma, the set of separating equilibrium investments can be conveniently
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represented by two sets.
Lemma 4 Assume there exists a separating equilibrium 〈xSPh , xSP` , β˜〉 with off-equilibrium
path belief β˜ and µ˜ = β˜µh + (1− β˜)µ` which passes the intuitive criterion as defined in
Definition 2. Define sets
Nθ(µ˜) =
{
x | ui(x, µθ, µθ) ≥ maxz ui(z, µθ, µ˜)
}
, (3.6)
and
Mθ =
{
x | ui(x, µθ, µ−θ) ≤ ui(xSPθ , µθ, µθ)
}
. (3.7)
Then the equilibrium investment satisfies xSPθ ∈ Nθ(µ˜) ∩M−θ, θ ∈ {h, `}.
The set Nθ(µ˜) denotes all investment levels by an insider of type θ for which she
earns a higher utility from revealing her true type than the maximum utility she can
earn if she deviates to an off-equilibrium path action when off-equilibrium belief is µ˜.
The setMθ includes all investments by an insider of type θ for which she does not wish
to pretend to be the other type (−θ) if she can signal her type by investing xSPθ .
In other words, 〈xSPh , xSP` , β˜〉 forms a separating equilibrium if the insider does not
wish to deviate from her type to an off-equilibrium path investment, i.e. xSPθ ∈ Nθ(µ˜),
or the other type’s investment, i.e. xSPθ ∈M−θ.
In the next theorem, we characterize the the separating equilibrium and the condi-
tion for its existence.
Theorem 5 Assume the set N`(µh) ∩ Mh is non-empty and let xFIh = αµh4(1−φ)2 and
xSP` = {minx s.t. x ∈ Mh}. There exists a separating equilibrium in the form of
〈xFIh , xSP` , 1〉 which satisfies the intuitive criterion.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the equilibrium described in Theorem 5. For any fixed level of
investment, a high type insider’s utility is higher if she is believed to be low and a low
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Figure 3.2: Illustrating the separating equilibrium (α = 0.5, µh = 25, µ` = 20, F = 15,
and φ = 0.35)
type insider prefers to reveal her true type. Therefore, it is intuitive that we set the
off-equilibrium path believes to be high. This implies that, in a separating equilibrium,
the high type insider invests her full information investment xFIh . In order to separate
herself from a high type, a low type should chose an investment level from the shaded
area in Figure 3.2. Since her utility is increasing in this area, the low type chooses the
largest possible investment which is denoted by xSP` in Figure 3.2.
3.5 Effects of Reciprocity and Information Asymmetry
In this section, we explore how the reciprocity and information asymmetry affect the
outcomes in the separating equilibrium derived in Section 3.4.3. As described in The-
orem 5, in a separating equilibrium, the high-type insider invests her full information
investment. Therefore, we focus on the effects of reciprocity on the low-type insider who
needs to adjust her investment in order to separate herself from a high-type insider.
Effects of Reciprocity on the Information Flow. Interestingly, the reciprocity may
create a condition under which there is no separating equilibrium. Figure 3.3a shows
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(a) Existence of a separating equilibrium (b) Changes in the insider’s incentives
Figure 3.3: Effects of reciprocity on the information and incentives
how the existence of a separating equilibrium will be affected by φ. For any value of
ρ =
√
µ`
µh
, if φ is large enough we reach the parameter region in which there is no
separating equilibrium. This suggests that, if the reciprocity is high, there could be a
situation in which signaling fails and the insider (the informed agent) cannot signal her
type to the outsider (the uninformed agent) via distorting her investment. This result
is in contrast to the common wisdom that entrepreneurs should bring investors from
their social network to the crowdfunding campaign to create the first momentum.
The above result is easiest explained by analyzing how the insider’s incentives to
deviate change as φ increases(see Figure 3.3b). Regardless of φ, the high-type insider
always prefers to be believed to be of low-type in which case she enjoys a larger share
of crowdfunding campaign. If the reciprocity is not too high, a similar intuition applies
to low-type insider as well. However, if the reciprocity is larger than a threshold, the
low-type insider would like to signal a high revenue project in order to induce a larger
investment by the outsider. Although this would dampen her payoff, it increases her
reciprocal utility. This dynamic creates a situation in which each type wants to pretend
to be the other type. Hence, a separating equilibrium is not sustainable.
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(a) Equilibrium investment (b) Share of crowdfunding campaign
Figure 3.4: Effects of changes in reciprocity on the equilibrium outcomes for the insider
Cost of Separation. Sustaining a separating equilibrium is costly for the insider
(comparing to the full information benchmark) and, in the equilibrium, the insider
always under-invests (see Figure 3.4a). For higher φ, the gap between the investments
decreases and the insider’s investment is closer to her full information benchmark which
means separating is less costly.
Although the insider’s utility is negatively affected by information asymmetry, in-
terestingly, her payoff (i.e. xixi+xtαµ` − xi) can be larger under information asymmetry
if the reciprocity is large enough(see Figure 3.4b). The intuition is as follows. When
there is no information asymmetry, as the reciprocity increases, the insider invests more
aggressively which improves her reciprocal utility but reduces her payoff. This trend
continues to hold when there is information asymmetry as well. However, its magnitude
is moderated by the fact that the insider under-invests in the separating equilibrium
(see Figure 3.4a). This is especially significant when φ is high. Therefore, when there
is reciprocity, the existence of information asymmetry can improve the insider’s payoff
share by moderating her investment.
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Impacts on the Outsider. Figure 3.5a shows how the outsider’s equilibrium invest-
ment changes in reciprocity with and without information asymmetry. When there is
no information asymmetry, the outsider’s equilibrium investment decreases with reci-
procity. This is intuitive because as φ increases, the insider invests more and the out-
sider’s share of campaign decreases. Hence, she decreases her investment. However,
when there is information asymmetry the outsider’s investment is non-monotonic in
φ. As we mentioned above, the insider under-invests in the equilibrium and, therefore,
when the reciprocity is relatively small the outsider can earn the same share of crowd-
funding campaign by a smaller investment (comparing to full information benchmark).
As reciprocity increases, the insider increases her investment and the outsider does the
same to compete with the insider for a larger share of crowdfunding campaign. How-
ever, as the reciprocity increases, the difference xFI` − xSP` decreases (i.e. the insider
under-invests less) and eventually the outsider finds it unprofitable to invest more and
she decreases her investment level.
This dynamic of equilibrium investments also determines how investors share the
project’s revenue. Recall from Proposition 16 that, when there is no reciprocity and
no information asymmetry, investors split the crowdfunding share equally. When there
is reciprocity, since the insider under-invests, initially the outsider share is larger than
50% (see Figure 3.5b). As the reciprocity continues to increase, the insider increases her
investment level and eventually the outsider’s share of crowdfunding campaign drops
below 50% benchmark, but it is always more than her share when there is no information
asymmetry. Finally, it is interesting to observe that the information asymmetry benefits
the outsider who is uninformed. This is because the insider under-invests and the
outsider gets an opportunity to earn a larger share of the revenue with the same or
smaller amount of investment.
Impacts of Information Asymmetry on Social Welfare. We define social welfare as
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(a) Equilibrium investment (b) Share of crowdfunding campaign
Figure 3.5: Effects of changes in reciprocity on the equilibrium outcomes for the outsider
the sum of investors’ payoffs 4. Since the project’s revenue (i.e. µh or µ`), and hence the
return to the campaign, is not affected by the investments as far as xi + xt ≥ F , social
welfare is reversely related to the total investment. For a fixed level of reciprocity,
the total investment is always higher and, hence, the social welfare is lower without
information asymmetry. The reason is that the information asymmetry induces a lower
investment by the insider which, in turn, reduces the outsider’s investment. In short,
the information asymmetry improves the social welfare by moderating the competition
between investors for earning a larger shares of crowdfunding campaign.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter explored the effects of reciprocity and information asymmetry in a revenue
sharing crowdfunding context. We built a signaling game to study how reciprocity may
affect the informed agent’s ability to signal the quality of the project via distorting
her investment. We showed that the reciprocity between informed investor and the
4Alternatively, one can define the social welfare as the sum of investors’ utility. However, this does
not change the main result here saying the information asymmetry increases social welfare
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entrepreneur may negatively affect her ability to signal the project’s quality. When a
separating equilibrium exists, surprisingly, the outside investor who is uninformed bene-
fits from the information asymmetry. This is because information asymmetry moderates
insider’s investment and alleviate the competition between the investors.
References
Abhishek, V., J. A. Guajardo, Z. Zhang. 2016. Business models in the sharing economy:
Manufacturing durable goods in the presence of peer-to-peer rental markets .
Alaei, S., A. Malekian, M. Mostagir. 2016. A dynamic model of crowdfunding. Ross
School of Business Paper (1307).
Allen, F., M. Qian, J. Xie. 2018. Understanding informal financing. Journal of Financial
Intermediation .
Anderson, S. P., V. A. Ginsburgh. 1994. Price discrimination via second-hand markets.
European Economic Review 38(1) 23–44.
Babich, V., S. Marinesi, G. Tsoukalas. 2018. Does crowdfunding benefit entrepreneurs
and venture capital investors? Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research
(2971685).
Banerjee, A. V., E. Breza, E. Duflo, C. Kinnan. 2017. Do credit constraints limit
entrepreneurship? heterogeneity in the returns to microfinance. Heterogeneity in
the Returns to Microfinance (September 1, 2017). Buffett Institute Global Poverty
Research Lab Working Paper (17-104).
Becker-Peth, M., E. Katok, U. W. Thonemann. 2013. Designing buyback contracts for
irrational but predictable newsvendors. Management Science 59(8) 1800–1816.
111
112
Belavina, E., S. Marinesi, G. Tsoukalas. 2018. Designing crowdfunding platform rules
to deter misconduct. Available at SSRN 3093437 .
Bendoly, E., K. Donohue, K. L. Schultz. 2006. Behavior in operations management:
Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions. Journal of operations man-
agement 24(6) 737–752.
Benjaafar, S., G. Kong, X. Li, C. Courcoubetis. 2018. Peer-to-peer product sharing:
Implications for ownership, usage, and social welfare in the sharing economy. Man-
agement Science .
Bolton, G. E., E. Katok. 2008. Learning by doing in the newsvendor problem: A
laboratory investigation of the role of experience and feedback. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management 10(3) 519–538.
Bostian, A. A., C. A. Holt, A. M. Smith. 2008. Newsvendor pull-to-center effect: Adap-
tive learning in a laboratory experiment. MSOM Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management 10(4) 590–608.
Brown, J. R., S. M. Fazzari, B. C. Petersen. 2009. Financing innovation and growth:
Cash flow, external equity, and the 1990s r&d boom. The Journal of Finance 64(1)
151–185.
Cachon, G. P. 2003. Supply chain coordination with contracts. Handbooks in operations
research and management science 11 227–339.
Cachon, G. P., P. Feldman. 2018. Pricing capacity over time and recourse strategies:
Facilitate reselling, offer refunds/options, or overbook? Offer Refunds/Options, or
Overbook .
113
Cachon, G. P., M. A. Lariviere. 2005. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing
contracts: strengths and limitations. Management science 51(1) 30–44.
Carlson, J. A., T. B. O’Keefe. 1969. Buffer stocks and reaction coefficients: An ex-
periment with decision making under risk. The Review of Economic Studies 36(4)
467–484.
Chakraborty, S., R. Swinney. 2019. Signaling to the crowd: Private quality information
and rewards-based crowdfunding. Available at SSRN 2885457 .
Chen, J., S. Esteban, M. Shum. 2013. When do secondary markets harm firms? Amer-
ican Economic Review 103(7) 2911–34.
Chen, J. 2018. Essays on early-stage financing and firm behavior. Ph.D. thesis, Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology.
Chen, K.-Y., M. Kaya, O¨. O¨zer. 2008. Dual sales channel management with service
competition. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(4) 654–675.
Chen, Y., O¨. O¨zer. 2017. Supply chain contracts that prevent information leakage .
Cho, I.-K., D. M. Kreps. 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102(2) 179–221.
Courty, P. 2003a. Some economics of ticket resale. Journal of Economic Perspectives
17(2) 85–97.
Courty, P. 2003b. Ticket pricing under demand uncertainty. The Journal of Law and
Economics 46(2) 627–652.
Croson, R., K. Donohue. 2002. Experimental economics and supply-chain management.
Interfaces 32(5) 74–82.
114
Cui, T. H., J. S. Raju, Z. J. Zhang. 2007. Fairness and channel coordination. Manage-
ment science 53(8) 1303–1314.
Cui, Y., I. Duenyas, O¨. S¸ahin. 2014. Should event organizers prevent resale of tickets?
Management Science 60(9) 2160–2179.
Cumming, D., Y. Zhang. 2016. Alternative investments in emerging markets: A review
and new trends. Emerging Markets Review 29 1–23.
Desai, P., D. Purohit. 1998. Leasing and selling: Optimal marketing strategies for a
durable goods firm. Management Science 44(11-part-2) S19–S34.
Diehl, E., J. D. Sterman. 1995. Effects of feedback complexity on dynamic decision
making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 62(2) 198–215.
Dunlop, W. C., A. Staufer, P. Levy, G. J. Edwards. 2018. Innovative pharmaceutical
pricing agreements in five european markets: A survey of stakeholder attitudes and
experience. Health Policy .
Esteban, S., M. Shum. 2007. Durable-goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case
of automobiles. The RAND Journal of Economics 38(2) 332–354.
Fatehi, S., M. R. Wagner. 2019. Crowdfunding via revenue-sharing contracts. Manu-
facturing & Service Operations Management .
Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental economics 10(2) 171–178.
Fraiberger, S. P., A. Sundararajan. 2015. Peer-to-peer rental markets in the sharing
economy .
Galbreth, M. R., B. Ghosh, M. Shor. 2012. Social sharing of information goods: Impli-
cations for pricing and profits. Marketing Science 31(4) 603–620.
115
Geng, X., R. Wu, A. B. Whinston. 2007. Profiting from partial allowance of ticket
resale. Journal of Marketing 71(2) 184–195.
Ha, A. Y., S. Tong, H. Zhang. 2011. Sharing demand information in competing supply
chains with production diseconomies. Management Science 57(3) 566–581.
Hendel, I., A. Lizzeri, M. Siniscalchi. 2005. Efficient sorting in a dynamic adverse-
selection model. The Review of Economic Studies 72(2) 467–497.
Ho, T.-H., N. Lim, T. H. Cui. 2010. Reference dependence in multilocation newsvendor
models: A structural analysis. Management Science 56(11) 1891–1910.
Ho, T.-H., X. Su, Y. Wu. 2014. Distributional and peer-induced fairness in supply chain
contract design. Production and Operations Management 23(2) 161–175.
Huang, S., Y. Yang, K. Anderson. 2001. A theory of finitely durable goods monopoly
with used-goods market and transaction costs. Management Science 47(11) 1515–
1532.
Jiang, B., L. Tian. 2016. Collaborative consumption: Strategic and economic implica-
tions of product sharing. Management Science .
Jiang, Y., Y.-C. Ho, X. Yan, Y. Tan. 2018. Investor platform choice: Herding, platform
attributes, and regulations. Journal of Management Information Systems 35(1) 86–
116.
Johnson, J. P. 2011. Secondary markets with changing preferences. The RAND Journal
of Economics 42(3) 555–574.
Kalkanci, B., K.-Y. Chen, F. Erhun. 2011. Contract complexity and performance under
asymmetric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management science
57(4) 689–704.
116
Kalkancı, B., K.-Y. Chen, F. Erhun. 2014. Complexity as a contract design factor: A
human-to-human experimental study. Production and Operations Management 23(2)
269–284.
Karaivanov, A., A. Kessler, et al. 2013. A friend in need is a friend indeed: Theory and
evidence on the (dis) advantages of informal loans. Dicussion Paper, Simon Fraser
Univeristy .
Katok, E., D. Y. Wu. 2009. Contracting in supply chains: A laboratory investigation.
Management Science 55(12) 1953–1968.
Kaya, M., O¨. O¨zer. 2011. Pricing in business-to-business contracts: Sharing risk, profit
and information .
Kim, A., A. Lahiri, D. Dey. 2018. The’invisible hand’of piracy: An economic analysis
of the information-goods supply chain. MIS Quarterly, Forthcoming .
King, R. G., R. Levine. 1993. Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. The
quarterly journal of economics 108(3) 717–737.
Kong, G., S. Rajagopalan, H. Zhang. 2013. Revenue sharing and information leakage
in a supply chain. Management Science 59(3) 556–572.
Kremer, M., S. Minner, L. N. Van Wassenhove. 2010. Do random errors explain newsven-
dor behavior? Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(4) 673–681.
Kuppuswamy, V., B. L. Bayus. 2018. Crowdfunding creative ideas: The dynamics of
project backers. The Economics of Crowdfunding . Springer, 151–182.
Lariviere, M. A. 1999. Supply chain contracting and coordination with stochastic de-
mand. Quantitative models for supply chain management . Springer US, 233–268.
117
Lee, H., S. Whang. 2002. The impact of the secondary market on the supply chain.
Management science 48(6) 719–731.
Lee, S., P. Persson. 2016. Financing from family and friends. The Review of Financial
Studies 29(9) 2341–2386.
Leslie, P., A. Sorensen. 2013. Resale and rent-seeking: An application to ticket markets.
The Review of Economic Studies rdt033.
Li, J. 2018. Profit sharing: A contracting solution to harness the wisdom of the crowd .
Li, M., N. C. Petruzzi, J. Zhang. 2016. Overconfident competing newsvendors. Man-
agement Science 63(8) 2637–2646.
Lim, M. K., H.-Y. Mak, Y. Rong. 2014. Toward mass adoption of electric vehicles:
impact of the range and resale anxieties. Manufacturing & Service Operations Man-
agement 17(1) 101–119.
Loch, C. H., Y. Wu. 2008. Social preferences and supply chain performance: An exper-
imental study. Management Science 54(11) 1835–1849.
McKelvey, R. D., T. R. Palfrey. 1995. Quantal response equilibria for normal form
games. Games and economic behavior 10(1) 6–38.
Mollick, E. 2014. The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study. Journal of
business venturing 29(1) 1–16.
Novos, I. E., M. Waldman. 1984. The effects of increased copyright protection: An
analytic approach. Journal of political economy 92(2) 236–246.
O¨zer, O¨., Y. Zheng, K.-Y. Chen. 2011. Trust in forecast information sharing. Manage-
ment Science 57(6) 1111–1137.
118
Pasternack, B. A. 1985. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities.
Marketing science 4 166–176.
Polzin, F., H. Toxopeus, E. Stam. 2017. The wisdom of the crowd in funding: informa-
tion heterogeneity and social networks of crowdfunders. Small Business Economics
1–23.
Polzin, F., H. Toxopeus, E. Stam. 2018. The wisdom of the crowd in funding: informa-
tion heterogeneity and social networks of crowdfunders. Small Business Economics
50(2) 251–273.
Roma, P., E. Gal-Or, R. R. Chen. 2018. Reward-based crowdfunding campaigns: infor-
mational value and access to venture capital. Information Systems Research 29(3)
679–697.
Rust, J. 1985. Stationary equilibrium in a market for durable assets. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society 783–805.
Schumpeter, J. A. 2017. Theory of economic development . Routledge.
Schweitzer, M. E., G. P. Cachon. 2000. Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with
a known demand distribution: Experimental evidence. Management Science 46(3)
404–420.
Simon, H. A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 69(1) 99–118.
Statista. 2019. Alternative financing report 2019. https://www.statista.com/
outlook/335/100/crowdfunding/worldwide.
Sterman, J. D. 1989. Modeling managerial behavior: Misperceptions of feedback in a
dynamic decision making experiment. Management science 35(3) 321–339.
119
Su, X. 2008. Bounded rationality in newsvendor models. Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management 10(4) 566–589.
Swofford, J. L. 1999. Arbitrage, speculation, and public policy toward ticket scalping.
Public Finance Review 27(5) 531–540.
Taylor, T. A. 2002. Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort
effects. Management Science 48(8) 992–1007. doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168.
Tian, L., B. Jiang. 2018. Effects of consumer-to-consumer product sharing on distribu-
tion channel. Production and Operations Management 27(2) 350–367.
Tsay, A. A., N. Agrawal. 2000. Channel dynamics under price and service competition.
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(4) 372–391.
Tsay, A. A., S. Nahmias, N. Agrawal. 1999. Modeling supply chain contracts: A review.
Quantitative models for supply chain management . Springer US, 299–336.
Wu, D. Y., K.-Y. Chen. 2014. Supply chain contract design: Impact of bounded ratio-
nality and individual heterogeneity. Production and Operations Management 23(2)
253–268.
Yang, L., L. Debo, V. Gupta. 2016. Trading time in a congested environment. Man-
agement Science 63(7) 2377–2395.
Zervas, G., D. Proserpio, J. W. Byers. 2017. The rise of the sharing economy: Estimating
the impact of airbnb on the hotel industry. Journal of Marketing Research 54(5) 687–
705.
Zhang, J., S. Savin, S. K. Veeraraghavan. 2017. Revenue management in crowdfunding.
Available at SSRN 3065267 .
120
Zhang, Y., K. Donohue, T. H. Cui. 2015. Contract preferences and performance for
the loss-averse supplier: Buyback vs. revenue sharing. Management Science 62(6)
1734–1754.
Zhu, J.-D. 2014. Effect of resale on optimal ticket pricing: Evidence from major
league baseball tickets. Tech. rep., Working paper. Feb. 2014. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.¡
http://homepage. ntu. edu. tw/˜ jdzhu/doc/jdzhu p1 v5. pdf.
Appendix A
Omitted Theoretical Proofs for
Chapter 1
Lemma 5 The expected leftover inventory and the probability of overstocking are as
follows.
E[Q−D]+ = µ∆
12
(
3 + 6λξ +
(
1 + λ
(−2 + λ+ 3λξ2) )) (A.1)
P(Q ≥ D) = 1 + λξ
2
(A.2)
Proof of Lemma 5: In order to calculate the E[qb −D]+ and P(qb ≥ D), we define
dL and dH as follows.
dL = λµ (1 + ξ∆ ) + (1− λ)µ (1−∆) = µ
(
1 + (λ ξ − (1− λ))∆),
dH = λµ (1 + ξ∆ ) + (1− λ)µ (1 + ∆) = µ
(
1 + (λ ξ + (1− λ))∆),
where dL and dH are the lowest and highest possible order quantity from a boundedly
rational retailer, respectively. Thus, the retailer’s order quantity qb follows a uniform
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distribution U [µ (1+(λ ξ−(1−λ))∆), µ (1+(λ ξ+(1−λ))∆)], and the density function
is 12µ∆ (1−λ) . Since the demand is independent with the retailer’s order quantity, the
joint density function of qb and D is
1
4µ2 ∆2 (1−λ) . Then, we have
E[qb −D]+ =
∫ dH
dL
∫ qb
µ (1−∆)
qb −D
4µ2 ∆2 (1− λ)dD dqb
=
µ∆
12
(
3 + 6λξ +
(
1 + λ
(−2 + λ+ 3λξ2) ))
P(qb ≥ D) =
∫ dH
dL
∫ qb
µ (1−∆)
1
4µ2 ∆2 (1− λ)dD dqb =
1 + λ ξ
2
This completes the proof.
Before proceeding with other theoretical proofs, we present an intermediate results
which we use later in the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 6 For any contract (wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) ∈ F , there exists an equivalent contract
(w, u, v) =

(wˆ − uˆ, 0, vˆ − uˆ) if vˆ − uˆ ≥ 0,
(wˆ − vˆ,−(vˆ − uˆ), 0) if vˆ − uˆ < 0,
with 0 ≤ w ≤ p, u ≥ 0, and v ≥ 0, under which the retailer’s order quantity and all
profits are the same.
Proof of Lemma 6: First note that two contracts (w, u, v) and (wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) are equivalent
if both induce the same critical ratio (and the probability of stockout) and profits for
the retailer, the supplier, and the supply chain. Since all profits and the critical ratio
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can be presented in the term of retailer’s underage and overage costs, i.e.
Πc = (p− c)E
[
Q
]− pE[Q−D]+
Πr = c
r
u E
[
Q
]− (cru + cro)E[Q−D]+, and
Πs = (p− c− cru)E
[
Q
]− (p− cru − cro)E[Q−D]+.
To prove that contracts (w, u, v) and (wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) are equivalent, it is enough to show that
both contracts have the same underage and overage costs. It is now easy to check
that both contracts (w, u, v) and (wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) correspond to the same underage and overage
costs.
Assume vˆ − uˆ < 0, then we have
cru(wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) = p− wˆ + uˆ = p− (wˆ − vˆ)− (vˆ − uˆ) = p− w + u = cru(w, u, v),
and
cro(wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) = wˆ − vˆ = (wˆ − vˆ)− 0 = w − v = cro(w, u, v),
which implies that both contracts (w, u, v) and (wˆ, uˆ, vˆ) induce the same overage and
underage costs. Also, note that the contract (w, u, v) is a feasible contract. Since uˆ ≥ vˆ,
we have 0 ≤ wˆ − vˆ ≤ p and 0 ≤ −(vˆ − uˆ) ≤ w, therefore (w, u, v) ∈ F . This completes
the proof for the first case. The case of vˆ − uˆ ≥ 0 can be proven by following a similar
approach.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let d ≡ u− v and wu ≡ w− u and applying Lemma 6, without
lose of generality, the contract (w, u, v) can be written as (wu, d). In what follows we
prove the results in three steps.
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Step (i). We first show that Πs(wu, d) and Πc(wu, d) are concave in wu, and
Πr(wu, d) is convex in wu for a given d. By Lemma 5, substituting the values of E[qb −
D]+ and P(qb ≥ D) into the profit functions, we obtain
Π s(wu, d) = µ(−(c− w))(∆λψ + 1)− 1
12
d∆µ(λ(λ+ 3ψ(λX + 2)− 2) + 4),(A.3)
Π r(wu, d) =
1
12
∆µ(d− p)(λ(λ+ 3ψ(λψ + 2)− 2) + 4) + µ(p− w)(∆λψ + 1),(A.4)
Π c(wu, d) =
µ
12
(
12− 12 c (∆λ ξ + 1)− p (∆ (λ (λ+ 3 ξ (λ ξ − 2)− 2) + 4))).(A.5)
Taking the second derivatives of profit functions with respect to w, we get
∂2
∂ w2
Π s(wu, d) = −2 ∆λµ (d (λ− 2) + 2 p)
(p− d)2 < 0, (A.6)
∂2
∂ w2
Π r(wu, d) =
2 ∆ (2− λ)λµ
p− d > 0, (A.7)
∂2
∂ w2
Π c(wu, d) = −2 ∆λ
2 µ p
(p− d)2 < 0. (A.8)
Hence we proved Π s(wu, d) and Π c(wu, d) are concave and Π r(wu, d) is convex in wu
for fixed d.
Step (ii). We show that there is a unique wα(d) that solves Πr(wα(d), d) = α
for a fixed α > 0 and d. This also implies that the set of wholesale price w that sat-
isfies Πr(wα(d), d) ≥ α is [0, wα(d)]. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
maximum supply chain profit is no less than than the retailer’s outside option, i.e.
µ
(−12c2∆ + 12c(∆ + 1)p+ p2 (∆(λ− 1)2 − 12)) /12p ≥ α; otherwise, the problem P s
is infeasible.
The proof uses Intermediate Value Theorem and the fact that Πr(wu, d) is strictly convex
with respect to wu. On the one hand, for any d > 0, we have lim(wu,d)→(0,d) Π r(wu, d) ≥
α and, on the other hand, lim(wu,d)→(p,d) Π r(wu, d) ≤ lim(wu,d)→(p,p) Π r(wu, d) = 0 < α.
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In addition, as will be shown in the proof of Lemma 2 (i), ∂∂ wΠ r(wu, d) < 0. Hence,
there exists a unique solution to the equation Πr(wu, d) = α.
Step (iii). Lastly, we prove that the constraint Π r(wu, d) ≥ α is binding at the
optimal solution of P sw. Since Πs(wu, d) is strictly concave with respect to w, the
optimal solution of the problem P sw is either w∗ = wα(d) (a corner solution), or the
interior solution w∗ = wˆ(d) that satisfies the first order condition ∂∂wΠs(wu, d) = 0, i.e.
wˆ(d) =
∆λ(p− d)(2(c+ d) + p) + d∆λ2(d+ p) + (p− d)2
2∆λ(2p− d(2− λ)) . (A.9)
Next, we show that the solutions of the problem P sw cannot be w = wˆ(d). Without
loss of generality, we assume that Πr(wˆ(d), d) > α. Otherwise, if Πr(wˆ(d), d) ≤ α, then
w∗ = wα(d) . Substituting w = wˆ(d) into the supplier’s profit function, we get
Πs(wˆ(d), d) =
1
12∆λ(2p− d(2− λ))
[
µ (d2 (3−∆ (λ− 2)λ (∆ ((λ− 2)λ+ 4)− 6)) +
2 d (p (∆λ (3(λ+ 1)−∆ ((λ− 2)λ+ 4))− 3)− 6 c∆ (λ− 1)λ) +
3 (∆λ (p− 2 c) + p)2)
]
.
It follows that
∂2
∂d2
Πs(wˆ(d), d) =
λµ (p (∆ (λ− 2)− 1)− 2 c∆ (λ− 2))2
2 ∆ (2 p− d(2− λ))3 ≥ 0. (A.10)
If the constraint Πr(w, d) ≥ α is not binding, since Πs(wˆ(d), d) is convex with respect
to d, either d = p or d = 0 is the optimal solution.
If d = p, we get wˆ(d) = p which also yields in an infeasible solution because Πr(p, p) =
0 < α. Next we show that the contract (wˆ(0), 0) cannot be optimal. If ∂∂dΠs(wˆ(d), d)|d=0 >
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0, the statement is trivially true. Now consider the case ∂∂dΠs(wˆ(d), d)|d=0 < 0. Since
limd→p Πs(wˆ(d), d) = Πc(p, p) = maxξΠc(ξ) > maxξΠc(ξ)− α > Πs(wˆ(0), 0),
there exists 0 < d′ < p such that Πs(wˆ(0), 0) = Πswˆ(d′), d′). Since
∂
∂d
Πc(wˆ(d), d) =
λµ (p− d)
(
p (∆ (λ− 2)− 1)− 2 c∆ (λ− 2)
)2
2∆
(
d (λ− 2) + 2 p
)3 > 0,
the supply chain profit increases in d. We have
Πr(wˆ(0), 0) + Πs(wˆ(0), 0) = Πc(wˆ(0), 0)
< Πc(wˆ(d
′), d′)
= Πr(wˆ(d
′), d′) + Πs(wˆ(d′), d′).
Since Πs(wˆ(0), 0) = Πs(wˆ(d
′), d′), it follows that Πr(wˆ(d′), d′) > Πr(wˆ(0), 0) ≥ α (See
Figure A.1 for illustration). Therefore, the supplier can improve his profit by increasing
d higher than d′ while keeping the retailer’s participation constraint satisfied. This
suggests that (wˆ(0), 0) is not the optimal solution and the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 2: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we use change of variable
d ≡ u − v and wu ≡ w − u. The proof consists of three steps. Step (i) we show that
∂
∂ wΠ r(wu, d) < 0 for any given d; in Step (ii) we study how
d
d d ξ(wα(d), d) > 0 behaves
when λ < 1; and finally in Step (iii) we show that dd d ξ(wα(d), d) = 0 for λ = 1.
Step (i). Note that the values of E[qb−D]+ and E[qb] depend on (w, d) only through
the intermediate variable ξ = p−2wu+dp−d . Let L(ξ) ≡ E[qb−D]+ and Q(ξ) ≡ E[qb] . Hence,
Πr(wu, d) = (p− wu)Q(ξ)− (p− d)L(ξ), and
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Figure A.1: The Solution (wˆ(0) , 0) Cannot Be Optimal
∂
∂ wu
Πr(wu, d) =
∂ ξ
∂ w
.
∂ Q
∂ ξ
(p− wu) − ∂ ξ
∂ wu
.
∂ L
∂ ξ
(p− d)−Q
=
µ
(
d
(
∆λ (λ− 2) + 1)+ ∆λ (λ− 2)(p− 2wu)− p)
p− d .
Hence, ∂∂ wuΠ r(wu, d) < 0 if and only if f(wu, d) = d
(
∆λ (λ− 2) + 1)+ ∆λ (λ− 2)(p−
2wu) − p < 0. Since ∂∂ wu f(wu, d) = 2∆λ(2 − λ) > 0, the maximum of f(wu, d) is
archived at wu = p. Observing that f(p, d) = −(p− d)(1−∆λ(2− λ)) < 0. We obtain
that ∂∂ wuΠ r(wu, d) < 0.
Step (ii). From Lemma 1, the constraint Π r(wu, d) ≥ α is binding, i.e. Π r(wu, d) =
α. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Π r(wu, d), we get
∂
∂ d
wα(d) = −
∂
∂ dΠ r(wu, d)
∂
∂ wu
Π r(wu, d)
. (A.11)
where ∂ ξ∂ d =
2(p−w)
(p−d)2 > 0 and
∂ ξ
∂ w = − 2p−d < 0. Now we consider two cases when d ≥ 0
and d > 0 separately.
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Case 1. Assume vˆ− uˆ ≥ 0. From Lemma 6 we know that when d = v− u ≥ 0, we can
consider the equivalent contract (wu, d) = (w − u, v − u) which gives us
Π r(wu, d) = (p− wu)Q(ξ)− (p− d)L(ξ)
with the partial derivatives
∂
∂ wu
Π r(wu, d) =
∂ ξ
∂ wu
.
∂ Q
∂ ξ
(p− wu) − ∂ ξ
∂ wu
.
∂ L
∂ ξ
(p− d) −Q, and (A.12)
∂
∂ d
Π r(wu, d) =
∂ ξ
∂ d
.
∂ Q
∂ ξ
(p− wu) − ∂ ξ
∂ d
.
∂ L
∂ ξ
(p− d) + L. (A.13)
As a result, we have
d
du
ξ(wα(d), d) =
∂ ξ
∂ u
+
∂
∂ d
wα(d) .
∂ ξ
∂ wu
=
∂ ξ
∂ d
−
∂
∂ dΠ r(wu, d)
∂
∂ wu
Π r(wu, d)
.
∂ ξ
∂ wu
=
∂ ξ
∂ d
−
∂ ξ
∂ d .
∂ Q
∂ ξ (p− wu) − ∂ ξ∂ d . ∂ L∂ ξ (p− d) + L
∂ ξ
∂ wu
. ∂ Q∂ ξ (p− wu) − ∂ ξ∂ wu . ∂ L∂ ξ (p− d) −Q
.
∂ ξ
∂ wu
=
∂ ξ
∂ d
(
1−
∂ Q
∂ ξ (p− wu) − ∂ L∂ ξ (p− d) + L( ∂ ξ∂ wu /
∂ ξ
∂ d)
∂ Q
∂ ξ (p− wu) − ∂ L∂ ξ (p− d) − Q
)
=
∂ ξ
∂ d
(
−Q− L( ∂ ξ∂ wu /
∂ ξ
∂ d)
∂
∂ dΠ r(wu, d)
)
(equal in sign)
sgn
= Q+ L
(
∂ ξ
∂ wu
/
∂ ξ
∂ d
)
= Q+ L
(−(p− d)
p− wu
)
(equal in sign)
sgn
= (p− wu)Q− (p− d)L
= Πr(wu, d) ≥ α > 0.
The first equal in sign holds because, as shown in step (i), we have ∂∂ wΠ r(wu, d) < 0
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and ∂ ξ∂ d =
2(p−wu)
(p−d)2 > 0. The second equal in sign holds because p − wu = cru > 0. This
completes the proof of the claim dd d ξ(wα(d), d) > 0.
Case 2. Assume d = v − u < 0. From Lemma 6, we can consider the equivalent
contract (wu, d) = (w − v,−(v − u)). We now write the retailer’s profit as
Π r(wu, d) = (p− wu)Q(ξ)− (p+ d)L(ξ)
with the partial derivatives
∂
∂ wu
Π r(wu, d) =
∂ ξ
∂ wu
.
∂ Q
∂ ξ
(p− wu) − ∂ ξ
∂ wu
.
∂ L
∂ ξ
(p+ d) −Q, and (A.14)
∂
∂ d
Π r(wu, d) =
∂ ξ
∂ d
.
∂ Q
∂ ξ
(p− wu) − ∂ ξ
∂ d
.
∂ L
∂ ξ
(p+ d) − L. (A.15)
As a result, we have
d
d d
ξ(wα(d), d) =
∂ ξ
∂ d
+
∂
∂ d
wα(d) .
∂ ξ
∂ wu
=
∂ ξ
∂ d
(
−Q+ L( ∂ ξ∂ wu /
∂ ξ
∂ d)
∂
∂ dΠ r(wu, d)
)
(equal in sign)
sgn
= −Q+ L
(
∂ ξ
∂ wu
/
∂ ξ
∂ d
)
= −Q+ L
(
p+ d
p− wu
)
(equal in sign)
sgn
= −(p− wu)Q+ (p+ d)L
= −Πr(wu, d) ≤ −α < 0.
The first equal in sign holds because, as shown in step (i), we have ∂∂ wΠ r(wu, d) < 0
and ∂ ξ∂ d = − p−wu(p+d)2 > 0. The second equal in sign holds because p− wu = cru > 0. This
completes the proof of the claim dd d ξ(wα(d), d) > 0.
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Step (iii). Lastly, we show that ξ(wα(d), d) is a constant when the retailer is fully
rational, i.e. λ = 1. The profit functions in this case can be simplified to
pis(wu, d) = µ(wu − c)
(
1− ∆(d+ p− 2wu)
d− p
)
− d∆µ(p− wu)
2
(d− p)2 ,
pir(wu, d) = −µ(p− wu)(d(∆− 1) + p−∆wu)
d− p , and
pic(wu, d) =
µ
(
c(d− p)(∆(d+ p− 2wu)− d+ p) + p
(
(d− p)2 −∆(d− wu)2
))
(d− p)2 ,
where wu = w − u and d = v − u. From Lemma 1, the constraint in problem P s is
binding and, hence, the supplier maximizes his own profit by maximizing the supply
chain profit. For fixed u and d, the optimal wholesale price for the supply chain is
wu(d) = d+ c− c dp . Different values of d corresponds to different share of supply chain
profit between the supplier and the retailer. Since
∂
∂d
pis(wu, d) =
µ (p− c)(p− c∆)
p2
> 0
∂
∂d
pir(wu, d) = −µ (p− c)(p− c∆)
p2
< 0,
the supplier’s profit is increasing in d and the retailer’s profit is decreasing in d. There-
fore, the optimal contract that the supplier chooses is a nonlinear contract with the
largest possible d which makes the retailer’s participation constraint binding. That is,
the contract that the supplier offers to the retailer with outside option α is
(wu, d) =
(
p+ u− αp
µ(p− c∆) , p−
αp2
µ(p− c)(p− c∆)
)
.
Hence, ξ(wα(d), d) = 1− 2cp which is constant.
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Lemma 7 Let ξ = 1 − 2wα(0,0)p and ξ¯ = 1. The optimal solution ξ∗ ∈ [ξ, ξ¯] of the
problem (1.4.2) satisfies
ξ∗ =

ξ¯ if ξ¯ ≤ 1
λ
(
p− 2c
p
)
,
1
λ
(
p− 2c
p
)
if ξ <
1
λ
(
p− 2c
p
)
< ξ¯,
ξ if
1
λ
(
p− 2c
p
)
≤ ξ.
(A.16)
Proof of Lemma 7: As suggested by (1.10),
Π c(ξ) = − µ
12
(
12c(∆λξ + 1) + p
(
∆
(
λ(λ+ 3 ξ(λξ − 2)− 2) + 4)− 12)). (A.17)
Since ∂
2
∂ ξ2
Π c(ξ) = −µλp4 < 0, Π c(ξ) is concave with respect to ξ. Solving the first order
condition ∂∂ ξΠ c(ξ) = 0, we get ξ =
1
λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
.
The optimal solution of (1.4.2) is either the interior solution that ξ∗ = 1λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
or
the boundary solution ξ∗ = ξ¯ or ξ. Specifically, the optimal solution ξ∗ is 1λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
if
1
λ
(
p−2c
p
)
∈ [ξ, ξ¯]. Otherwise, if 1λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
> ξ¯, the profit function Πc(ξ) is increasing
on [ξ, ξ¯], and the optimal solution is ξ∗ = ξ¯. Similarly, if ξ > 1λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
, then Πc(ξ) is
decreasing on [ξ, ξ¯], and the optimal solution is ξ∗ = ξ.
Proof of Proposition 1: From Lemma 1, the constraint Πr(wu, d) ≥ α is binding.
Hence, the problem P sw is equivalent to
maxd{Π c(wα(d), d) s.t. (wα(d), d) ∈ F}.
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Note that Π c(wα(d), d) can be written as Πc(ξ(wα(d), d)), where
ξ(wα(d), d) =
p− 2wα(d) + d
p− d
. By Lemma 7, if
ξ >
1
λ
(
p− 2 c
p
)
, (A.18)
the optimal solution is ξ∗ = ξ. Since from Lemma 1 we know that ξ(wα(d), d) is
increasing in d when d = v−u ≥ 0 and is decreasing when d = v−u < 0, the minimum
value of ξ = ξ(wα(d), d) is attainted at d = 0. That is, the optimal choice of contract is
a wholesale contract.
Now substituting ξ = ξ(wα(0), 0) = 1− 2 wα(0)p into (A.18), we get the condition
wα(0) ≤ 1
2
(
p− 1
λ
(p− 2 c)
)
under which the no protection contract (wu, d) = (wα(0), 0) dominates all other nonlin-
ear contracts with d > 0.
Proof of Corollary 1: The proof is shown by contradiction. Assume that p−2c > 0.
By Theorem 1, a no-protection contract is optimal if the inequality (1.11) is satisfied.
Therefore, for any λ, we have
0 ≤ wα(0) ≤ 1
2
(
p− 1
λ
(p− 2 c)
)
,
which can be simplified to p−2c ≤ 0 , a contradiction to the assumption that p−2c > 0.
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Proof of Corollary 2: As a wholesale price cannot exceed a market price p, the
inequality (1.11) is always satisfied if 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
) ≥ p. This condition can be
simplified to 2 cp > 1 + λ.
Proof of Proposition 2: We first, in step (i), show the existence of λ¯ and then, in
step (ii), we show that λ¯ is non-decreasing in c.
Step (i). We first show that there exist λ¯ such that wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1
λ¯
(p− 2 c)
)
. Note
that wα(d) is also a function of other parameters including λ. We show that wα(0) is
increasing in λ. By the implicit function theorem we have ∂∂ λwα(d) = −
∂
∂ λ
Π r(wu,d)
∂
∂ wu
Π r(wu,d)
and ∂∂ wuΠ r(wu, d) < 0 by the proof of Lemma 2. In order to show that
∂
∂ λwα(0) ≥ 0,
we only need to show that ∂∂ λΠ r(wu, 0) ≥ 0. Since
∂
∂ λ
Π r(wu, d) =
µ∆
(
3 ξ(p− 2wu)− p
(
λ+ 3λ ξ2 − 1))
6
,
expressions ∂∂ λΠ r(wu, d) and 3 ξ (p − 2wu) + p
(
1− λ− 3λ ξ2) are equal in sign. By
substituting ξ(w, 0) = p−2wup into 3 ξ (p− 2wu) + p
(
1− λ− 3λ ξ2), we have
4(1− λ)
p
(
p2 − 3pwu + 3w2u
) ≥ 0.
The above inequality holds because min0≤wu≤p{p2 − 3 pwu + 3w2u} = 14p2 ≥ 0 and,
as a result, ∂∂ λwα(0), is increasing in λ with 0 ≤ wα(0) ≤ p.
On the other hand, since the necessary condition for the no-protection contracts
to be optimal is p − 2c < 0, the right hand side of (1.11), i.e., 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
)
, is
decreasing in λ. When λ → 0, we have limλ→0 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
) → ∞ > wα(0), and
when λ = 1, 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
)
= c ≤ wα(0). Therefore there exists λ¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that
wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1
λ¯
(p− 2 c)
)
. In addition, the inequality (1.11) is satisfied if and only if
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λ < λ¯.
Step (ii). Next, we show λ¯ is non-decreasing in c. First, note that wα(d) is the
wholesale price that makes the retailer’s participation constraint binding and does not
depend on c. Hence, wα(0) is constant with respect to c. Taking the derivative of both
sides of (1.11) with respect to c, we have
dwα(0)
dλ¯
dλ¯
dc
=
1
2
(
1
λ¯2
dλ¯
dc
(p− 2c) + 2
λ
). (A.19)
Since dwα(0)
dλ¯
≥ 0 and p− 2c ≤ 0, we have dλ¯dc ≥ 0. That is, λ¯ increases in c.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof consists of two steps.
Step (i). We first show the existence of c¯. We observe that wα(0) does not change with
c and c ≤ wα(0) ≤ p. In addition, the right hand side of the inequality (1.11) increases
in c because ∂∂ c
[
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
) ]
= 1λ > 0. Since limc→p
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
)
> p and
limc→0 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c)
)
< 0, there exists c¯ such that it solves the equation wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c¯)
)
.
Step (ii). Taking the derivative of both sides of wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c¯)
)
dwα(0)
dc¯
=
1
2
(
1
λ2
(p− 2 c) + 2
λ
dc¯
dλ
)
Since dwα(0)dc¯ = 0 and p− 2c < 0, we have dc¯dλ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is similar to Proposition 3. First, applying the
implicit function theorem to the equation Π r(wα(0), 0)− α = 0, we obtain
d
d ∆
wα(0) = −
∂
∂∆Π r(wu, d)
∂
∂wu
Π r(wu, d)
= −
− µ3 p
(
p2 (1− λ)2 − 3(λ− 2)λpwu + 3(λ− 2)λw2u
)
∂
∂,wu
Π r(wu, d)
=
µ
3 p
(
p2 (1− λ)2 + 3wu λ(2− λ) (p− wu)
)
∂
∂wu
Π r(wu, d)
< 0.
Taking the derivative of both sides of wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c¯)
)
with respect to λ,
we have,
dwα(0)
d∆¯
d∆¯
dλ
=
1
2λ2
(p− 2c).
Since dwα(0,0)
d∆¯
< 0 and p− 2c ≤ 0, we have d∆¯dλ ≥ 0. That is, ∆¯ increases in λ.
Proof of Proposition 5: Applying the implicit function theorem to the equation
Π r(wα(0), 0)− α = 0, we obtain
d
dα
wα(0) =
1
d
dwu
Π r(wu, d)
< 0.
Taking the derivative of both sides of wα(0) =
1
2
(
p− 1λ (p− 2 c¯)
)
with respect to λ, we
have
dwα(0)
dα
dα¯
dλ
=
1
2λ2
(p− 2c).
Since dwα(0)dα < 0 and p− 2c ≤ 0, we have dα¯dλ ≥ 0. That is, α¯ increases in λ.
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Proposition 18 Suppose the boundedly rational retailer follows the mean-anchoring
heuristic and places orders according to qp = λ q
∗ + (1 − λ)µ where λ is the retailer’s
rationality coefficient. If the condition
p+ (p− 2 c) ∆ (2− λ) ≤
√
4α∆(2− λ)λpµ−1 + p2(1−∆(2−∆)(2− λ)λ) (A.20)
holds, the optimal contract for the supplier among all nonlinear contracts is a wholesale
price contract with wholesale price
w =
p(1 + ∆(2− λ)λ)−√4α∆(2− λ)λpµ−1 + p2(1−∆(2−∆)(2− λ)λ)
2∆(2− λ)λ . (A.21)
Proof of Proposition 18: Under the mean-anchoring heuristic, the retailer’s profit
function is according to
Πpr(w, b) =
µ
(
∆(λ(d+ p− 2wu)− d+ p)2 + 4(p− wu)(−∆λ(d+ p− 2wu) + d− p)
)
4(d− p) .
Similar to the main model in §1.3.1, a wholesale price contract is optimal if ξ >
1
λ
(
p−2 c
p
)
, where ξ = ξ(wpα(0), 0). This condition can be simplified to
wpα(0) ≤
1
2
(
p− 1
λ
(p− 2c)
)
,
where wpα(0) solves Π
p
r(w, 0) = α. The Π
p
r(w, 0) = α has two solutions:
wpα,1(0) =
µp(δ(λ− 2)λ− 1)−√p√µ(µp− δ(λ− 2)λ(4a+ (δ − 2)µp))
2δ(λ− 2)λµ ,
and
wpα,2(0) =
√
p
√
µ(µp− δ(λ− 2)λ(4a+ (δ − 2)µp)) + µp(δ(λ− 2)λ− 1)
2δ(λ− 2)λµ .
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Since
wpα,2(0) =
√
p
√
µ(µp− δ(λ− 2)λ(4a+ (δ − 2)µp)) + µp(δ(λ− 2)λ− 1)
2δ(λ− 2)λµ
≥ p(1 + ∆λ)
2 ∆λ
> p,
wpα,2(0) is not feasible. Thus, the solution is w
p
α(0). Now, Substituting w
p
α(0) into the
condition wpα(0) ≤ 12
(
p− 1λ (p− 2c)
)
, we get
p+ ∆ (p− 2 c) ≤
√
p2(1−∆λ (2−∆)) + 4 ∆λα pµ−1.
Proof of Lemma 3: We adapt the Logit model in Su (2008) under a wholesale price
contract for a model under a general contract (w, u, v). By Lemma 6, a contract (w, u, v)
can be written in the form of a new contract with two parameters, i.e., (wu, d), where
d = v − u. Under a given contract (wu, d), if the retailer orders q units, her expected
profit could be written as
Πr(q) = (p− wu)q − (p+ d)E[q −D]+
= q(p− wu)− (p+ d)((∆− 1)µ+ q)
2
4∆µ
(A.22)
The retailer’s profit in (A.22) could be written as a quadratic function of q as Πr(q) =
Aq2 +Bq + C, with coefficients A = − p−d4∆µ , B = (1+ξ∆)(p−d)2∆ , and C = −µ (1+ξ∆)
2(p−d)
4∆ ,
where ξ = p+wup−d .
When the retailer places an order according to the Logit model, the density function of
the order quantity Q is given by
e(Aq
2+Bq+C)/β∫ µ(1+∆)
µ(1−∆) e
(Az2+Bz+C)/β dz
.
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Denote the probability density function of the standard normal distribution by φ and its
cumulative distribution function by Φ. The probability density function of a truncated
Normal distribution with parameters µN and σ2N over the interval [µ(1−∆), µ(1 + ∆)]
is
fN (q) =
φ
(
q−µN
σN
)
Φ
(
µ(1+∆)−µN
σN
)
− Φ
(
µ(1−∆)−µN
σN
)
=
e−(q−µN )2/2σ2N∫ µ(1+∆)
µ(1−∆) e
−(z−µN )2/2σ2N dz
. (A.23)
Let µN = µ(1 + ξ∆) and σ2N =
2β∆µ
p−d , we obtain:
−(q − µN )2/2σ2N = −
p− d
4β∆µ
(
q − µ(1 + ξ∆))2
= − p− d
4β∆µ
(
q2 − 2µ (1 + ξ∆) q + µ2(1 + ξ∆)2)
=
Aq2 +Bq + C
β
.
The comparison of (A.22) and (A.23) suggests that the behavioral order quantities
Q follows a truncated Normal distribution with µN = µ(1 + ξ∆) and σ2N =
2β∆µ
p−(v−u) .
If we have q˜ ∼ TruncatedN (0, 2β∆µ
(p−d)(1−λ)2 ) on the interval [−µ∆(1 + ξ), µ∆(1 − ξ)],
the behavioral model in (1.1) induces the same distribution as the Logit model by Su
(2008).
Appendix B
Extra Experimental Results for
Chapter 1
Extra Experimental Results
Statistical Results of Hypothesis 1
In the between treatment analysis, we first compare LOWR treatment, HPCO and
HDVAR to BASE for contracts A, B and C. In the experiments, subjects make 30
consecutive decisions (denoted by nt ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 30}) in each treatment. In order to
evaluate the effect of time periods, we divide the 30 periods into two halves. Let the
indicator function Jt(nt) takes value zero if the time period nt ≤ 15 and takes value one
otherwise. We extend the model in Equation (1.12) by including time period effect:
log
(
pitj
pitD
)
= αtj +
4∑
k=2
Ik(t)
(
βtj + τ
t Jt(nt)
)
j ∈ {A,B,C}.
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Table B1 shows the statistical results with and without the timer period effect. It
shows that the time period effect is not significant in most of the cases. In particular,
the results inferences in Section 1.5.3 does not change when taking into account the time
period effect. The only case in which the time period effect is significant (at 95% level)
is the comparison between LOWR with BASE for contract B. In addition, although the
two segments division is the simplest way to evaluate time period effect, more granulated
divisions of the time periods do not change the results.
We next analyze the choice of different type of contracts (i.e. wholesale price vs.
buyback) by aggregating the data for individual contracts in the between treatment
analysis. Let piWS and piBB be the probability of choosing a wholesale price contract
and that of of choosing a buyback contract, respectively. We run a multiracial logistic
regression to estimates the equation
log
(
piWS
piBB
)
= αt +
4∑
k=2
Ik(t)
(
βt + τ t Jt(nt)
)
,
where the superscripts t ∈ {2(LOWR), 3(HPCO), 4(HDVAR)} indicate the treatments
compared to BASE treatment. The results of estimation is presented in Table B2. It
suggests that subjects are more likely to choose wholesale price contracts in all the
three treatments as deviated from BASE treatment. The effects are all significant with
p value at least ≤ 0.01.
Statistical Results of Hypotheses 2
Tables B3 and Table B4 show the results of statistical tests for Hypotheses 2. Let
f tj denote the proportion of the contract j ∈ {A,B,C} is chosen in the treatment
t ∈ {1(BASE), 2(LOWR), 3(HPCO), 4(HDVAR)}. Similarly, f tWS = f tA + f tC denotes
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the fraction of a wholesale price contract is chosen and f tBB = f
t
B + f
t
D the fraction of
a buyback contract is chosen in treatment t. In BASE, since a subject has the highest
expected payoff under contract D, we compare contracts A, B and C with contract
D. In all other treatments, we compare contracts A, B, and D with contract C as
a subject has the highest expected payoff under this contract in treatments LOWR,
HPCO, HDVAR.
More Statistical Results and Estimations for Section 1.6.2
In our analysis in Section 1.6.2, we consider different values of critical ration which
serves as our treatments. Here we investigate if there is any treatment effect. Formally,
we use a difference in difference regression model as follows.
λcrb = λ◦ +
∑
cr∈{.33,.25,.17}
τ crIcr +
∑
cr∈{.33,.25,.17}
γcrIcrb+ ηb+ crb (B1)
where Icr is a dummy variable set to 1 when the observation is from the treatment
group with critical ratio equal to cr. Table B5 presents the estimation results. From
Table B5, we can see that the coefficients of treatment effect are not significant and,
hence, the only significant part of regression model in (B1) is its constant term λ◦.
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Table B1: Logistic Regression Estimation for Models with and without Time Period
Effect
∗∗∗p− value < 0.001; ∗∗p− value < 0.01; ∗p− value < 0.05.
C
o
n
tr
a
c
t
Without τ t With τ t
Coef. exp(.) Coef. exp(.)
L
O
W
R
v
s.
B
A
S
E A
Intercept -2.070∗∗∗ – -2.066∗∗∗ –
Treatment 1.713∗∗∗ 5.546 1.713∗∗∗ 5.546
Time period – – 0.009 0.991
B
Intercept -1.377∗∗∗ – -1.684∗∗∗ –
Treatment 0.526∗ 1.693 0.526∗ 1.692
Time period – – 0.562∗ 1.754
C
Intercept -0.216∗ – -0.249 –
Treatment 1.021∗∗∗ 2.775 1.021∗∗∗ 2.775
Time period – – -0.069 0.933
H
P
C
O
v
s.
B
A
S
E A
Intercept -2.070∗∗∗ – -2.112∗∗∗ –
Treatment -0.117 0.890 -0.117 0.89
Time period – – 0.086 1.089
B
Intercept -1.377∗∗∗ – -1.585∗∗∗ –
Treatment -0.198∗∗∗ 0.820 -0.199 0.820
Time period – – 0.394 1.484
C
Intercept -0.216∗ – -0.265∗ –
Treatment 0.404∗∗ 1.498 0.404∗∗∗ 1.498
Time period – – 0.101 1.106
H
D
V
A
R
v
s.
B
A
S
E
A
Intercept -2.065∗∗∗ – -2.160∗∗∗ –
Treatment 2.136∗∗∗ 8.463 2.137∗∗∗ 8.478
Time period – – 0.180 1.198
B
Intercept -1.377∗∗∗ – -1.366∗∗∗ –
Treatment 1.365∗∗∗ 3.917 1.365∗∗∗ 3.916
Time period – – -0.022 0.978
C
Intercept -0.216∗ – -0.320∗ –
Treatment 1.090∗∗∗ 2.975 1.092∗∗∗ 2.981
Time period – – 0.206 1.229
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Table B2: Estimation Results for Multinomial Logistic Regression when Comparing
with Baseline Treatment for the Type of Contract
∗∗∗p− value < 0.001; ∗∗p− value < 0.01; ∗p− value < 0.05
Treatment Intercept αt βt τ t
LOWR
(t=2)
Coef. -0.236∗ (0.12) 0.999∗∗∗ (0.14) -0.083 (0.14)
Wald χ2 4.28 53.858 0.375
exp(.) – 2.716 0.92
HPCO
(t=3)
Coef. -0.291∗∗ (0.11) 0.366∗∗(0.12) 0.028 (0.12)
Wald χ2 6.768 9.172 0.055
exp(.) – 1.442 1.028
HDVAR
(t=4)
Coef. -0.382∗∗ (0.12) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.208 (0.14)
Wald χ2 10.617 38.507 2.385
exp(.) – 2.305 1.231
Table B3: P-values for Hypothesis Testing of within Treatment Analysis for BASE
χ2 Exact Sig.
H0 : f
t
WS = f
t
BB 8.542 0.004
H0 : f
t
D = f
t
A 137.755 <0.001
H0 : f
t
D = f
t
B 90.25 <0.001
H0 : f
t
D = f
t
C 4.301 0.043
Table B4: P-values for Hypothesis Testing of within Treatment Analysis for LOW,
HPCO, and HDVAR
LOWR (t = 2) HPCO (t = 3) HDVAR(t = 4)
χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig.
H0 : f
t
WS = f
t
BB 57.408 < 10
−3 1.422 0.248 50.599 < 10−3
H0 : f
t
C = f
t
A 88.424 < 10
−3 41.882 <0.001 51.955 < 10−3
H0 : f
t
C = f
t
B 135.157 < 10
−3 201.551 <0.001 51.597 < 10−3
H0 : f
t
C = f
t
D 51.955 < 10
−3 5.357 0.023 35.208 < 10−3
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Table B5: Estimation Results for Difference in Difference Regression model
coefficient t-test p-value
λ◦ 0.826 (0.040) 20.632 0.000
τ0.33 -0.168 (0.075) -2.222 0.053
τ0.25 -0.054 (0.082) -0.667 0.521
γ0.33 0.008 (0.012) 0.696 0.504
γ0.25 -0.021 (0.012) -1.729 0.118
γ0.17 -0.023 (0.012) -1.949 0.083
η 0.860 (0.110) 0.023 0.982
Table B6: Estimation Results for Multinomial Logistic Regression when Comparing
with LOWR Treatment for the Type of Contract
∗∗∗p− value < 0.001; ∗∗p− value < 0.01; ∗p− value < 0.05
Treatment Intercept αtw Treatment Effect β
t
w
SIXC
(t=5)
Coef. -0.536∗∗∗ (0.10) -0.185(0.14)
Wald χ2 28.13 1.74
exp(.) – 0.831
NOOPT
(t=6)
Coef. -1.285∗∗∗ (0.11) 1.734∗∗∗(0.15)
Wald χ2 134.56 142.98
exp(.) – 5.665
Appendix C
Sample Experimental
Instructions for Chapter 1
Experimental Instructions: HPCO Treatment
Supply Chain Contracting Game
Payment Method
You will be paid $4 of show-off fee and a performance-based reward which depends on
your performance during the experiment. The higher profit you earn, the higher your
payment would be. The experimenter will calculate your total performance-based re-
ward at the end of the session.
Experimental Procedure and Setting
The order of events in the experiment is as follows
1. You (as a supplier) choose a contract to offer to a computerized retailer.
2. Retailer places and order with you and receives his order instantaneously and pays
145
146
you based on the wholesale price specified in the contract.
3. A random number of customers visit the retailer’s store and purchase the item at
market price which is known to you.
4. The retailer only can sell to the customers up to the number of items he ordered.
If retailer has any leftover, you need to pay the retailer b for each leftover item.
Number of Customers or Demand
Demand is a random number at each period and independent of the realized demand
in the previous periods. In the experiment, the number of customers that visit the
retailer’s store can be any integer number between 100 to 300 with equal probability.
Retailer’s Decision and Profit
The retailer makes decisions to maximizes his own profit, however he is prone to mis-
takes. The retailer’s order, with 75% of chance, is such that it leads to the maximum
profit for him. However, with (100-75)% = 25% of chance, he makes an error and places
a random order which can be any integer number between 100 to 300.
Retailer purchases each item at wholesale price specified in the contract you (as
a supplier) offered to him and sells it at market price at his store. He will return the
leftover items at the end of the period for the reimbursement. According to the buyback
price specified in the contract, you pay him for returned items. for each item you sell to
the retailer your net profit is the difference between the wholesale price and production
cost. If the demand realized to be less than retailer’s orders quantity, for leftover items
you pay the retailer according to the buyback price. Your profit is going to be calculated
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as follows. Your cost of production is 10.5 per unit produced.
Your Profit = (wholesale price − cost of production) × order quantity −
buyback price × Maximum {order quantity − demand, 0}
You will be given a table similar to the one in the Figure C1 below to help you
make your decision. The first column is the contract code, the second and third are
the wholesale and buyback prices. The retailer’s order, for each contract, will be the
weighted average of the number in the fourth column and a random number between
100 and 300. For example, if you choose contract C, the retailer’s order is according to
0.75× 127 + 0.25× random number.
Numerical Examples
Let set market price to be 12 and production cost to be 10.5 in these examples. Please
get sure you can follow the calculations.
Example 1. Suppose you offered contract D, retailer’s order is 100 units, and the
demand is 114, then Your Profit = (11.25− 10.5)× 100− 0× 0 = · · · .
Example 2. Example 2. Suppose you offered contract C, retailer’s order is 137 units,
and the demand is 144, then Your Profit = (11.5−10.5)×137−8.25×0 = · · · .
Example 3. Suppose you offered contract C, retailer’s order is 210 units, and the
demand is 200, then Your Profit = (11.5− 10.5)× 210− 8.25× 10 = · · · .
Example 4. Suppose you offered contract B, retailer’s order is 184 units, and the
demand is 200, then Your Profit = (11− 10.5)× 184− 7.75× 0 = · · · .
Example 5. Suppose you offered contract B, retailer’s order is 230 units, and the
demand is 200, then Your Profit = (11− 10.5)× 230− 7.75× 30 = · · · .
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Sample Screenshots: HPCO Treatment
The experimental game is simple and consists of one choice stage and one summary of
results stage. In the first stage, subjects observe a page similar to one in Figure C1
which show the environment and parameters and ask them to choose a contract among
four possible contracts. As soon as a subject chooses a contract and confirms his/her
choice, he/she moves to the second stage in which he/she observes the realized demand
and retailer’s order as well as the subsequent reward in the current period (see Figure
C2).
Figure C1: A Screenshot from Choice Stage in the Laboratory Experiments
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Figure C2: A Screenshot from Summary Stage
Appendix D
Omitted Theoretical Proofs for
Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider the case without trading. By Equation (2.1), utility
of a consumer of type θ from choosing plans m1 and m2 are, respectively, un(L, θ) =
rL − p1 and un(H, θ) = r(θH + (1 − θ)L) − p2. Because un(H, 1) > un(L, 1) and
un(H, 0) < un(L, 0), there exists a threshold θn such that un(H, θn) = un(L, θn) and
un(H, θ) > un(L, θ) if and only if θ > θn. Moreover, since
d
dθun(H, θ) >
d
dθun(L, θ), the
threshold θn is unique. Therefore, the equilibrium is in the form of a switching strategy
characterized by the threshold θn which solves un(L, θn) = un(H, θn) or, equivalently,
θn =
ρ
r with ρ =
p 2−p 1
H−L .
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider the case with trading. By Equation (2.2), utility
of a consumer of type θ from choosing plans m1 and m2 are, respectively, ut(L, θ) =
un(L, θ) + β(r− pi)(H −L)θ and ut(H, θ) = un(H, θ) +αpi(H −L)(1− θ). By a similar
argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, since ddθut(H, θ) >
d
dθut(L, θ), ut(H, 1) >
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ut(L, 1), and ut(H, 0) < ut(L, 0), there exists a unique threshold θt such that ut(H, θ) >
ut(L, θ) if and only if θ > θt. Moreover, θt solves ut(L, θt) = ut(H, θt) and can be
expressed as
θt =
ρ− αpi
r − αpi − β(r − pi) (C1)
where ρ = p2−p1H−L , α = min
{
ψd
ψs
, 1
}
, and β = min
{
ψs
ψd
, 1
}
.
The total supply and demand on the trading market can be calculated as
ψt =
∫ 1
θt
U(q 2, θ)dG(θ) =
1
2
(1− θt)2(H − L),
and
ψd =
∫ θt
0
L(q 1, θ)dG(θ) =
1
2
θ2t (H − L).
Assume θt ≥ 12 . Since ψsψd =
(1−θt)2
θ2t
, we have α = 1 and β = (1−θt)
2
θ2t
. Plugging
back these values of α and β into (C1) and solving for θt, we get θt =
r−pi
2r−pi−ρ . Note
that θt ≥ 12 holds only if pi ≤ ρ. Thus, we have the first expression in Equation (2.10).
Assume θ < 12 . We have α =
θ2t
(1−θt)2 and β = 1. Plugging back these values of α and β
into (C1) and solving for θt, we get θt =
ρ
ρ+pi . Therefore, we have shown
θt =

r − pi
2r − (ρ+ pi) if pi ≤ ρ,
ρ
ρ+ pi
if pi > ρ.
Using θt we obtained above, we get
α =

1 if pi ≤ ρ,
ρ2
pi2
if pi > ρ,
(C2)
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and
β =

(r − ρ)2
(r − pi)2 if pi ≤ ρ,
1 if pi > ρ.
(C3)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume c = 0. Note that, since the unit service cost is
zero, service provider’s profit increases if and only if more consumers opt for the high
plan. Therefore, the threshold pih can be viewed as a special case of the threshold pip
(which we derive in Proposition 7) where c = 0. Hence, the proof follows similarly.
Proof of Proposition 7: Define ∆p =
Πt−Πn
H−L where Πn(Πt) denotes the service
provider’s profit without (with) trading1. After some algebra, ∆p can be written as
∆p(pi, c) =

(r − ρ)(2ρr(ρ− r + pi)− c(r(pi − ρ) + ρ(ρ+ pi)))
2r2(2r − ρ− pi) if pi ≤ ρ,
ρ2 (2r(ρ+ pi − r)− c(ρ+ pi))
2r2(ρ+ pi)
if pi > ρ.
Before proceeding, we verify that
d
dpi
∆p =

(ρ− c)(r − ρ)
(2r − ρ− pi)2 if pi ≤ ρ,
ρ2
(ρ+ pi)2
if pi > ρ,
and
d
dc
∆p =

−(r − ρ)(r(pi − ρ) + ρ(ρ+ pi))
2r2(2r − ρ− pi) if pi ≤ ρ,
− ρ
2
2r2
if pi > ρ.
1Scaling the profit difference by H − L does not change the sign of Πt −Πn.
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Based on value of the service cost c, consider the following three mutually exclusive
cases.
1. Case I: Assume c ≤ 2r
(
1− rρ
)
.
(a) Assume pi ≤ ρ. Then ddpi∆p > 0 and, because ∆p(0, c) ≤ 0 and ∆p(ρ, c) ≥ 0,
there exists a threshold pip such that ∆p ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≥ pip. To obtain
pip, we solve ∆p = 0 which gives us pip =
ρ(2r−c)(r−ρ)
ρ(2r−c)−rc .
(b) Assume pi > ρ. Then, ddpi∆p > 0,
d
dc∆p < 0, and ∆p(ρ, 2r(1 − r/ρ)) = 0
which implies ∆p ≥ 0.
2. Case II: Assume 2r
(
1− rρ
)
< c ≤ 2rρr+ρ .
(a) If pi ≤ ρ, ddpi∆p < 0 and maxpi ∆p(pi, c) = ∆p(0, c) = −ρ(2r−c)(r−ρ)
2
2r2(2r−ρ) < 0.
Therefore, ∆p < 0.
(b) If pi > ρ, ddpi∆p > 0. Therefore, since ∆p(ρ, c) ≤ 0 and ∆p(r, c) ≥ 0, there
exists a threshold pip such that ∆p ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≥ pip. To obtain pip,
we solve ∆p = 0 which gives us pip =
2r2
2r−c − ρ.
3. Case III: Assume c > 2rρr+ρ .
(a) If pi ≤ ρ, using a similar argument as in Case II part (b), we have ∆p < 0.
(b) If pi > ρ, since ddpi∆p > 0 and maxpi ∆p(pi, c) = ∆p(r, c) =
ρ2(2ρr−c(ρ+r))
2r2(ρ+r)
< 0,
we have ∆p < 0.
To summarize, we showed that when c > 2rρr+ρ , regardless of the value of pi, we have
∆p < 0. When c ≤ 2rρr+ρ , ∆p ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≥ pip. Moreover, pip = 2r
2
2r−c − ρ if pi > ρ
and pip =
ρ(2r−c)(r−ρ)
ρ(2r−c)−rc if pi ≤ ρ.
154
Proof of Proposition 8: Define the difference in consumer utility with and without
trading (scaled by H − L) as ∆u(θ) = ut−unH−L . Let ρ = p2−p1H−L and consider the following
three cases.
1. Consider high type consumers, i.e. θ > max{θt, θn}. The utility difference ∆u(θ)
captures the extra utility that consumers earn due to trading which is equal to
αpi(1− θ). Plugging back α from (C2), we get ρ2pi (1− θ).
2. Consider switchers, i.e. min{θt, θn} < θ ≤ max{θt, θn}. The utility difference
∆u(θ) captures the extra surplus due to both trading and plan adjustment. Two
cases are possible.
(a) Assume θt ≤ θn. The utility difference is αpi(1 − θ) + rθ − (p2 − p1) which,
using (C2), can be simplified to (1− θ)ρ2pi + rθ − ρ.
(b) Assume θt > θn. The utility difference is β(r − pi)θ − rθ + (p2 − p1) which,
using (C3), can be simplified to ρ− θ
(
r − (r−ρ)2r−pi
)
.
3. Consider low type consumers, i.e. θ ≤ min{θt, θn}. The utility difference ∆u(θ)
captures the extra utility that consumers earn due to trading which is equal to
β(r − pi)θ. Plugging back β from (C3), we get (r−ρ)2r−pi θ.
Next, we show that θn = arg maxθ ∆u(θ). Assume θt = min{θt, θn} and observe that,
from derivations above, ∆u(θ) can be written as
∆u(θ) =

ρ2
pi (1− θ) if θ ≥ θn,(
r − ρ2pi
)
θ + ρ
2
pi − ρ if θt ≤ θ < θn,
(r−ρ)2
r−pi θ if θ < θt.
It is straight forward to show that ∆u(θ) is increasing in θ for θ < θn and decreasing
in θ for θ ≥ θn. Therefore, the consumer that benefits the most is of type θ = θn. The
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proof follows similarly for the case of θn = min{θt, θn}.
Proof of Proposition 9: Recall that Si = (r − c)Pi with i ∈ {n, t}. Define ∆s(pi) =
St(pi)−Sn
(r−c)(H−L) =
Pt(pi)−Pn
H−L . Consider the following two cases.
Case I. Assume pi ≤ ρ. We have ∆p = (pi−ρ)r
2+(ρ+pi)ρ2
2r2(ρ+pi)
. Since ∆p(0) = −12
(
1− ρ2
r2
)
<
0, ∆p(ρ) =
1
2
(ρ
r
)2
> 0, and ddpi∆p(pi) = ρ
(
ρ
ρ+pi
)2
> 0, there exists a unique threshold
pis such that Pt(pi) ≥ Pn if and only if pi ≥ pis and pis solves Pt(pis) = Pn.
Case II. Assume pi > ρ. We have ∆p =
ρ2
2r2
> 0 implying Pt(pi) > Pn.
Proof of Theorem 3: We follow three steps to complete this proof. We first solve
for the optimal prices for the case without trading following by the case with trading.
Then, we show that pn2 < p
t
2.
Step 1: Optimal prices without trading. From Theorem 1, we have θn =
ρ
r
with ρ = p2−p1H−L which implies p2 = (H − L)ρ+ p1. The full market coverage constraint
implies un(L, 0) = rL − p1 ≥ 0. At the optimal solution, this constraint binds. To see
why, assume by contradiction that it does not bind, i.e. rL − p1 > 0. Increase p1 and
p2 by a small amount  > 0. This increases the service provider’s profit by  without
violating the constraint. Therefore, the constraint rL− p1 > 0 binds and p1n = rL. We
can now write p2 as a function of ρ only, i.e. p2 = rL+ (H − L)ρ.
Denote the service provider’s revenue without trading by Rn which can be calculated
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as
Rn = p1θn + p2(1− θn)
= p2 − (p2 − p1)θn
= p2 − ρ
2
r
(H − L)
= rL+
(
ρ− ρ
2
r
)
(H − L).
Total consumption without trading, denote by Pn, can be calculated as
Pn = θnL+
∫ 1
θn
{L+ θ(H − L)} dθ
= L+
H − L
2
(1− θ2n)
= L+
H − L
2
(
1− ρ
2
r2
)
.
The service provider’s profit without trading is Πn = Rn − c Pn. Plugging back the
values of Rn and Pn obtained above, we get
Πn = (r − c)L+ (H − L)
(
−
(
1
r
− c
2r2
)
ρ2 + ρ− c
2
)
.
Since d
2
dρ2
Πn = −2
(
1
r − c2r2
)
< 0, the optimal ρ can be obtained by solving the first
order condition which gives us
ρ∗n =
r2
2r − c . (C4)
Therefore, pn2 = rL + (H − L)ρ∗n = rL + (H − L) r
2
2r−c . Finally, for our future use, the
equilibrium threshold with the optimal prices is θn =
r
2r−c .
Step 2: Optimal prices with trading. Similar to step 1, the participation
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constraint binds and p1t = r L. The service provider’s revenue with trading is
Rt = p1 + (p2 − p1)(1− θt)
= rL+ (p2 − rL)(1− θt)
= rL+ (H − L) ρ (1− θt)
and the total consumption with trading (denoted by Pt) is
Pt =
H + L
2
−max
{
H − L
2
(2 θt − 1), 0
}
.
If θt ≥ 12 , or equivalently when pi ≤ pi, we have Pt = H+L2 − (ψd − ψs). If θt < 12 ,
or equivalently when pi > ρ, demands are fully satisfied and Pt =
H+L
2 . Putting these
together, total consumption can be written as
Pt =

H + L
2
− H − L
2
(2θt − 1) if pi ≤ ρ,
H + L
2
if pi > ρ.
(C5)
Subtracting service costs from revenue, and after some algebra, the service provider’s
profit with trading is
Πt =

(rL− cH) + (H − L)
(−ρ2 + rρ+ c(r − pi)
2r − (ρ+ pi)
)
if pi ≤ ρ,(
rL− c H + L
2
)
+ (H − L) ρ pi
ρ+ pi
if pi > ρ.
(C6)
If pi ≤ ρ, since d2
dρ2
Πt = −2(H−L)(r−pi)(2r−pi−c)2 < 0, the service provider’s profit is concave with
respect to ρ and there exists a unique optimal maximizer of Πt which can be obtained
by solving the first order condition. If pi > ρ, since ddρΠt = −pi (H−L)(ρ+pi)2 < 0, the service
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provider’s revenue increases in ρ and ρ∗ = pi. This gives us
ρ∗t =

2r − pi −
√
(2r − pi − c)(r − pi) if pi ≤ 1
3
(2r + c),
pi if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
(C7)
Given ρ∗t above, ps2 = (H−L)ρ∗t +Lr. For our future reference, we calculate θt under
the optimal prices as follows:
θt =

√
r − pi
2r − pi − c if pi ≤
1
3
(2r + c),
1
2
if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
(C8)
Step 3: Proving pn2 < p
t
2. In order to prove p
n
2 < p
t
2, it is sufficient to show ρ
∗
n < ρ
∗
t .
After some algebra, we have
ρ∗t − ρ∗n =

2r − pi −
√
(2r − pi − c)(r − pi)− r
2
2r − c if pi ≤
1
3
(2r + c),
r2 − c2
6r − 3c if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
(C9)
The following two steps complete the proof.
1. Assume pi ≤ 13 (2r + c). In this case, since ddpi [ρ∗t − ρ∗n] < 0, the minimum value of
ρ∗t − ρ∗n is attained at pi = 13 (c + 2r). The value of ρ∗t − ρ∗n at this point is equal
to 3(3r−c)(r−c)2r−c which is positive, hence ρ
∗
t > ρ
∗
n for pi ≤ 13 (2r + c).
2. Assume pi > 13 (2r + c). Since r > c, we have ρ
∗
t > ρ
∗
n.
Proof of Proposition 10: Part 1: Aggregate consumer surplus. When prices
are set optimally, denote aggregate consumer surplus without trading by U∗n. It can be
159
calculated as
U∗n = r L+
r
2
(
1−
(
ρ∗n
r
)2)
(H − L)− rL−
(
ρ∗n − r
(
ρ∗n
r
)2)
(H − L)
=
(
r
2
(
1 +
(
ρ∗n
r
)2)
− ρ∗n
)
(H − L)
=
r
2
(
r − c
2 r − c
)2
(H − L).
When prices are set optimally, denote aggregate consumer surplus with trading by
U∗t . Also define ∆∗c =
U∗t −U∗n
H−L . Now, consider two cases as follows.
Case I: Assume pi ≤ 13(2r + c). In this case, aggregate consumer surplus with
trading is
Ut(pi) = (r − c)
(
H − (H − L)
√
r − pi
2r − pi − c
)
−(
(r − c)L+ (H − L)
(
−2
√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi) + 3r − 2pi − c
))
= (H − L)
(
2
(√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi)− r
)
− (r − c)
√
r − pi
2r − c− pi + 2pi
)
,
and
∆∗c(pi) =
1
2
(
2
(
2
(√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi)− r
)
(C10)
−(r − c)
√
r − pi
2r − c− pi + 2pi
)
− r(r − c)
2
(2r − c)2
)
.
The function ∆∗c satisfies the following three properties.
1. ddpi∆
∗
c > 0. Let H(c) =
d
dpi∆
∗
c . Function H(c) attains its minimum at c = r. Because
H(r) = 0, we have H(c) < 0.
2. ∆∗c(0) ≤ 0. The first order condition ddc∆∗c(0) has two real solutions, c1 = (2−
3
√
22)r
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and c2 = r. Moreover,
d2
dc2
∆∗c(0)|c=(2− 3√22)r =
3(2− 3√2)
8r > 0 and
d2
dc2
∆∗c(0)|c=r =
−1r . Therefore, ∆∗c(0) attains its maximum at c = r. Since ∆∗c(r) = 0, we have
∆∗c(0) ≤ 0.
3. ∆∗c(
1
3(2r + c)) > 0. After some algebra, we have ∆
∗
c(
1
3(2r+c)) =
(r−c)(r2+c2−rc)
3(2r−c)2 > 0.
These three properties together imply that there is a unique threshold pi∗c1 such that
∆∗c(pi) ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≥ pi∗c1. Moreover, since −d∆
∗
c/dpi
d∆∗c/ dc
> 0, pi∗c1 increases in c.
Case II: Assume pi > 13(2r + c) and observe that
U∗t (pi) =
H + L
2
(r − c)−
((
rL− H + L
2
c
)
+
pi
2
(H − L)
)
=
H − L
2
(r − pi),
and
∆∗c(pi) =
1
2
(r − pi)−
(
r
2
(
r − c
2r − c
)2)
=
1
2
(
r − pi − r(r − c)
2
(2r − c)2
)
.
Since d∆
∗
c
dpi = −H−L2 < 0, ∆∗c(r) < 0, and ∆∗c(13(2r + c)) > 0, there exists a threshold
pi∗c2 = {pi | ∆∗c(pi) = 0} such that ∆∗c(pi) ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≤ pi∗c2. Moreover, since we
have −d∆∗c/dpid∆∗c/ dc =
2r2(r−c)
(2r−c)2 > 0, the threshold pi
∗
c2 increases in c.
Part 2: Individual consumer surplus When prices are set optimally and with-
out trading, consumer’s utility is
u∗n(θ) =

0 if θ ≤ r2r−c ,
(θ − r2r−c) r (H − L) if θ > r2r−c .
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When prices are set optimally and with trading, consumer’s utility is
u∗t (θ, pi) =

θβ(r − pi) (H − L) if θ ≤ θt,
rθ (H − L) + αpi (1− θ) (H − L) + r L− pt2 if θ > θt,
where pt2 is according to (2.23). Define ∆
∗
u(θ, pi) =
u∗t (θ,pi)−u∗n(θ)
H−L and consider the follow-
ing two cases.
Case I. If pi ≤ 13(c + 2r), we have θt =
√
1−pi/r
2−pi/r , α = 1, and β =
(r−ρ)2
(r−pi)2 =(
r−pi−
√
(2r−pi−c)(r−pi)
)2
(r−pi)2 . After some algebra, one can show that
u∗t (θ, pi) =

(
r−pi−
√
(2r−pi−c)(r−pi)
)2
(r−pi)2 θ (H − L) if θ ≤
√
1−pi/r
2−pi/r ,(√
(r − pi)(2r − pi − c)− (2− θ)(r − pi)
)
(H − L) if θ >
√
1−pi/r
2−pi/r .
Noting that θt =
√
r−pi
2r−pi−c >
r
2r−c when pi ≤ 13(c+ 2r), we have
∆∗u(θ, pi) =

(
r−pi−
√
(2r−pi−c)(r−pi)
)2
(r−pi)2 θ if θ <
r
2r−c ,
r2
2r−c −
(
r −
(
1−
√
r−c
r−pi
)2)
θ if r2r−c ≤ θ <
√
r−pi
2r−pi−c ,√
(2r − pi − c)(r − pi) + r22r−c − 2(r − pi)− piθ if θ ≥
√
r−pi
2r−pi−c .
(C11)
The function ∆∗u increases in θ when θ <
r
2r−c = θt and decreases when θ >
r
2r−c = θt.
Therefore, a consumer of type θ = θt benefits the most from trading. In addition, there
exists some θ` >
r
2r−c such that a consumer of type θ < θ` benefits from trading and
consumers with type θ > θ` are worse off.
Case II. Assume pi > 13(2r + c). It follows that θt =
1
2 and β = 1. Therefore, we
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have u∗t (θ, pi) = θβ(r − pi). In this case, we have
∆∗u(θ, pi) =

(r − pi) θ if θ ≤ r2r−c ,(
r2
2r−c − piθ
)
if θ > r2r−c .
The function ∆∗u increases in θ when θ ≤ θt = r2r−c and decreases when θ > r2r−c .
Therefore, the consumer of type θt benefits the most from trading. Finally, all consumers
of type θ > r
2
pi(2r−c) are worse off and all other consumers are better off by trading.
To sum up, a consumer of type θn benefits the most from trading. In addition, there
exist a threshold θ` such that a consumer of type θ benefits from trading if and only if
θ < θ`.
Proof of Proposition 11: Part 1: Service provider’s profit. When prices are
optimal, the service provider’s profit without trading (denoted by Π∗n) and with trading
(denoted by Π∗t ) are, respectively,
Π∗n = (r − c)L+
(
(r − c)2
2r − c
)
H − L
2
, (C12)
and
Π∗t (pi) =

(r − c)L+
(
3r − 2
√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi)
− 2pi − c
)
(H − L) if pi ≤ 1
3
(c+ 2r),
(r − c)L+ (pi − c)H − L
2
if pi >
1
3
(c+ 2r).
(C13)
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Define ∆∗p(pi) =
Π∗t (pi)−Π∗n
H−L . After some algebra, ∆
∗
p can be written as
∆∗p(pi) =

3r − (2pi + c+ 2√(r − pi)(2r − c− pi) )− (r − c)2
2(2r − c) if pi ≤
1
3
(c+ 2r),
1
2
(
pi − c− (r − c)
2
2r − c
)
if pi >
1
3
(c+ 2r).
The following steps show that there exists a unique threshold pi∗p such that ∆∗p(pi) ≥ 0
if and only if pi ≥ pi∗p.
1. ∆∗p is increasing in pi because, if pi ≤ 13(c+ 2r), we have ddpi∆∗p = 3r−c−2pi√(r−pi)(2r−pi−c) −
2 > 0 and, if pi > 13(c+ 2r), we have
d
dpi∆
∗
p =
1
2 > 0.
2. At pi = 13(2r + c), we have ∆
∗
p(
1
3(2r + c)) =
1
2
(
r2−c2
6r−3c
)
> 0.
3. At pi = 0, we have ∆∗p(0) =
(r−c)2
2(2r−c) + 3r −
(
c+ 2
√
r(2r − c)
)
< (3 − 2√2)r −
(r−c)2
2(2r−c) < 0.
Part 2: Social welfare. Social welfare (with optimal prices) is given by S∗i = (r −
c)P ∗i with i ∈ {t, s}. Define ∆∗s(pi) = 2(S
∗
t (pi)−S∗n)
(r−c)(H−L) where S
∗
t (S
∗
n) denotes social welfare
with(without) trading when prices are set optimally. ∆∗s(pi) can be simplified to
∆∗s(pi) =

1 +
(
r
2r − c
)2
− 2
√
r − pi
2r − pi − c if pi ≤
1
3
(2r + c),(
r
2r − c
)2
if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
(C14)
If pi ≤ 13(2r + c), observe that ddpi∆∗s > 0, ∆∗s(0) < 0, and ∆∗s(13(2r + c) > 0. If
pi > 13(2r+ c), we have ∆
∗
s =
(
r
2r−c
)2
> 0. These together imply that there is a unique
threshold pi∗s such that ∆∗s(pi) ≥ 0 if and only if pi ≥ pi∗s .
Part 3: Order of thresholds. Thresholds pi∗p and pi∗s can be calculated as pi∗p =
7r2−c2−2rc
16r−8c and pi
∗
s =
(c−2r)(c3−3c2r−cr2+7r3)
(c−3r)(3c2−12cr+13r2) . It is now straightforward to show that
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d
dcpi
∗
p > 0 and
d
dcpi
∗
s > 0. Next, observe that
pi∗p − pi∗s =
(r − c)2 (49r3 − 67cr2 + 31c2r − 5c3)
8(3r − c)(2r − c) (13r2 − 12cr + 3c2)
(equal in sigh) =
49r3 − 67cr2 + 31c2r − 5c3
13r2 − 12cr + 3c2
> 0
where the last inequality holds because minc{13r2 − 12cr + 3c2} = 4r2 > 0 and
minc{49r3 − 67cr2 + 31c2r − 5c3} = 8r3 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 12: The market clearings price pim should equalize supply and
demand on trading market, i.e. ψs = ψd. This holds when α = β = 1 or, equivalently,
pim =
1
3(2r + c).
In order to show that the market clearing price pim leads to win-win, we need to
show that pi∗p ≤ pim ≤ pi∗c2. First, note that pim−pi∗p = (11r−5c)(c+r)24(2r−c) . Since c ≤ r, we have
pim > pi
∗
p. Next note that, since pi
∗
c2 =
r2(3r−2c)
(2r−v)2 , we have pi
∗
c2 − pim = (r−c)(r
2−cr+c2)
3(2r−c)2 > 0
which implies pim ≤ pi∗c2. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13: First, we show that ∆∗p (as defined in part 1 of Proposition
10) is decreasing in c. It follows that
d
dc
∆∗p =

−1
2
(
1 +
(3r − c)(r − c)
(2r − c)2
)
if pi ≤ 1
3
(2r + c),
−1 + r − pi√
(r − pi)(2r − pi − c) −
(3r − c)(r − c)
2(2r − c)2 if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
(C15)
It is easy to verify that for both cases ddc∆
∗
p < 0.
Second, we show that ∆∗p(pim) is concave in c; first increasing and then decreasing.
165
The profit difference ∆∗p(pim) can be simplified to ∆∗p(pim) =
1
6
(
r2−c2
2r−c
)
. Hence, we
have ddc∆
∗
p =
(r−c)2−2cr
(2r−c)2 and
d2
dc2
∆∗p = − 6 r
2
(2r−c)3 . The second equation verifies the con-
cavity and solving the first order condition leads to cm = (2−
√
3)r which maximizes ∆∗p.
Proof of Theorem 14: Without trading and when there is a single plan, the service
provider solves
maxq◦,p◦
{
p◦−c Pn◦ s.t. r θmin{H, q◦}+r (1−θ) min{L, q◦}−p◦ ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]
}
(C16)
where Pn◦ denotes total consumption without trading. Since the left hand side of the
constraint in (C16) is monotone increasing in θ, it is sufficient to consider the constraint
for θ = 0, i.e. r min{L, q◦} ≥ p◦. Because the objective function in (C16) is monotone
increasing in p◦, the constraint r min{L, q◦} ≥ p◦ binds. Moreover, for any q◦ > L, the
objective function decreases in q◦. Hence, we only need to consider q◦ ≤ L and solve
max q◦≤L(r−c)q◦ which gives us mn◦ = (L, rL) as the optimal contract without trading.
Now consider the case with trading. The total supply and demand on trading market
is given by
ψs =
∫ 1
0
U(q◦, θ) dG(θ) =
1
2
(H − q◦)
and
ψd =
∫ 1
0
L(q◦, θ) dG(θ) =
1
2
(q◦ − L).
Therefore, ψdψs =
H−q◦
q◦−L and we have
α =

1 if q◦ ≤ H + L
2
,
H − q◦
q◦ − L if q◦ >
H + L
2
,
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and
β =

q◦ − L
H − q◦ if q◦ ≤
H + L
2
,
1 if q◦ >
H + L
2
.
Given α and β above, we can calculate total consumption (denoted by P t◦). If q◦ >
H+L
2 ,
total consumption reaches its maximum value H+L2 and, if q◦ ≤ H+L2 , trading market
reallocates unused capacities and aggregate consumption is equal to the total allowances
sold. Denotes aggregate consumption with trading by P t◦ and observe that
P t◦ =

q◦ if q◦ ≤ H + L
2
,
H + L
2
if q◦ >
H + L
2
.
Consider the case with trading. Since participation constraint is monotone in types,
the service provider’s problem can be written as
max q◦,p◦
{
p◦ − c P t◦ s.t. r L− p◦ + αpi (q◦ − L) ≥ 0
}
. (C17)
Since ddp◦ [rL− p◦+αpi (q◦−L)] < 0 and ddq◦ [rL− p◦+αpi (q◦−L)] > 0, the constraint
in (C17) binds and we have p◦ = r L + αpi (q◦ − L). Then we can write the objective
function in (C17) as
Πt◦ =

(pi − c)q◦ + (r − pi)L if q◦ ≤ H + L
2
,
−pi q◦ + r L+ piH − c H + L
2
if q◦ >
H + L
2
.
We now consider two cases.
Case I. Assume pi ≤ c. Because ddq◦Πt◦ < 0 for all q◦, the the optimal contract is
mt◦ = (L, rL).
Case II. Assume pi > c. Because ddq◦Π
t◦ < 0 for all q◦ ≥ H+L2 and ddq◦Πt◦ > 0 for all
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Table C1: Summary of notations for Proposition 19
Performance metric # of contracts
Value added
by trading
Service provider’s profit
one ∆p1 = Π
t◦ −Πn◦
two ∆p2 = Πt −Πn
Social welfare
one ∆s1 = S
t◦ − Sn◦
two ∆s2 = St − Sn
q◦ < H+L2 , the optimal quantity is q
t◦ =
H+L
2 and p
t◦ = r L+αpi (q◦−L) = r L+pi H−L2 .
Before proceeding, in Table C1, we summarize the notations that we use. The
superscript “p” refers to the service provider’s profit; the superscript “s” refers to social
welfare; subscript “1” represents the case with single contract; and the subscript “2”
represents the case with two contracts we study in Section 2.6.
Proposition 19 (Number of Contracts & Value of Trading) The following
statements hold.
1. ∆p2 > ∆
p
1, if and only if (c, pi) ∈ {(c, pi) s.t. pi < c and pi ≥ pi∗p},
2. ∆s2 > ∆
s
1, if and only if (c, pi) ∈ {(c, pi) s.t. pi < c and pi ≥ pi∗s},
where pi∗p and pi∗s , are defined in Proposition 11.
Proof of Proposition 19: Service provider’s profit. When there is one contract
the service provider’s profit difference with and without trading is
∆p1(pi) =

0 if pi ≤ c,
H − L
2
(pi − c) if pi > c.
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When there are two contracts, we already calculated the service provider’s profit differ-
ence which we denote by ∆p2(pi) here. After scaling by
H−L
2 , we can write the difference
of differences in the service provider’s profit as
∆p1(pi)−∆p2(pi)
(H − L)/2 =

4
√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi)−
4(r − pi)− (3r − c)(r − c)
2r − c if pi ≤ c,
4
√
(r − pi)(2r − c− pi)−
r
(
r
c− 2r + 6
)
+ 5pi if c < pi ≤ 1
3
(2r + c),
(r − c)2
(2r − c) if pi >
1
3
(2r + c).
As the above equation suggests, we consider the following three cases.
Case I: Assume pi ≤ c. Trading does not add an extra value for the service provider
when there is only one contract, i.e. ∆p1 = 0. When there are two contracts,
∆p2 > 0 if and only if pi > pi
s
1. Hence, ∆
p
1 > ∆
p
2 if and only if pi < pi
s
1.
Case II: Assume c < pi ≤ 13(2r+c). Since ddc [∆p1(pi)−∆p2(pi)] < 0, ddpi [∆p1(pi)−∆p2(pi)] <
0, and at point (c, pi) = (r, r) we have ∆p1 −∆p2 = 0, it follows that ∆p1 > ∆p2 for
all c and pi satisfying c ≤ pi < 13(2r + c).
Case III: Assume pi > 13(2r + c). Since 2r − c > 0, we always have ∆p1 > ∆p2.
This completes the proof for the service provider’s profit.
Social Welfare. After scaling by (r−c)(H−L)2 , we can write the difference of differences
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in social welfare as
∆s1(pi)−∆s2(pi)
(r−c)(H−L)
2
=

2
√
r − pi
2r − pi − c −
(
r
2r − c
)2
− 1 if pi ≤ c,
2
√
r − pi
2r − pi − c −
(
r
2r − c
)2
if c < pi ≤ 1
3
(2r − c),
1−
(
r
2r − c
)2
if pi >
1
3
(2r − c).
We consider three cases separately.
Case I: pi ≤ c. Since the optimal contract with or without trading is (L, rL), ∆s1(pi) =
0. Hence, ∆s1 > ∆
s
2 if and only pi < pi
s
2.
Case II: c < pi ≤ 13(2r + c). Since ddc [∆s1(pi)−∆s2(pi)] < 0, it attains its minimum value√
2− 1
(2−c)2 > 0 at pi = c. Hence, ∆
s
1 > ∆
s
2.
Case III: pi > 13(2r + c). Since
r
2r−c increases in c, we have
r
2r−c ≤ 12 . This implies
1−
(
r
2r−c
)2 ≥ 34 . Hence, ∆s1 > ∆s2.
Proof of Proposition 15: Equilibrium without trading. For a consumer of type
θ, define ∆n(θ) = un(q2, θ)− un(q1, θ) which can be calculated as
∆n(θ) = un(q2, θ)− un(q1, θ)
=
(
r
∫ q2
0
xfθ(x) dx+ rq2
∫ ∞
q2
xfθ(x) dx− p2
)
−
(
r
∫ q1
0
xfθ(x) dx+ rq1
∫ ∞
q1
xfθ(x) dx− p1
)
= r
∫ q2
q1
F¯θ(x) dx− (p2 − p1).
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Now consider two types θ1 and θ2 such that θ1 < θ2 and observe that
∆n(θ2)−∆n(θ1) = r
∫ q2
q1
(
F¯θ2(x)− F¯θ1(x)
)
dx > 0,
where the inequality holds by Assumption 1. Therefore, ∆n(θ) is continuous and increas-
ing in θ. Assumption 3 and the monotonicity of ∆n(θ) together imply that ∆n(0) < 0
and ∆n(1) > 0. Therefore, there exists a unique θn ∈ (0, 1) which solves ∆n(θn) = 0
and a consumer of type θ opts for the high plan if and only if θ ≥ θn. The threshold θn
is the solution to ∆un(θ) = r
∫ q2
q1
F¯θ(x) dx− (p2 − p1) = 0 or, equivalently,
∫ q2
q1
F¯θ(x) dx =
p2 − p1
r
. (C18)
Equilibrium with trading. The utility of a consumer of type θ from opting for
the high plan is
ut(q2, θ) = r
∫ q2
0
xfθ(x) dx+ rq2
∫ ∞
q2
xfθ(x) dx
+ αps
∫ q2
0
(q2 − x)fθ(x) dx+ β(r − pi)
∫ ∞
q2
(x− q2)fθ(x) dx− p2
= r
∫ q2
0
F¯θ(x) dx+ αpi
∫ q2
0
Fθ(x) dx+
β(r − pi)
[∫ ∞
0
xfθ(x) dx−
∫ q2
0
F¯θ(x) dx
]
= [r − αpi − β(r − pi)]
∫ q2
0
F¯θ(x) dx+ αpiq2 + β0(r − pi)
∫ ∞
0
xfθ(x) dx
and, similarly, the utility of a consumer of type θ from opting for the low plan is
ut(q1, θ) = [r − αpi − β0(r − pi)]
∫ q1
0
F¯θ(x) dx+ αpiq1 + β(r − pi)
∫ ∞
0
xfθ(x) dx.
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Define ∆ut(θ) = ut(q2, θ)− ut(q1, θ) and observe that
∆ut(θ) =
(
r − α0pi − β0(r − pi)
) ∫ q2
q1
F¯θ(x)dx+ α0pi(q2 − q1)− (p2 − p1).
Next, we show that ∆ut(θ) increases in θ. Consider two types θ1 and θ2 such that
θ1 < θ2 and observe that
∆ut(θ1)−∆ut(θ2) =
(
r − αpi − β(r − pi)
)∫ q2
q1
(
F¯θ1(x)− F¯θ2(x)
)
dx
=
(
(1− β)(r − pi) + (1− α)pi
)∫ q2
q1
(
F¯θ1(x)− F¯θ2(x)
)
dx.
Since α ≤ 1 and β ≤ 1, (1−β)(r−pi)+(1−α)pi > 0 and ∆ut(θ) increases in θ. Because
∆ut(0) < 0 and ∆ut(1) > 0, there exists a threshold θt such that a consumer of type θ
selects the high plan if and only if θ ≥ θt where θt solves
∫ q 2
q 1
F¯θt(x) dx =
p 2 − p 1 − αpi(q 2 − q 1)
r − αpi − β(r − pi) . (C19)
Changes in prices. First consider the threshold θn which is the solution to (C18).
Taking derivative with respect to p1 and p2, respectively, gives us
d θn
d p1
= − 1
r
∫ q 2
q 1
∂F¯θ(x)
∂θ dx
< 0
and
d θn
d p2
=
1
r
∫ q 2
q 1
∂F¯θ(x)
∂θ dx
> 0.
The inequalities hold because, by Assumption 1, we have ∂F¯θ(x)∂θ dx > 0.
Define L(θt) =
∫ q 2
q 1
F¯θt(x) dx and verify that the following properties of L(θt).
I ) q2 − q1 > L(θt) because q2 − q1 =
∫ q 2
q 1
dx >
∫ q 2
q 1
F¯θt(x) dx.
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II ) ∂L(θt)∂θt ≥ 0 because, by assumption 1, F¯θ(x) increases in θt.
III ) ∂α∂θt ≥ 0 and
∂β
∂θt
≤ 0 because ψs (ψd) decreases (increases) in θt.
IV ) r − αpi − β(r − pi) ≥ 0 because minα,β{r − αpi − β(r − pi)} = r > 0.
Now we can rewrite the equilibrium condition in (C19) as
(
r − αpi − β(r − pi)
)
L(θt) =
p 2 − p 1 − αpi (q 2 − q 1). Taking derivative with respect to p1, p2, and pi, respectively,
gives us
∂θt
∂ pi
=
− (βL(θt) + α(q2 − q1 − L(θt)))
(r − αpi − β(r − pi))∂L(θs)∂θt + pi(q2 − q1 − l(θt)) ∂α∂θt − (r − pi)L(θt)
∂β
∂θt
< 0,
∂θt
∂ p2
=
1
(r − αpi − β(r − pi))∂L(θs)∂θt + pi)(q2 − q1 − L(θt)) ∂α∂θt − (r − pi)L(θt)
∂β
∂θt
< 0,
and
∂θt
∂ p1
= − αpi
(r − αpi)− β(r − pi))∂L(θ)∂θt + pi(q2 − q1 − L(θs)) ∂α∂θt − (r − pi)L(θt)
∂β
∂θt
> 0.
The first inequality holds because the nominator is negative (by I) and the denominator
is positive (by II-IV). Similarly, the last two inequalities hold by properties II-IV.
Proof of Proposition 15: We first establish an intermediate result. We show that
there exists a threshold ρ such that α < 1 and β = 1 if pi > ρ and α = 1 and β ≤ 1 if
pi ≤ ρ. The following steps prove this claim.
1. ddqO(q, θ) = Fθ(q) > 0 and ddqL(q, θ) = −(1 − Fθ(q)) < 0, therefore O(q 1, θ) <
O(q 2, θ) and L(q 2, θ) < L(q 1, θ) for some q1 and q2 such that q1 < q2.
2. The above step, together with the fact that θt decreases in pi, imply that ψs
increases in pi and ψd decreases in pi.
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3. The above step implies that ψsψd increases in pi. Hence, α(β) decreases(increases)
in pi and there is a threshold ρ such that α = 1 and β ≤ 1 if and only if pi ≤ ρ.
We now continue with the proof of Proposition 15.
Portion choosing high plan. Define the right hand sides of (2.29) and (2.30) as
Hn =
p 2−p 1
r and Ht(pi) =
p 2−p 1−αpi (q 2−q 1)
r−αpi−β(r−pi) , respectively. Moreover, Ht(pi) is continuous
and increasing in pi. Because the left hand sides of (2.30) and (2.29) are identical,
θt(pi) ≤ θn if and only if Ht(pi) ≤ Hn. Next, we show that there exists a unique
threshold pih such that Ht(pi) ≤ Hn if and only if pi ≥ pih.
Observe that Ht(0) =
p2−p1
(1−β)r >
p2−p1
r = Hn and Ht(r) =
p2−p1−αr(q2−q1)
(1−α)r =
p2−p1
r −
α(q2−q1)
1−α
(
r− p2−p1
q2−q1
)
r <
p2−p1
r = Hn. Hence, there exists a threshold pih such that θt(pi) ≤ θn
if and only if pi ≥ pih and pih solves Ht(pih) = Hn. The uniqueness is due to monotonicity
of Ht(pi) with respect to pi.
Social Welfare. We consider the following two cases separately.
Case I: Assume pi ≤ ρ which implies α = 1 and β < 1. The proof relies on two
facts: (1) St(pi) increases in pi (because θt(pi) decreases in pi) and (2) St(ρ) > St
(as argued in Case I). If St(0) ≥ Sn, social welfare is always higher and pih = 0.
If St(0) < Sn, there exists a threshold pis (which solves St(pis) = Sn) such that
St(pi) ≥ Sn holds if and only if pi ≥ pis.
Case II: Assume pi > ρ which implies α < 1 and β = 1. Define ∆s(pi) = St(pi)−Sn =
(r − c)(Pt(pi)− Pn) and simplify it to
∆s(pi) = (r − c)
∫ θn
0
L(q1, θ)dG(θ) + (r − c)
∫ 1
θn
L(q2, θ)dG(θ) > 0.
Therefore, for any pi > ρ, we have St(pi) > Sn.
Service Provider. We first show that Πt increases in pi. Assume pi > ρ. since θt
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decreases in pi and p1 < p2, Πt = p1 θt + p2 (1− θt)− cP¯ increases in pi. Assume pi ≤ ρ
and observe that
Πt = p1 θt + p2 (1− θt)−
c
(∫ θt
0
L(q1, θ) dθ −
∫ 1
θt
L(q2, θ) dθ +
∫ θt
0
O(q1, θ) dθ +
∫ 1
θt
O(q2, θ) dθ
)
.
Consider pi1 and pi2 such that pi1 < pi2 and define ω = θt(pi1)− θt(pi2). Observe that
Πt(pi2)−Πt(pi1) = (p2 − p1)ω +
= c
∫ θt(pi1)
θt(pi1)−ω
(
O(q2, θ)−O(q1, θ)−
(L(q2, θ)− L(q1, θ)))dθ.
Since O(q2, θ) > O(q1, θ) and L(q2, θ) < L(q1, θ), we have Πt(pi2) > Πt(pi1). Therefore,
Πt increases in pi. Moreover, it is easy to verify that Πt decreases in c.
Next, we establish the existence of threshold pip. Define ∆p(pi, c) = Πt(pi, c)−Πn(c)
and notice that, because Πt increases in pi, ∆p increases in pi as well. Assume ∆p(r, r) > 0
(otherwise we have c¯ = r) and define c¯ = {c | ∆p(r, c) = 0}. Consider the following two
cases.
Case I: Assume c ≤ c¯ which implies ∆p(r, c) ≥ 0. Since ∆p decreases in c, we have
∆p(0, c) < ∆p(0, 0) = −(p2 − p1)(θt(0)− θn) ≤ 0. Hence, there exists a threshold
pip such that Πt(pi, c) ≥ Πn(c) if and only if pi ≥ pip.
Case II: Assume c > c¯. Because ∆p is increasing in pi, we have ∆p(pi, c) < ∆p(r, c) <
0. Therefore, Πt(pi, c) < Πn(c).
This completes the proof.
Appendix E
Omitted Theoretical Proofs for
Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 16. Set φ = 0 and follow the steps in the proof of Proposition
17. The results follow.
Proof of Proposition 17. Assume the expected return of the project is µ and its
known to both the insider and the outsider. In this case, the insider solves the following
problem.
maxx≥0 φ
(
(1− α)µ− F + x+ xt(x, µ)
)
+ (1− φ)
(
x
x+ xt(x, µ)
αµ− x
)
,(C1)
s.t. x+ xt(x, µ) ≥ F, (C2)
xt solves (3.4) (C3)
Since we assume F ≤ αµ and the constraint (C2) is already included in the outsider’s
problem in (3.4), it is sufficient to use backward induction by first characterizing the
outsider’s best response and then plugging back its best response into (C2).
Upon her arrival, the outsider observes xi and invests xt which solves (3.4). It is easy
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to verify that the objective function in (3.4) is concave and the unconstrained problem
has a unique solution, i.e. x∗t (xi) =
√
αµxi − xi. If x∗t (xi) + xi < F then the outsider
invests F − xi which is just enough investment such that the entrepreneur has enough
capital to execute the project. Putting these together the outsider’s best response is as
follows.
xt(xi) =

F − xi, if xi ≤ F 2αµ
√
αµxi − xi, if F 2αµ < xi ≤ αµ
0. if xi > αµ
(C4)
If αµ is small, the best response function xt(xi) is monotone decreasing in xi. However,
if αµ is sufficiently high then the function is not monotone. It decreases for xi ≤ F 2αµ and
then it is concave for xi >
F 2
αµ with increasing slope at xi =
F 2
αµ . Plugging back xt(xi)
from (C4) into the insider’s utility we have
ui(xi, xt(xi, µ), µ) =

φ(1− α)µ+ (1− φ)xi
(αµ
F − 1
)
, if xi ≤ F 2αµ
φ((1− α)µ− F )− xi(1− φ) +√αµxi, if F 2αµ < xi ≤ αµ
(1− φ) (αµ− xi) + φ
(
(1− α)µ− F + xi
)
. if xi > αµ
(C5)
We exclude the case of xi > αµ since it implies that the investors gives free money to
the entrepreneur which is even larger than his project’s value. First, assume xi ≤ F 2αµ
and observe that ∂∂xiui(xi, xt, µ) = (1− φ)
(αµ
F − 1
)
> 0. Next, assume xi >
F 2
αµ . Since
∂2
∂x2i
ui(xi, xt, µ) = − 14xi
√
αµ
xi
< 0, the utility function is concave with ∂∂xiui(xi, xt, µ) =
−(1 − φ) + 12
√
αµ
xi
and lim
xi↓F2αµ
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, xt, µ) = −(1 − φ) + αµ2F . Therefore, if −(1 −
φ) + αµ2F < 0, then the insider’s optimal investment is x
FI
i =
F 2
αµ . On the other hand, if
−(1−φ)+ αµ2F ≥ 0, the insider’s optimal investment is an interior solution xFIi = αµ4(1−φ)2 .
The condition for always having an interior solution is αµ
4(1−φ)2 ≥ F
2
αµ which can be
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simplified to αµF ≥ 2(1− φ). Putting everything together, the insider’s full information
investment is
xFIi (µ) =

αµ
4(1−φ)2 , if
αµ
F ≥ 2(1− φ),
F 2
αµ , otherwise.
(C6)
This completes the proof.
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 5, we establish an intermediate result
in the next lemma.
Lemma 8 For a fixed investment level x, define the utility difference between being
truthful and imitating the other type by ∆uθ(x) = ui(x, µθ, µθ) − ui(x, µθ, µ−θ), θ ∈
{h, `}. Then, ∆u` ≥ 0 if and only if
√
µ`
µh
≥ φ1−φ and ∆uh < 0 for all φ ∈ [0, 0.5].
Proof of Lemma 8. Consider first ∆uh. After some algebra, we can write as
∆uh(x) =
(√
µ` µh − (1− φ)µh − φµ`
)√αx
µ`
.
It is straight forward to show that ∆uh < 0 if and only if
√
µ`
µh
< 1−φφ holds. Since
µ` < µh and φ ≤ 0, we always have ∆uh < 0. In a similar way, we can show that
∆u`(x) =
(√
µ` µh − (1− φ)µ` − φµh
)√αx
µh
is positive if and only if
√
µ`
µh
≥ φ1−φ or φ ≥ Φ` with Φ` = ρ1−ρ .
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a separating equilibrium 〈xSPh , xSP` , µ˜〉. Consider
the type θ and denote the other type by −θ. To sustain the separating equilibrium,
the type θ should not deviate to an off-equilibrium path investment x˜. Therefore, we
have the condition ui(x
SP
θ , µθ, µθ) ≥ ui(x˜, µθ, µ˜). Since this should holds for all possible
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x˜ 6= xSP , we have ui(xSPθ , µh, µh) ≥ maxz ui(z, µθ, µ˜). This condition is captured by the
set Nh(µ˜).
Also, the repeating investment by type −θ should not be such that the type θ
deviates to that, hence xSPθ /∈ Mθ =
{
x | ui(x, µθ, µ−θ) ≤ ui(xSPθ , µθ, µθ)
}
. These
two conditions ensure us that there does not exists an off-equilibrium path investment
x˜ such that type θ ∈ {h, `} wants to deviate to that investment from her equilibrium
investment xSPθ . This implies that conditions (1) and (2) in the Definition 2 are not
restricting the off-equilibrium path beliefs and the intuitive criterion does not impose a
restriction on the off-equilibrium path beliefs.
Proof of Theorem 5. Based on the results in Lemma 8, we consider two cases
separately. In the first case we assume
√
µ`
µh
≥ φ1−φ and show that there exists a
separating equilibrium and specify it. In the second case, we assume
√
µ`
µh
< φ1−φ and
show there does not exists a separating equilibrium.
Case 1. Assume
√
µ`
µh
≥ φ1−φ . We show that there exists a separating equilibrium
such that xSPh = x
FI
h , x
SP
` = x
SP
` , β˜ = 1 and it satisfies the initiative criterion as defined
in Definition 2.
First consider the high type insider. By Lemma 4, the high type’s investment in
the equilibrium needs to satisfy xSPh ∈ Nh(1)∩M`. Since in the conjectured separating
equilibrium the off-equilibrium path beliefs are set to be high, we have Nh(1) = {xFIh }.
Next, consider the setM` =
{
x | ui(x, µ`, µh) ≤ maxz ui(z, µ`, µ`)
}
. Assumption
√
µ`
µh
≥
φ
1−φ implies ui(x, µ`, µh) ≤ ui(z, µ`, µ`) for any x ∈ R+ which implies M` = R+. By
Lemma 4, we should have xSPh ∈ {xFIh } ∩ R+ = {xFIh }.
Consider now the low type insider. To characterize a low type insider’s investment
in the equilibrium, we need to specify sets N` and Mh. First consider the set N` and
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define
∆` h(x) = ui(x, µ`, µ`)−maxz ui(z, µ`, µh)
= φ((1− α)µ` − F )− x(1− φ) +√αµ` x
− 1
4
(
φ(αµhφ− 4F (1− φ))
(1− φ) +
αµ2` (1− φ)
µh
+ 2(2− α)µ`φ
)
=
√
αµ`x− x(1− φ)− 1
4
(
αµ2` (1− φ)
µh
+
αµhφ
2
1− φ + 2αµ`φ
)
.
Note that N` is non-empty (because ui(x, µ`, µ`) > ui(x, µ`, µh) for x ∈ R+) and the
function ∆` h is concave (because
d2
dx2
∆` h = −2(1− φ) < 0). Therefore, the set N` is a
well-defined convex set which can be written as [n1h, n
2
h] where
n1h =
√
α(−µh)(µh − µ`) (µhφ2 − µ`(φ− 1)2)− µh√αµ`
2µh(φ− 1)
and
n2h =
−√α(−(µ` − µh)) (µ`(φ− 1)2 − µhφ2)−√αµ`µh
2
√
µh(φ− 1)
are obtained by solving ∆` h(x) = 0.
Using a similar argument, we can write Mh = [m1h,m2h] with
m1h =
−√αµ`φ+
√
α(µ` − µh) (µ`φ2 − µh(φ− 1)2) +
√
αµhφ+
√
α(−µh)
2
√
µ`(φ− 1)
and
m2h = −
√
(µ` − µh) (µ`φ2 − µh(φ− 1)2) + µ`φ+ µh(−φ) + µh
2(φ− 1)
√
µ`
α
.
Next we show that N`(µh) ∩Mh = [m1h, n2h] and nonempty, i.e. m1h ≤ n2h. To show
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this observe that
n2h −m1h =
(µh − µ`)(µ`(−φ) + µ` + µhφ)√
µh(µh − µ`) (µ`(φ− 1)2 − µhφ2)
(C7)
+
− (µ`−µh)(µ`φ+µh(−φ)+µh)√
(µh−µ`)(µh(φ−1)2−µ`φ2)
+ µ` − µh
√
µ`
.
The first term is trivially positive. We show that the second term is positive if and only
if
− (µ` − µh)(µ`φ+ µh(−φ) + µh)√
(µh − µ`) (µh(φ− 1)2 − µ`φ2)
+ µ` − µh > 0
(iff)⇐⇒ ((µh − µ`)(µ`φ+ µh(1− φ)))2
− (µh − µ`)2(µh − µ`)
(
µh(1− φ)2 − µ`φ2
)
> 0
(iff)⇐⇒ µ`µh(µh − µ`)2 > 0
This completes the proof.
Case 2. Assume
√
µ`
µh
< φ1−φ and recall that, by Lemma 8, we have ∆u` < 0 and
∆uh < 0. Under this assumption, we show that there is no off-equilibrium path beliefs
β˜ which can be supported as a separating equilibrium. By contradiction, assume that
〈xSPh , xSP` , β˜〉 is a separating equilibrium. When off-equilibrium beliefs are β˜, define
the deviation set for the high type by Dh(µ˜) =
{
x | ui(x, µh, µ˜) ≥ maxz ui(z, µh, µh)
}
.
Using a similar argument as in Case 1, we can show that the set Dh(µ`) is a convex set
and can be written as Dh = [d1h, d2h]. For any investment x ∈ Dh the h−type insider
deviates from her separating equilibrium because ui(x
SP
h , µh, µh) ≤ maxz ui(z, µh, µh).
Hence, to sustain a separating equilibrium, we should ensure that xSP` /∈ Dh(µ`) and,
for any x ∈ Dh(µ`), β(x) > 0.
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Since ui(x, µ`, µ`) is concave in x and x
SP
` /∈ [d1h, d2h], the separating investment level
which gives the highest utility to the `-type insider is either xSP` = d
1
h or x
SP
` = d
2
h. We
show that neither xSP` = d
1
h nor x
SP
` = d
2
h can be supported as an equilibrium leading
to a contradiction. Assume xSP` = d
1
h. Since by assumption
√
µ`
µh
< φ1−φ we have
ui(x, µ`, µ`) < ui(x, µ`, µ) for µ > µ`, we can always find a small positive number  such
that ui(d
1
h, µ`, µ`) < ui(d
1
h + , µ`, µ) which implies that x = d
1
h cannot be supported as
a separating equilibrium. The proof follows similarly for the case of xSP` = d
2
h.
